Francisco

[In order to discus this issue we must first prove that free will exists. So far everyone is dancing around this basic question.]
I'd say the opposite is true, as the assumption that prevails, and that all our actions are based on, is that free will does exist. So to answer the initial question, we would need to attempt to prove first that it doesn't exist, and that our feeling that we are making choices freely is itself an illusion, and that it was either predetermined or an inevitable result of evolution that we should feel that way.

"Predetermined" doesn't require a purpose behind all of this, but doesn't rule it out either. The best argument against free will has always been that physical laws of nature make the chain of cause and effect lead to inevitable results, and that one of those effects IS the illusion that decision making processes operate freely rather than that they are simply part of chemical reactive process which calls itself "life."

Present day science suggests there is a randomness involved in the cause and effects process that might allow for a reasonable belief in free will after all. So while that doesn't prove the "free will" concept is valid, it tends to weaken the argument that it isn't. So it doesn't look like we can prove that free will doesn't exist, but that still doesn't give us a way to prove the opposite either.

In fact, we would almost need to have a voice from God (which some claim they have heard) to prove with any certainty that we have free will. Of course many of us would then argue with that voice that if he (God) is real, and knows all things, then he is omnipotent, and must be lying about the free will scenario.

[Just what the hell if free will? An action that is free from influence of another being. It is a social concept. A linguistic term to describe a social situation.]
I'm afraid you need to look up the definition of free will again. It doesn't merely apply to social situations - it applies to choices made by any living creature that attempts to decide, instinctively or consciously, how to react in any given situation.

asaris

As you probably know mantus, I dispute your first premise. It assumes that only events can cause other events, but I maintain that agents can also cause events.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Mantus

Francisco,

I'll support your idea that we much first disprove free will simply because both your and my question will lead the same outcome.

As I stated, randome events do not give us free will at all. Infact to me, random events and chaos seem less capable of spawning free will. After all, a random or chaotic action has no meaning nor purpose. So while they are certainly free, there is no will behind them.

Indeed I do know the defenition of free will. I am simply stating that the term must have evolved from a very basic idea into what it has become today. While the application of the term expanded it's meaning was never elaborated. Thus we are using a rather base term in very complex arguments.


asairis,

Of course asairis, but an agent causing an uncaused event would make that event meaningless. You proposition grants us freedom, but we would lack will.

asaris

If an agent is causing an event, it's not an uncaused event. The phrase "an agent causing an uncaused event" is self-contradictory on its face.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Francisco

Here's the basic question, boys: After we have been led to the water, whose "will" makes us drink?

Francisco

Something The Ref posted earlier on this thread sticks with me as one reason people are talking at cross-purposes here:

[The problem here is Too Much Logic. Logic works well on a 2-term basis -- yes/no, on/off, black/white, open/closed. This is the basis of most Western thought. We like to think of ourselves of Logical (and Reasonable) individuals. But what if there were a third term in Logic? Yes/No/Maybe? On/Off/Partial? Black/White/Grey? This would up-end most of our discussion, lead to the possibility of Free Will, and punch a large hole in science as we know it.]

There actually is the "third term" in logic being used in Western thought, and rather than punching a large hole in known science, it was/is the foundation of modern science. It's referred to as inductive or (more recently) as abductive logic. The yes/no logic referred to is deductive logic.

What I see in this discussion is one person arguing from one form and others arguing from the other forms, and often the same person using all forms at once to "prove" that some gut feeling they have is in fact logical.

What form did I just use? God only knows.

Mantus

asaris,

Truth be told I have no idea what this agent is. I asume you mean consciousness or something along those lines.

asaris

No, by agent I mean me. Or you. The idea is that *I* cause my free actions, whatever I might be.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Francisco

Is being your own agent anything like being your own eye-witness?

1010011010

Quantum probability breaks determinism. It doesn't break causality in a historic sense, but it does make all systems essentially chaotic over long enough timescales (Note: chaotic and random are not synonyms).

Causality has been traditionally recognized as not sufficient to preclude free will. I suppose one could argue that it's turtles all the way down and the decision making of agents is, ultimately, a mechanical/chemical/physical process... but then we have to get into the whole observer phenomenon, which gets kind of messy when the oberver IS the thing being observed.

