The main argument being made for free will as an illusion hinges on the assumption that free will would necessarily violate the infalliability of omniscience.
The flaw in that reasoning is that free will only requires that you
can choose an option, not that you actually
will choose the option... while violating the infalliability of omniscience requires that you actually
do choose the option. There is no internal inconsistency in saying that an agent
can choose something (and thus has free will) but the agent
won't choose it (and thus maintaining the infalliability of omniscience).
Quote:
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Originally Posted by Francisco
Well, I agree that, in effect, "Will not is the same as can not."
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Oddly enough, I, too, would agree that,
in effect, "will not" and "can not" are not significantly different. Operationally they're the same. Just as, from our perspective, fatalism would be indistinguishable from free will!
The only way for the discussion to proceed is to set up a hypothetical situation and see how free will plays out in a given scenario. To point out that one scenario would be operationally equivalent to another scenario (i.e. "in effect") is to utterly miss the point.