12-08-2003, 01:24 PM | #1 (permalink) | |
lascivious
|
Modal Onthological Argument.
I am surprised that this never came up in any of the threads I read.
The Ontological argument for the existence of god was first conceived off by St. Anselm. It argument derives the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being — namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists — can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived — i.e., God — exists. Fromn then on it developed into a Model Onthological Argument, which uses model logic. A borrowed copy of which I will post in short here: Quote:
http://www-phil.tamu.edu/~b-everman/.../intro/God.pdf Tell me what you guys think. As I am still trying to make heads or tails out of it. - edit - link fixed Last edited by Mantus; 12-08-2003 at 03:58 PM.. |
|
12-08-2003, 02:11 PM | #2 (permalink) |
Pasture Bedtime
|
There's an unspoken leap at the end of this, which is turning g into God. The only stated property of g is that, if it exists, its existence is necessary. Whether or not God's existence is necessary has yet to be proven. Also, could there not be other things with that property?
Necessity is so arbitrary, and the vagueness of such a term is an embarrassment to most philosophers, who think in detail. |
12-08-2003, 03:39 PM | #3 (permalink) |
Tilted
Location: Somewhere between Arborea and Bytopia
|
Sledge is right on both counts.
St. Anselm's argument doesn't explain why it would be necessary for a single greatest being to exist, not two or more of equal greatness. In fact it doesn't explain why the existence of anything is necessary. Nor would there be any correlation between said being and any god defined by a human religion, because every religion (that I know of) ascribes certain traits to its vision of God. Complete goodness is one I'm thinking of.... an evil god would still fit St. Anselm's criteria. By the way, Mantus, check your link to the .pdf, I couldn't get it to work.
__________________
"Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind." -Emerson |
12-08-2003, 04:16 PM | #4 (permalink) |
Sky Piercer
Location: Ireland
|
1. Nothing is better than God
2. A ham sandwich is better than nothing 3. Therefore a ham sandwich is better than God. The Ontological argument follows similar logic. It plays silly word games. Essentially, in the words of Kant, "existence is not a predicate". Proof of the existence of the fliminian. I'm going to attempt to prove to you the existence of a creature called a fliminian. some may say it is a fictional creature. Others may say that I just made it up. Lies. It exists. First off: What is a fliminian? Well let’s define it: A fliminian is a creature with the following properties: 1. It is shaped like a horse, except it has eight legs. 2. It has a tail like a scorpion. 3. It exists. Therefore the existence of the fliminian is necessary, and we can follow the previous proof to show that it hence exists. After all it is a contradiction in terms to claim that a creature which exists does not exist.
__________________
|
12-09-2003, 02:46 PM | #5 (permalink) | ||
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Quote:
~Ex, such x>God H>{empty set} Ergo, H>God However, your following argument is somewhat more convincing: Quote:
1. If God possibly exists, he exists in some possible world (def. of possibility) 2. God possibly exists (premise) 3. Therefore, God exists in some possible world. (1,2) 4. If God exists, he exists necessarily (Anselm's argument) 5. Therefore, in the possible world in which God exists, he exists necessarily. (3,4) 6. If something exists necessarily, it exists in all possible worlds (definition of necessity) 7. Therefore, God exists in all possible worlds. (5,6) So, since the actual world is a possible world, God exists. There are two possible counterarguments. One would be to deny premise 2, that is, to argue that the concept of God is incoherent. This is not clearly the case. The other would be to deny S5, since that is the only modal system under which the argument is valid. (In effect, this would be to say that the step to seven is invalid). Your argument regarding the fliminian is invalid. The necessarily existence of God is proved from the definition of God, not merely stipulated. Why can't there be any more than one God? Well, God is by definition the greatest possible being. That is, for any being, if that being is not the greatest possible being, that being is not God. But if a being is the greatest possible being, it must have all the power which it is possible to have. If there are two beings, equal in power, they do not have all the power it is possible to have (since, if there was only one such being, it would have more power). Therefore, there can only be one greatest possible being. Finally, it is not possible for the greatest possible being to be evil, because it is better to be good than evil.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
||
12-09-2003, 03:32 PM | #6 (permalink) |
Sky Piercer
Location: Ireland
|
I really don't understand the statement:
If God exists, he exists necessarily. If a bucket is red, then it is red necessarily. In fact, if a bucket exists, then it exists necessarily, in the sense that a bucket which exists that does not exist is obviously a contradiction. If anything exists it exists neccesarily. In fact even more generally: A implies A neccesarily. The only thing that the ontological argument does is show that "God exists" is implicit in the definition of god. The fliminian's existence is the same, except that it is stated explicitly in it's definition. ________________________ My biggest problem with the ontological argument as you have stated above is the jump from 5 to 6. 5. Therefore, in the possible world in which God exists, he exists necessarily. (3,4) 6. If something exists necessarily, it exists in all possible worlds (definition of necessity) -in a possible world where my bucket is red, it is red necessarily. -If it is red neccesarily, then it is red in all possible worlds. -therefore my bucket is red. the definition of necessity is essentially that A implies B. so if we have "A then B neccesarily", we can postulate a world where A. In that world we necessarilty have B. it does not follow that we have B in all worlds...only worlds where A. restated: In worlds where we have A, we have B necessarily. In fact in ALL WORLDS where A, we necessarily have B. But it does not follow that we necessarily have B in all worlds...we only have B necessarily in worlds where we have A.