Also, the focus on the mechanical aspect overlooks that the question is not so much about what does happen as what could happen. Though Alice always chooses vanilla and Bob always chooses chocolate with 100% predictablity, this does not prevent them from choosing differently the next time they're in the ice cream shop. They won't choose differently, but that's a fundamentally different statement from saying they can't choose differently.

__________________
Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

[Quantum probability breaks determinism. It doesn't break causality in a historic sense, but it does make all systems essentially chaotic over long enough timescales (Note: chaotic and random are not synonyms).]

From Computer Desktop Encyclopedia: chaos = The science that deals with the underlying order of the seemingly random nature of the universe.

No, chaotic and random are not synonyms, but use of one doesn't preclude the use of the other in making a generalization.

[Also, the focus on the mechanical aspect overlooks that the question is not so much about what does happen as what could happen. ]

To nitpick in return, the question was definitely about what does happen as opposed not only to what could happen but what should happen. Predictability and predeterminability are not synonyms either. They can be used in the same sentence, but not interchangeably.

Otherwise the main point made that "Quantum probability breaks determinism" is dead on target.

1010011010

Well, the original question was whether we have free will or an omniscience being. I haven't see where anyone has explicitly explained that one doesn't preclude the other.

__________________
Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

I think Asaris has taken that position, although I don't buy his argument. As to what you have said, I think we may disagree on the definition of omniscience as it applies to a divine being.

The definition you may be using is: God can know in advance what I will do, even though free will in the fullest sense of the phrase does exist. God somehow has a "middle knowledge" - that is, knowledge of how free agents will act in any given circumstances.

However the definition that most of the discussion of free will has revolved around is that, simply put, God knows everything that will be.

And in your original post, you referred to determinism, which has been defined as:
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.

So if you are in fact not referring to determinism in the same vein as omniscience, then you have added something valuable to this discussion.

That said, I don't think the alternate definition of omniscience is persuasive, as it's not how most religions would define the fundamental nature of their deity.

Mantus

Are you not the sum of various causes?

1010011010

First off, I'm not using omniscience as it applies to a divine being... because "divine being" implies other characteristics (e.g. omnipotence) that merely serve to confuse the issue. The being in question is omniscient. It knows everything. Simultaneously and atemporally. Past, Present, Future. This knowledge has no impact on our free will. This omniscient being may know than Bob won't choose vanilla ice cream, but that is not the same as saying Bob can't choose vanilla.

We can talk about omnipotent beings, omnicient and omnipotent beings that just watch, omnicient and omnipotent beings that meddle, omnicient and omnipotent universe creating beings, etc. and how each combination of traits would impact actual freedom of will (in all cases we would still appear to have free will), but we need to keep each case seperate.

I think is one of those cases where the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts.

__________________
Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

This thread actually started with the following caveat: "This discussion is not about the Christian god or Jesus, but about every religion with a supreme, omniscient being."

And you, yourself, wrote: "Well, the original question was whether we have free will or an omniscience being."

So to now say, "I'm not using omniscience as it applies to a divine being" is to be a bit disingenuous.

Then you say: "The being in question is omniscient. It knows everything. Simultaneously and atemporally. Past, Present, Future. This knowledge has no impact on our free will. This omniscient being may know than Bob won't choose vanilla ice cream, but that is not the same as saying Bob can't choose vanilla.?"

Actually that's exactly the same as saying Bob can't choose vanilla. The only way to be sure he won't is to know that he can't, because the choices have already been made in advance. Who made them is another question, but in your scenario, it certainly was not Bob.

Mantus

Are you sure this is true?

Suppose one is put in a situation to make a choice. Based on one's experience there can only be one outcome. Otherwise you won't be using cognitive judgement. If the choice is random or unpredictable then it looses it's meaning. Then you are not making a choice but playing a lottery in your head.

Francisco

On the assumption that one has free will, which seems probable (regardless of whether you believe in a supreme being), the freedom relates to the fact it is you that will be making the choice, rather than some force that set things in motion long before your time. Based on your experience, there may be only one outcome (for the sake of argument), but the situation determines that outcome, and you have determined, and thus chosen, by recognizing the particular circumstances involved, what part of your experience to draw from in making the decison as to how to proceed.

When we talk of randomness (or of chaos if you will), it has to do with a different part of the debate, which is whether or not natural law, or the process of cause and effect, allows for other than an inevitable chain of events from whatever we envision as the beginning of our time. Randomness argues against inevitability and puts us in a position where we can be a bit more confident that the ability to make choices in life is ours rather than some unknown force of nature.

Thus if the situation referred to initially did not necessarily come about through predetermination, the choice we made in reacting to it was not necessarily predetermined either.

But if you believe in God, then you have to also consider the possibility that your particular God may have made the choice in advance, and randomness and chaos are perhaps figments of a physicist's imagination. And then you may be back to square one in this debate - and I use the term debate advisedly.

1010011010

I read that as an attempt to prevent this from devolving into a discussion of "Well, the Bible says...", not to try to further detail the attributes of the omniscient being.

Does Alice's knowledge that Bob will choose chocolate restrict Bob's choices? It doesn't.

You find yourself in a Catch-22 as far as the "The only way to be sure he won't is to know that he can't..." assertion goes.
If we treat omniscience as a scaled up version of Alice's knowledge, then Bob still has free will.
If we treat omniscience as a fundamentaly different type of knowledge, it becomes unclear that the "if won't then can't" reasoning applies. Bob's ability to choose vanilla doesn't violate the infalliabilty of omniscience because, though he can choose vanilla, he won't. How do we know he won't? Because we're omniscient.... not because he can't.

This is that confusing the issue problem I talked about before. The "force that set things into motion" and the omniscient being are not necessarily the same. So the fact that an omnicient being knows what you will choose is unrelated to what you can choose.

To affect free will the being has to exert some influence over the decision. Merely knowing the outcome has no impact on the decision, since the being plays no role and does not participate in the decision in any way.

If we're talking about creator gods, then everything subsequent to the creator's choice to make this particular universe at the exclusion of all others renders all apparent choices in the universe subordinate to that first choice. BUT, we're not explicitly talking about creaor gods.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

Of course they are related.

A probability assessment scaled up is still a probability assessment. Again you are varying your definitions of omniscience to fit your arguments. And sometimes vice versa.

Tp paraphrase Descarte: I won't, therefore I can't. OR: I can't, therefore I won't.

Your post is replete with non sequiturs. We are at an impasse as far as one of us being able to see the other's point(s). Much less agree with them.

Francisco

Debate: A formal contest of argumentation in which two opposing teams defend and attack a given proposition.
As I surmised earlier, this has become a debate rather than a discussion. (Some say a debate is what happens when a tango goes bad.) I've never seen a debate where one side conceded any major points, or where concession was other than a strategy for winning over the judges.
Certainly the participants cannot be relied on to judge each other. And we did not agree in advance to accept any judgements we didn't otherwise agree with.

But I must nevertheless end my presentation with the following summation: There is no conceivable way that the convoluted arguments of my opponent could have been fashioned in advance except by some chaotic roll of the dice, or even by a roomful of monkeys with typewriters. If that doesn't demonstrate free will exists, and omniscience only in myth, I'm a monkey's uncle. (But I could be a monkey's cousin, of course.)

1010011010

Since you have thus far resisted any inclination to provide or clarify your own definition of omniscience for the sake of this discussion, I've been keeping things open and providing various interpretations (E.G scaled up version of common knowledge or a mystical/atemporal knowledge) and then going on to demonstrate (or attempt, anyway, I'm sorry if it confused you.) that in any case free will is not precluded by omniscience alone.

To not craft your argument to fit the definitions (or to craft an argument in the absence of definitions) is an exercise in meaninglessness (or mental masturbation). There can be no understanding if we do not explain what we mean by the words we use.

FYI:
[ QUOTE=$username ] $quoted_text [ /QUOTE ]
Remove the spaces around the square brackets.

Based on this and your subsequent post, I take it you're bowing out of the discussion? Up until you lapsed into bald assertions, appeals to popularity, and ad hominem it was actually interesting. If you ever wish to resume presenting substance for your stance, feel free.

__________________
Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

Actually my previous posts will show I've always been using pretty much the same definition you claimed you were using, except for the part that "it has no impact on our free will," which is the basis for a long running dispute between theists and non-theistic philosophers, and the very basis for this whole thread. And thus clearly a bald assertion on your part (and not a caveat usually added by non-theists)..