__________________
|
12-09-2003, 05:04 PM | #7 (permalink) |
Little known...
Location: Brisbane, Australia
|
Personally I have a few issues with Anselm's Ontological Argument.
However, I think it is a little easier to understand if you formulate it without using the whole God exists necessarily. 1. We can imagine a being greater than which nothing can be conceived which does not exist. 2. We can imagine a being greater than which nothing can be concieved which does exist, and is thus greater than the being which doesn't. 3. Therefore, a being greater than which nothing can be concieved must exist. In my opinion this doesn't really add up and appears to be little more than semantics... |
12-10-2003, 02:58 AM | #8 (permalink) |
On the lam
Location: northern va
|
Everyone seems to be bring up good points--it seems there are two arguments for god's existence:
1. the "god is the greatest thing possible to conceive" argument, which states that a god that doesn't exist is not as great as a god that does exist, and therefore, by definition of what a god is (the greatest thing), he must exist. Analogous argument: The best way to travel from washington to tokyo is by teleportation, but teleportation is not available to us. However, if teleportation was available, the fact that it was available would make it a MUCH nicer option than some theoretical construct of teleportation that doesn't exist. Therefore, the best way to travel from washington to toyko is by using teleportation that does exist. 2. The "necessary" argument: Anselm seems to be saying that everything that exists is "necessary", whatever "necessary" means. Nothing is extraneous in the world. Moreover, if something doesn't exist, it's out of necessity that it doesn't exist! Since the universe does not need god's absence, since the universe is not dependent on god not being around, he must exist. Analogous argument: had a hard time thinking of one. That's a MESSED UP argument right there. Hm--how about this: since the universe does not need a peanut butter sandwich on jupiter, since it's not dependent on a peanut butter sandwich being somewhere on jupiter, that sandwich must exist. that's not a good analogous argument there though. you could say that the universe needs the laws of physics to be followed, and the laws of physics say you shouldn't have a peanut butter sandwich on jupiter. how about this: it's not necessary that quarks (or whatever happens to be the most elementary particle) are not made up of 10,000 dancing flamingo-shaped particle-like things that, combined, behave like we expect a quark to behave. Since it's not necessary that they are not like that, they must be like that. I'm not happy with that analogy either. THat's a MESSED UP argument right there.
__________________
oh baby oh baby, i like gravy. |
12-10-2003, 04:54 AM | #9 (permalink) |
On the lam
Location: northern va
|
in fact, i'm tempted to argue, if we're bound to using the same logic, in the OPPOSITE direction--that since god is not necessary, he necessarily doesn't exist! what was anselm's argument for saying that god's non-existence was not necessary? anybody?
__________________
oh baby oh baby, i like gravy. |
12-11-2003, 02:08 PM | #10 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Look, there seems to be some disagreement about what it means to exist necessarily. The way my intro professor put it, is that there are four categories of types of existence, the first three of which are fairly intuitive.
1. Contingent existence: Something exists, but there's no contradiction in its not existing. Cats, dogs, Aunt Peggy. 2. Contingent non-existence: Something doesn't exist, but there's no contradiction in its existing. Unicorns, a golden mountain, my daughter Rae. 3. Impossible existence: Something doesn't exist, but there's a contradiction involved in its existing. A square circle. The fourth is that of Impossible non-existence, which would be something that exists, and it's non-existence is contradictory. The Ontological Argument seeks to show that God belongs to this fourth category.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-11-2003, 02:14 PM | #11 (permalink) | |
Sky Piercer
Location: Ireland
|
Quote:
or God is in this fourth category in all worlds that God exists.
__________________
|
|
12-11-2003, 05:00 PM | #12 (permalink) |
On the lam
Location: northern va
|
any examples of impossible non-existence? would that be things like the all matter/energy in the universe, laws of physics (though I don't think you could call that something that exists), ontological arguments (without which you couldn't discuss impossible non-existence)? in my mind, only the last item holds any chance of being in that category.
__________________
oh baby oh baby, i like gravy. |
12-07-2004, 09:17 AM | #13 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Since I'm linking to this thread, I thought I'd just add that there's a response to CSFlim's most recent post in my first post in this thread.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-07-2004, 09:26 AM | #14 (permalink) |
Super Moderator
Location: essex ma
|
the problems of syllogisms come at the level of premises/axoims.
once you put something into that machine, the rules for combination are such that you generate formally true propositions simply by not violating them (it is like any proof. same problem always obtains.) for example: what is necessity? it relies on a particular type of logical system to make sense. what status to attribute to existence? (see the post above re. kant) what is the link between god and the other terms exactly? none of this does or can appear in the proof. if you are yourself christian, maybe the proof is (or at onepoint was) compelling because, at the level of prior disposition, you are inclined to accept the terms as legitimate. if you are not, then things go otherwise.
__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear it make you sick. -kamau brathwaite |
12-07-2004, 12:25 PM | #16 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Roachboy, I discussed your first two questions in previous posts in this thread. I'm not sure what you mean by the third question, "What is the link between God and the other terms exactly?" Which other terms?
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-07-2004, 01:23 PM | #17 (permalink) |
whosoever
Location: New England
|
the interesting question to me is not can this arguement prove God? i don't think so.
it is, if we have this idea of God, where did it come from? does having the idea of God suggest somethign more than an idea?
__________________
For God so loved creation, that God sent God's only Son that whosoever believed should not perish, but have everlasting life. -John 3:16 |
12-07-2004, 01:32 PM | #18 (permalink) |
I change
Location: USA
|
martinguerre, probably not.
our brains are concept generating engines. one of the common patterns we use to impose a sense of order on things is to create chains of cause and effect. we see events as the effects of causes and by projecting backwards, we can easily come up with a notion of a first cause. that's just a single example of the kinds of projection (both proleptic and the reverse) that we employ to create fictitious concepts of all sorts. without some other parameters for our thought, we'd all be insane - that is, if the fact that our brain conjures up a concept gives the concept some validity...
__________________
create evolution |
12-07-2004, 06:05 PM | #19 (permalink) |
whosoever
Location: New England
|
Ultimately, it’s an aesthetic question. We see lots of patterns, both real and imagined.
To say probably not isn’t more defensible than saying probably so.
__________________
For God so loved creation, that God sent God's only Son that whosoever believed should not perish, but have everlasting life. -John 3:16 |
12-07-2004, 07:54 PM | #21 (permalink) | |
whosoever
Location: New England
|
Quote:
__________________
For God so loved creation, that God sent God's only Son that whosoever believed should not perish, but have everlasting life. -John 3:16 |
|
12-07-2004, 10:47 PM | #22 (permalink) |
Crazy
|
I understand (or I think I do) Anslem's argument but I think he makes too big a jump between the possibility of God existing and the reality of God existing. It's possible for a lot of things to exist which do not in fact exist. And I think it is assuming too much to say that God's non-existance is contradictory. Martinguerre, don't you have ideas of things you know don't exist? Why should your idea of God be any different?