As to such bald assertions and ad hominum arguments (assuming they are always sins), I would propose that the guilt should be shared equally between us.

As to bowing out, I've been interested in a discussion but not a debate - and I've already said why and commented on what I see as the difference.

And at the risk of seeming to use a further ad hominum argument, I offer the following not as a certainty but as opinion and as explanation of my own position:

I am admittedly an agnostic and have come to terms with living with uncertainty.
But I also feel that makes me more flexible in my ability to learn new things, as one can seldom learn without changing some aspect of our previous opinions and assumptions.

My feeling is that in this particular area, you are much less flexible. What comes through in your posts is that you are one of those persons with faith in a supreme being who have the continuing dilemma of trying to reconcile the proposition that this deity knows what we will do in advance, with him nevertheless advising us what we should and should not do, and with the belief that he will admonish or otherwise punish us for doing what he has ordained that we should not do, on the infinitesimal chance that we will not do what the deity knows we will do, because, as you propose, we theoretically could avoid doing it, and know we could avoid it, even though, paradoxically, we will inevitably do what the deity already knows we will do in spite of his instructions to the contrary (the futility of which he doesn't seem to see as a mitigating factor).

Does that about cover it?

Now perhaps you will counter that my agnosticism is as dogmatic a stance as is your faith. And I will not agree. And you will not change, and I must admit I will resist any such change in my mindset as well.

So the probabilty that we are at an impasse here seems high, and I gave up arguing about religion long ago (or so I thought). I'm sure there are many things you know that I don't, and many things you have learned that I could learn from you in turn. But instruction in religious dogma is not going to be included in that category.

asaris

The central question in free will is not, as you maintain, whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise. The central question is whether our actions are up to us -- this is why randomness is incompatible with free will. The question of whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise comes up because it seems like, if an action is up to us, we could have done otherwise. But this definition itself has its problems. In any case, I think it's easier to see how omniscience, which does not entail any influence on our actions, fails to conflict at all with free will. (Whereas Omnipotence might, but probably doesn't, and Providence gets really tricky).

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Francisco

You have made a distinction which is essentially without a difference. And certainly either "definition" has its problems. And to counter your bald statement with my own, omniscience, a priori, conflicts with the exercise of free will, as well as any theory that we have free will even if we don't exercise it.

And "randomness" would be incompatible with omniscience, but if you use the term as it relates to the chaos theory, which is how I and others have used it, it certainly is compatible with free will, and a prerequsite.

But as you once pointed out, all of this has pretty much been discussed before. (And why dance around the term omnipotence, as if it were not the real elephant in the room?)

In any case, I think we, too, are at the point where we need to agree to disagree.

1010011010

I'd describe myself as agnostic and atheist. Nobody knows if gods exist and I don't believe any do.
This whole conversation is purely a hypothetical enterprise for the purposes of edification and entertainment as far as I'm concerned.

To go on a bit, this free will v. omniscience question is not a moral one, because at no point is the omniscient being described as anything other than omniscient. It is not judgemental, merely all-knowing. It's all very straight forward: If an omniscient being exists, can we have free will?

I say yes, and I've tried to illustrate it several times with the "Bob can chose vanilla, but he won't." type examples. Thus far your response has been "No, he can't." Not a whole lot to work with in that response.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

Well, I did suspect you were playing a game, so it seems I have smoked you out (but game theory would dictate you have yet other layers of deception in wait). And now you say, "It's all very straight forward: If an omniscient being exists, can we have free will?" But the following illustrates you have never been straightforward in posing such a question, which was NOT the initial question, and given your record of dodging about, this is likely another aspect of your deceptive strategy.
And your attempt to illustrate whatever you thought you were illustrating by your Bob and his Vanilla gambit has fallen flat and would have been more appropriate as a lesson in your favorite Sunday School. One thing is clear through your smoke and fog screen: Agnostic or not, you still yearn for that childhood comfort zone that offered something magical to believe in, and you are still tormented by self-doubt.

Obviously I had much more to say than "no he can't," but as it turned out, all you ever really said was, "yes, he can," so there wasn't a whole hell of a lot to work with there either.

And of course this free will v. omniscience question IS a moral one. The "debate" has always been about man's freedom to make moral choices. It's never been a debate between different aspects of agnosticism, now has it, Bob?