__________________
Rule 37: There is no 'overkill.' There is only 'open fire' and 'I need to reload.' |
12-07-2004, 11:27 PM | #23 (permalink) |
whosoever
Location: New England
|
i do, livia. but human kind has wrestled with the question of God since time immemorial.
that doesn't prove God. it does say that humans tend to think about God. i'll expand the quote that's in my sig. line to explain. "No facts can take the place of truths, and if these be not truths, then is the loftiest part of our nature a waste. Let me hold by the better than the actual, and fall into nothingness off the same precipice with Jesus and John and Paul and a thousand more, who were lovely in their lives, and with their death make even the nothingness in to which they have passed like the garden of the Lord." Ontology can't make God a fact. It might suggest to us that God is a truth.
__________________
For God so loved creation, that God sent God's only Son that whosoever believed should not perish, but have everlasting life. -John 3:16 |
12-08-2004, 10:47 AM | #24 (permalink) |
Crazy
|
Humans also tend to think of monsters but that doesn't make monsters any more real. My point is that just because we have an idea of something doesn't mean it exists. Interesting quote - it sounds rather like Pascal's Wager restated. I've read some of George MacDonald's works and liked them.
__________________
Rule 37: There is no 'overkill.' There is only 'open fire' and 'I need to reload.' |
12-08-2004, 12:11 PM | #25 (permalink) | |
can't help but laugh
Location: dar al-harb
|
Quote:
our picture of God may be an muddy amalgam of what may actually be, but i am not convinced that we are capable of conceiving something that has a complete genesis within our minds. we are the perceivers and innovators... not the conceivers and creators.
__________________
If you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly, you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance for survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves. ~ Winston Churchill |
|
12-09-2004, 09:14 AM | #26 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Cf. Descartes' version of the Ontological Argument. He argues that we could not have made up the notion of perfection ourselves. We never encounter perfection, and it's not simply the negation of things we encounter, so it must have been placed in us. That's a quick and dirty version, btw.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-09-2004, 10:37 AM | #27 (permalink) |
Super Moderator
Location: essex ma
|
descartes' proof is also a semantic projection: that i have the notion of imperfection on its own implies its inverse....no necessary link to substance there....one of many many problems with the proof in descartes.
on the fly written, this.
__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear it make you sick. -kamau brathwaite |
12-09-2004, 11:20 AM | #28 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
But the Cartesian idea is that our idea of perfection is such that it can't be simply derived by negating imperfection. I suspect he's wrong too, mind you, but it's still interesting.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-09-2004, 11:56 AM | #29 (permalink) |
Crazy
|
I'm not sure we really have an idea of perfection. We have an idea of what we want things to be like and what they are like now but can we actually imagine something that is perfect?
__________________
Rule 37: There is no 'overkill.' There is only 'open fire' and 'I need to reload.' |
12-09-2004, 12:06 PM | #30 (permalink) |
I change
Location: USA
|
It does amaze me that so many folks tend to think the brain has some necessary relationship to whatever is outside of it. It's the sort of thinking that does stun me about the silliness of much philosophical pursuit. It's clear to me, at least, that my brain continually comes up with total nonsense. The human brain is a nonsense generator if there ever was one.
__________________
create evolution |
12-09-2004, 09:10 PM | #31 (permalink) | |
whosoever
Location: New England
|
Quote:
the speaker isn't saying he beleives, lest he be wrong and punished hereafter. he's saying he will believe, even if he is wrong, for beleif in and of itself in the here and now is worth his life's energy.
__________________
For God so loved creation, that God sent God's only Son that whosoever believed should not perish, but have everlasting life. -John 3:16 |
|
12-13-2004, 12:26 AM | #32 (permalink) | |
Insane
Location: New Zealand
|
Quote:
__________________
ignorance really is bliss. |
|
12-24-2004, 02:32 PM | #33 (permalink) | |
has been
Location: Chicago
|
I should like to nit-pick for a moment.
Quote:
God is not good because it is better to be good then evil, better worse, good and evil are all human symbols, if we decided that it were better for God to be evil, would he be so? God, I take it, does not conform to human expectations a propos to his nature any more than laws of nature do. I believe, and I have only started to study religious philosophy, that it is taken as a fairly common tenent that only negative qualities can be ascribed to God. == Otherwise asaris, quite well put.
__________________
tim(mah) |
|
12-27-2004, 07:14 AM | #34 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Actually, there is widespread disagreement about how, exactly, properties are ascribed to God. In philosophical theology, as far as I know, the via negativa is actually the least common opinion. It tends more to be held by mystics than philosophers. The most common is probably the analogical view, which holds that when we say that "God is good", for example, we mean that God is good in a way analogical to the way that humans are good. This was the view of Thomas Aquinas. The third view that I'm aware of is the unequivocal view, which happens to be the one I hold, and was also held by Duns Scotus. That is, when we say "God is good" we mean exactly the same thing as when we say that a human is good.
To reply more specifically to your objection, it's pretty clear from scripture that God is good; in fact, if there was one thing I'd want people to learn from scripture, it's that God is good. Moreover, it's clear both from scripture and from natural reason that it's better to be good than evil. Now, you are entirely correct to say that God always exceeds and escapes our expectations, but it would be more correct to parse this by saying that our concept of good might well be flawed rather than by saying that it is not true that God is good.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-27-2004, 12:10 PM | #35 (permalink) | |||
Addict
Location: Pennsylvania, USA
|
Quote:
Quote:
And it certainly does not tell us what is good and what is evil. What is good in nature? Survival? Procreation? How does god help us achieve this goal? Procreation especially seems to be hampered by religious ideas of chastity. Quote:
__________________
------------- You know something, I don't think the sun even... exists... in this place. 'Cause I've been up for hours, and hours, and hours, and the night never ends here. |
|||
12-28-2004, 09:29 AM | #36 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Master_Shake, you write that good is just looking out for your own interests. This isn't quite the way I'd put it. I'd say that the Good is, in fact, in your interest, but that there is more to say about the Good than simply that it is just looking out for your own interests. Let me put it this way; a lot of religious people, both Christian and non-Christian, have said over the years that, while it is in your interest to seek the good, you will not find the good merely by seeking whatever you think your own interests are. Assuming these people have some insight into what the good is, this means it's just too simplistic to say that good is just looking out for your own interests.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-28-2004, 11:50 AM | #37 (permalink) |
Addict
Location: Pennsylvania, USA
|
I guess I tend to associate the good with pleasure. I can feel pleasure and want to experience it again. I associate this with good. What other kind of good is there?
__________________
------------- You know something, I don't think the sun even... exists... in this place. 'Cause I've been up for hours, and hours, and hours, and the night never ends here. |
12-29-2004, 07:35 AM | #38 (permalink) |
Mad Philosopher
Location: Washington, DC
|
Well, there are problems with identifying the good with pleasure; for one, few people would call a life inside a happy box a good life. If you make this identification, then, you'll want to distinguish between different sorts of pleasures, but it's unclear that you really have any good reason for doing so. But I don't really need that. When we say that God is good, we mean that he has our best interests in mind. That is to say, if you want really good pleasures, working towards going to heaven is the way to go.
__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche |
12-29-2004, 11:38 AM | #39 (permalink) |
has been
Location: Chicago
|
Asaris,
Thanks for the response, the point I was trying to make was actually slightly different. That to say something is good requires first of all knowing what good is - that is, being able to distinguish good from evil. If we're working in a Chirstian conception one might understand the myth of the fall as man's taking or gaining this ability. But the question of the good raises are far more difficult question. Namely that of evil. If God is good, for whatever reason, then what is the explination for evil. While there are numerous, the ones that are most common either blame man or blame God, depending on if the answer comes from and atheist or a believer. Another 'theory', or perhaps theological idea, is that evil arrises through freedom, but not freedom in the sense of the freedom to choose good or evil. Freedom in a sense that is outside of God. Where man is in some sense a combination of the divine and what might be termed meonic freedom. Anyways this thread isn't about good and evil, I only wanted to point out that what people usualy say about this, that, or God being good or evil, are usually comments that fail to first tackle the entire problem of good and evil. Why I wanted to say all that, is only that I don't think God is good because it is better to be good than evil. In whatever sense our understanding of "good" actually relates to some 'true' "good" I certainly agree that it God is good.
__________________
tim(mah) |
Tags |
argument, modal, onthological |
|
|