Look up the etymology of the term omniscience, what don't you? It's always been entwined with finding, knowing and promulgating a universal set of moral laws.
I say this not for your benefit, but for that of those who might otherwise be taking you seriously.
Incidentally, one aspect of the art of deception is to acquire enough skill so that you don't get caught at it. You're not there yet.
____________________
Envision a faux Socrates, hoist on his own petard!

Zyr

Quick distraction:
Saying something is a possible outcome to a given situation is to say that were you to go through the situation an infinite number of times, at some point that thing would occur. To use previous metaphors, if Bob could choose chololate, then at some point, bob would. If Bob choses vanilla 100% of the time then he never will, and thus cannot. Will not is the same as can not.

Why do you make the choices you do? You make them based on previous experiences. If you are asked to choose vanilla or chocolate, there will be a reason. Maybe you hate chocolate. Maybe you hate chocolate, but are willing to try it for some reason. The point is, you will have a reason. If you hate chocolate, there will be a reason for that too, maybe it brings back traumatic memories of your childhood. But there will be a reason you childhood memories are so traumatic.

Free will is an illusion, God or not.

__________________
"Oh, irony! Oh, no, no, we don't get that here. See, uh, people ski topless here while smoking dope, so irony's not really a high priority. We haven't had any irony here since about, uh, '83 when I was the only practitioner of it, and I stopped because I was tired of being stared at."

Omnia mutantu, nos et mutamur in illis.
All things change, and we change with them.
- Neil Gaiman, Marvel 1602

Francisco

Well, I agree that, in effect, "Will not is the same as can not." And I think I understand why you believe free will is an illusion. Quite possibly it is. Certainly our choices are not completely free. There seems to be no way to be sure, however, or to rule out the possibility that it's not all an illusion.

Zyr

If you can not ever do anything but what is already predicted, then you do not have free will.

Can not being equal to will not, if you will not ever do anything but what is already prediceted, then you do not have free will.

And given the same conditions for any situation, the same person will do the same thing, not matter how many times it you run through it, i.e. he will not do anything different.

__________________
"Oh, irony! Oh, no, no, we don't get that here. See, uh, people ski topless here while smoking dope, so irony's not really a high priority. We haven't had any irony here since about, uh, '83 when I was the only practitioner of it, and I stopped because I was tired of being stared at."

Omnia mutantu, nos et mutamur in illis.
All things change, and we change with them.
- Neil Gaiman, Marvel 1602

1010011010

The main argument being made for free will as an illusion hinges on the assumption that free will would necessarily violate the infalliability of omniscience.

The flaw in that reasoning is that free will only requires that you can choose an option, not that you actually will choose the option... while violating the infalliability of omniscience requires that you actually do choose the option. There is no internal inconsistency in saying that an agent can choose something (and thus has free will) but the agent won't choose it (and thus maintaining the infalliability of omniscience).

Oddly enough, I, too, would agree that, in effect, "will not" and "can not" are not significantly different. Operationally they're the same. Just as, from our perspective, fatalism would be indistinguishable from free will!

The only way for the discussion to proceed is to set up a hypothetical situation and see how free will plays out in a given scenario. To point out that one scenario would be operationally equivalent to another scenario (i.e. "in effect") is to utterly miss the point.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

The problem with that "proof" is that we are almost never faced with exactly the same situation twice, so at some point we will have to do something we haven't done before. So was that newer reaction our choice or does the situation always dictate our actions and reactions? Is not the need to examine the possible consequences of alternate responses to a new situation, and make a decision, an act of free will, or are our responses always going to be dictated by the particular situation, regardless? And even when faced with the same situation twice, if we have learned new ways of dealing with problems in the interim, will the different reaction the second time around still not have been an act of free will (all other things being equal, no omniscient or omnipitant being involved, etc.)?
And if we don't have free will, should we even try to learn new ways to react to new situations? And is the attempt to answer to that question an exercise in free will in itself?
Ridiculous. A belief in fatalism inevitably leads to a different outcome than belief in free will, especially from our perspective.

1010011010

What does belief in fatalism or belief in free will have to do with my comment? You may benefit greatly from re-reading the post to which you are replying to verify that key words and tricky phrases that appear in your reply are relevant... as opposed to being some fabrication of your own misunderstanding. Here... I'll incorporate your comment about beliefs into my previous comment, and use easy to understand sentences.

Someone who believes in fatalism will act the same whether they have free will or not... because they have no way of distinguishing if they have free will or not from their perspective.
Someone who believes in free will will act the same whether they have free will or not... because they have no way of distinguishing if they have free will or not from their perspective.
Someone who believes in fatalism will probably act differently than someone who believes in free will... but this tells us nothing about whether or not free will exists.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

asaris

To the contrary, I think we can pretty clearly make a distinction. Consider two men in a locked room. Neither can leave. One man wants to be there, the other does not. Do we really want to say that there's no difference between these two men?

Just as another comment, I think the idea that we might have "completely" free will is generally a red herring. Next to no one really thinks our will is completely free, that is, completely unfettered as to its choice between two alternatives. We always make choices within a situation, and while some people want to say that this situation doesn't determine our choice, almost no one wants to say that it doesn't affect our choice.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

1010011010

Will there be any way to tell which is which without special knowledge?
If not, then, in effect there is no difference between them.

As for the point you're trying to make, Francisco has shown some trouble grasping the concept. You may have better luck, since I don't believe he suspects you of being a cryptotheist with sneaky ulterior motives.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

To 1010011010: It's a bit weird to be patronized by an idiot. But that's one way you spot an idiot, I suppose. What happened to the key word: "operationally"? Are you using alternating definitions again?

To Asaris: There's a difference between the two men, but no difference in their situation when it comes to leaving the room. Neither can. Neither will. That's why I added the caveat, "in effect."

And you could be right about the "red herring." There have been some very fishy statements made recently. The argument that you have no free will because you obviously have limited choices is a non sequitur worthy of our faux Socrates. It doesn't do much to prove we have any degree of free will either. It's just a bad example of an argument period.

asaris

Well, I think that's exactly the difference. It might be true that 'in effect' there is no distinction, but I'm not sure that that's relevant. You've noticed, I'm sure, that there's a difference between how we treat free will as a matter of law and how we treat it as a matter of morality. That's because free will is not exactly an observable phenomenon -- an act can look free, but not actually be free, and vice versa. What we're concerned with in this thread is whether or not an act is actually free. So we're allowed to presuppose special knowledge that we would not, practically speaking, ever have.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

1010011010

Yes, it is. Substandard reading comprehension is a pretty good one, too. The key word was "belief" actually, and it did not appear in the post to which you replied with an argument about beliefs. The key word did not appear because the post to which you replied was not about beliefs. Thus my suggestion you actually read the posts to which you reply. Allow me to urge you again to read and comprehend what another poster is actually saying prior to making a reply in the way of argument.
I'm sorry if I didn't realize you couldn't follow several seperate-but-related arguments simultaneously without becoming confused. I could explain again what was going on earlier in the thread using smaller words and simpler sentences if you think it would help you understand this time around.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions

Francisco

To Asaris: We've admittedly strayed from the initial question, which was essentially a theoretical one, and which, it appears, can only be answered by expressing an opinion, as there seems to be no way to put known or established "facts" together with a known or established logical system that will convincingly resolve the issue one way or the other. So on to addressing your latest contention, by expressing oponion only.

I'm not sure there's a difference that bears on the initial question. Both "matters" serve the same purpose, often come from the same source, apply to the same behaviors, often have the same penalties. The enforcers involved may be different and there has never been any agreement as to a universally just or equitable set of these laws, civil, criminal or moral. But all, as far as I'm aware, rest on the assumption that there is some degree of free will, and that we all have some degree of control over our actions, and therefor bear responsibilty, even if in varying degrees, for the consequences of our actions, which all of these laws in some way attempt to quantify and codify in the name of justice, fairness, just plain good versus evil, or in the name of your preferred diety.

So I'm not sure what you're getting at, except that if the difference is that morality comes from a diety and "laws" come from society, there is no clear distinction there either. Or is there?

To the idiot: Bite me.

1010011010

So, what then is the essence of a free act?
I'd say it's that you could have acted differently than you did.

It's not, as some posters have suggested, that you do act differently than you did... such a demand is incoherent.

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Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions