Military Criticism of Civilian Leadership - Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community

Elphaba · 04-15-2006, 04:55 PM

I assume that many of you on this forum are aware of the number of retired military officers coming forward to recommend that Rumsfeld step down or be removed from office. My increasing cynicism saw these officers as cowards or opportunists that waited until the safety of retirement to speak out. The following article caused me to rethink my understanding of the role of the military within our government.

This is obviously an opinion piece, but I found it enlightening and persuasive. I hope that a discussion is possible from those here in the military and folks like me that have never experienced the military oath to leadership or the constitution. I chose to put this thread in politics, but I don't look to a "right" or "left" response to this OP. I believe this article transcends simple political positions.

Hosted by TruthOut

Quote:

Permission to Speak Freely, Sir
By Stephen Pizzo
News for Real

Saturday 15 April 2006

I am sorry that high school and college kids no longer have to face a couple of years of mandatory military service. That may be a strange thing to say for a guy who protested the draft back in the '60s. Maybe it's the inevitable aging process. Or maybe it's the perspective you get from the higher altitude of experience.

What got me thinking about this were the extraordinary statements being made by recently retired U.S. generals. Those who have never served in the military don't understand how extraordinary it is for career military officers to say the things these guys are saying about their former civilian superiors.

I hit Marine Corps bootcamp on July 7, 1965, a wimpy kid from suburbia. The first thing we were told was that we were the lowest forms of life on earth -- and that meant lower than civilians. I was to learn as time went on that this was not just drill instructor blather. It was a genuine, deeply ingrained belief that permeated the highest ranks of the military for civilian control. We were repeatedly told that the lowest civilian we met on the street outranked the highest grade military officer. And that was not show. They believed it, not just as a principle, but a sacred trust.

Those who never served will likely see that as corny, empty rhetoric, window dressing, quaint -- at best. But those who did serve know of what I speak. We get it. That's one reason I bemoan that two generations of kids have since been spared a stint in uniform. It changed my life in ways I now understand and appreciate in ways I could not back then.

This is not a column about reinstituting the draft. I just want to make the case that you pay close and respectful attention to the recent statements by retired top Pentagon brass. Because never in my life did I ever expect to hear these kinds of things coming out of the mouths of such men. Never. Here's a sampler:

"Donald Rumsfeld has proved himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically. Mr. Rumsfeld must step down."
--General Paul Eaton, who oversaw training of Iraqi army troops, 2003-2004

"I really believe that we need a new secretary of defense because Secretary Rumsfeld carries way too much baggage with him. Specifically, I feel he has micromanaged the generals who are leading our forces there."
--retired Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack, former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.

"I think we need a fresh start … We need leadership up there (the Pentagon) that respects the military as they expect the military to respect them."
--Maj. Gen. John Batiste, commander 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, 2004-2005

We won't get fooled again … Rumsfeld and many others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach should be replaced."
--Marines Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, director of operations of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000-2002

"The problem is that we've wasted three years … absolutely, Rumsfeld should resign."
--Marines Gen. Anthony Zinni, former chief of U.S. Central Command

"A lot of them [other generals] are hugely frustrated. Rumsfeld gave the impression that military advice was neither required nor desired" in the planning for the Iraq war.
--Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, former commander of Marines forces in the Pacific Theater

"Everyone pretty much thinks Rumsfeld and the bunch around him should be cleared out. [Rumsfeld and his advisers have] made fools of themselves, and totally underestimated what would be needed for a sustained conflict."
--Army Maj. Gen. John Riggs

The administration is trying to counter these devastating statements by noting that none of the generals voiced such reservations during the lead-up to the war. And, because so many Americans now lack any direct experience with the military, the tactic may just work. After all, it's easy to dismiss these retired generals just that easily. "So, where were your qualms when we really need them, general?"

I know the answer to that question -- and it's not the answer the Bushies want you to get.

When an officer has a particularly sticky problem with the actions or orders of a superior officer, s/he can "request permission to speak freely, sir."

Well, that was tried, by Army Gen. Eric Shinseki, who was promptly and unceremoniously "shit-canned." (Another term my fellow vets may find familiar.)

The Pentagon's civilian leaders sent a clear message to the rest of the Pentagon brass: "Do what we want, or we'll find a junior officer who will."

With the "permission to speak freely" option off the table, the brass was left only with their prime directive: Civilians rule.

So, their silence leading up to war was not cowardice or careerism, as some have suggested. It was instead the manifestation of that deeply ingrained principle that civilians not only outrank them, but that the most dangerous thing that can happen in a democracy is for the military to start preempting civilian leadership.

We can quibble over that notion, of course. We can wave around the Nuremberg principle that "just following orders" is no defense for wrongdoing. I agree. But let me tell you, my experience in the military left me with a deep respect for the way the American military views its place in our democracy. They really do believe civilians rule. I would have it no other way. And neither should you.

Which is why we old vets understand better than most how gut-wrenching it must have been for these recently retired officers to go public. I am certain it was not the way they wanted to end their lifetimes of service to their country. Because, as far as these men are concerned, under normal circumstances, such behavior smacks of treason.

Retired two-star Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commanded the Big Red One (the Army's 1st Infantry Division) in Iraq until November, said Rumsfeld must go for ignoring and intimidating career officers. "You know, it speaks volumes that guys like me are speaking out from retirement about the leadership climate in the Department of Defense.

So, no one should take their statements lightly. This is serious business … especially at the very moment these same civilian leaders are grunting eagerly over satellite images of Iran.

Stephen Pizzo is the author of numerous books, including "Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans," which was nominated for a Pulitzer.

pocon1 · 04-15-2006, 07:51 PM

nothing to say

host · 04-15-2006, 08:19 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Elphaba

I assume that many of you on this forum are aware of the number of retired military officers coming forward to recommend that Rumsfeld step down or be removed from office. My increasing cynicism saw these officers as cowards or opportunists that waited until the safety of retirement to speak out......

The buck doesn't stop at Rumsfeld. The generals did not step up to back John Murtha, and they were silent when Rumsfeld "retired" Gen. Shinseki, who did his job, and stood up to Rumsfeld.

Now...they are speaking up, but they are targeting the wrong guy. Bush and Cheney are where the buck stops, and the "generals" use Rumsfeld as a smokescreen. Rumsfeld is a symptom of what the generals speak out against. Bush told all of us that he leaves decisions on how to carry out his military orders, to "the commanders in the field'. The generals now tell us that Bush did the opposite. In november, the voters have a chance to elect a new congress that will hold hearings, take testimony from the generals, and from many others in the government, and lay out the pre and post invasion of Iraq, Bush adminisration policies and decisions, for the voters to examine and draw conclusions from.

All we have now from the generals, is an indication that they will testify about Bush's assertions that they were given authority to carry out his orders, in the fiield, to determine proper troop levels, and tactics, and to effect a plan to achieve Bush's goal of "victory" in Iraq. I predict that no hearings will be called to ask any of these things to these former officers, by any congressional committee chairman, during this congressional session. Only the majority party has authority to convene hearings or to subpeona witnesss.

Until a new independent congress is convened or the generals direct their criticism to the president and co-president Cheney, the men who appointed Rumsfeld and supervised his management of the pentagon since 2001, nothing signifigant is actuallly happening, aside from obscuring and delaying what is required to effect change and hold those responsible, accountable for their decisions and assertions.

Marvelous Marv · 04-16-2006, 09:31 AM

I recently talked with a retired four-star who told me he thought Rumsfeld was the worst secretary of defense since McNamara.

My observation (and no, I don't know every senior officer) is that the military leaders do not consider Bush and Cheney to be the problem that you do, and they most certainly are not using Rumsfeld as a "smokescreen."

Knight Dragon · 04-16-2006, 10:44 AM

This can be a fairly complicated issue. There are several tiers of dynamics at play here.

First is the issue of candor. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, officers are obligated to be upfront and honest. The true issue is one of discretion rather than careerism. In other words, you don't openly disagree with the commanding officer in the presence of his subordinate commanders and staff just as you wouldn't do so with the CEO in the presence of the board members. Instead, discretion and judgment calls for voicing a dissenting opinion in the privacy of the commander's office. And if called on to express your view during the meeting, diplomacy suggests raising the issue of disagreement ("sir, I'm not convinced that this is the best method") and then giving a graceful way out ("I'd like to follow up with further discussion after the meeting, if it's okay with you) rather than putting the commander on the spot. Because when a commander is put on the spot, the commander will win...every time...regardless of whether or not the final decision is the right one or not. I know that naysayers will say that if a commander cannot stomach dissent, then that officer shouldn't be in command. True; however, what I'm talking about here is a professional obligation by the dissenter to present a winning argument in a way that doesn't put the commander on the spot and a professional obligation by the commander to be reasonable to criticism and dissent. Both must work together. And contrary to some of the perceptions in here, it works this way more often than not within the military decision-making process.

The second issue is one of public dissent while in the military as opposed to once separated or retired from the military. This is difficult to explain to those who have never served in the military or even those who have but never made it a full career. In simple terms, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, which serves as The Law for soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen, specifically outlaws conduct that publicly embarrasses or contradicts established military policy. During the Clinton administration, several active duty officers made the dumb mistake of criticizing the President. This was a gross violation of the UCMJ, and they were punished accordingly. What we have here are the views, opinions and criticisms of private citizens. Even though still subject to the UCMJ, these retired generals are protected whenever they voice their opinions as they have so far. They are subject to the UCMJ should they compromise classified information or exchange proprietary information (e.g. technical or other information which would give a private contractor an advantage when bidding for a government contract), and none of this applies to this argument.

The third issue is the one of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military leadership. There's always been a traditional understanding that the civilian leadership issues the broad goals and objectives while the military leadership works out the details to successfully accomplish those missions. The working assumption was that the civilian leadership didn't get involved in the eaches of the mission as long as they didn't violate any of the broad guidance (e.g. capturing prisoners assumes that they will be treated in accordance to the UCMJ---this shouldn't have to be spelled out, it is an implied task). However, it appears that Rumsfeld is digging deeper into the inner workings of the military than have his predecessors, and this rubs generals the wrong way. It comes across as micromanagement and interference, and perhaps it is. However, this leads into the next issue....

The fourth issue is the modernization of the US military and readiness to fight in the 21st century. This is perhaps the most contentious of all issues and, I would argue, the true root of all of this debate. There are two major schools of thought: one that envisions future wars along the lines of highly technological armies pitted against each other in multidimensional battle spaces and the other that sees Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq as the new version of modernized warfare. These still require modern technologies, but rather than combatting massive armies, the war is against guerrillas and terrorists. Many of the current military leaders in the Pentagon resist this notion and see the Vietnams, Somalias, Bosnias, Afghanistans and Iraqs as temporary deviations from the true future war: a high-tech showdown between massive armies pitted against each other in some ultimate Armageddon. Rumsfeld sought to transform the military from a cumbersome, large-scale massive force to a faster, lighter, highly maneuverable one that could adapt quickly to rapidly changing situations and successfully fight on a multi-dimensional scale. This is contrary to the traditional mindset that has existed in the Pentagon ever since World War II.

Is Rumsfeld 100% correct? Not necessarily. He needs to be willing to accept certain realities when radically changing the long-prevailing mindset embedded in military leadership, doctrine, tactics, principles, techniques and tradition. But the military officers have to accept the fact that the failure to adapt to change means certain death on the battlefield. The basic building block for military maneuvers has been divisions and brigades complemented by supporting elements that span the range of combined forces (air forces, marine forces, naval forces, special forces). What is needed is a radical change that perhaps eliminates separate forces and embodies combined forces that require little tailoring as opposed to more elaborate task organization. In other words, a battalion or brigade-size multi-service force that already has its own air, marine, naval and special operations assets. This would require a radical change in the very foundations of military thinking. And this goes against the grain of many current military leaders; it forces them out of their comfort zones that have been codified by all of the major conflicts from the Revolutionary War to the first phase of the war in Iraq. In short, the current military leadership still does not think outside of the box. The current military leadership still clings to a concept of warfare based primarily on 20th century experiences.

Like it or not, Vietnam was a precursor of future wars, and we conveniently categorized it as a temporary deviation from traditional warfare. We need to review Vietnam and pay attention to its painful lessons if we are to succeed in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Again, not saying that Rumsfeld has a clear and definitive view as I've articulated here. However, Rumsfeld is trying to change the prevailing military mindset and is coming across a lot of stiff resistance.

The issue is not the war in Iraq itself. That's just the catalyst being used to inflame public opinion against Rumsfeld. The issue is the degree of influence a secretary of defense has when managing the Pentagon and the military services, especially when that secretary is trying to reshape the military.

1010011010 · 04-16-2006, 02:44 PM

"Well. Why didn't they speak up when they had the chance?" you ask?

UCMJ Article 88 : CONTEMPT TOWARD OFFICIALS
"Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

Because it would have been a CRIME for them to speak up.

irateplatypus · 04-16-2006, 07:07 PM

Knight Dragon,

Thanks for taking time to give us all that synopsis. Military transformation is not only a hot topic for staff-geeks in the pentagon, it is definitely being felt at the unit level. Thought about starting thread on that several times, didn't think TFP had an audience connected with the military enough to spark enough discussion.

About presenting conflicting/dissenting voice to superior officers: not only will the commander win everytime, you also have to face the real possibility that his plan will have life-or-death consequences for those involved in his decision. carrying out such orders is much easier if the leadership is seen to have a single voice. how can we ask the enlisted troops to carry out the mission if every officer is bitching that his own plan wasn't adopted?

host · 04-16-2006, 09:52 PM

It is frustrating to attempt a thorough discussion here. I perceive an interest in "leaving out" key considerations, vital to examining what is really going on in the "controversy" created by retired senior officers recently calling for Rumsfeld to resign.

Probably the most important considerations that are "left out" are:
1.)The secrecy of the Bush administration, as to the actual reasons for invading and occupying Iraq, and the long term plan for the U.S. military role in Iraq. (See supporting articles, below.)

2.)Bush and Cheney appointed Rumsfeld, directed his agenda, approved and co-planned his decisions....he continues in his position on their approval, and they will appoint and supervise his successor, if Rumsfeld is fired. The buck stops at the desks of the co-presidents.

3.)Turning the wave of tardy, public dissent of combat "flag" officers, into something trivial, as in "if every officer is bitching that his own plan wasn't adopted?" seems like an attempt to avoid recognition and discussion of the controversy. Are some of the most respected, experienced, and involved, former senior combat officers, now criticizing Rumsfeld in unison....or not? If the critics are inconsequential in stature there is no controversy. If they were the former key military leaders who Rumsfeld ordered to war, in 2003, at the behest of Bush/Cheney, isn't it important to ask why they call for Rumsfeld's firing, instead of minimizing their stature?

4.)Did the former officers, turned critics, at this late date, harbor their objections to flawed or unworkable Iraq invasion and post invasion plans and orders, 3 years ago? If they did, did any of them have the option to resign in protest, and then publicly voice similar objections to the ones that they voice now about Rumsfeld's flawed leadership? What has changed to prompt them to voice dissent from the safety of measured, post retirement timetables, vs. sudden resignations in protest, in 2003?

5.)Why do the officers' criticism stop at Rumsfeld? If they are letting it all out now, why are none of the officers critisizing the POTUS who appointed and continues to support Rumsfeld? How can they avoid criticism of their former CIC, Bush....who said over and over, that he leaves troop levels and military strategy to "commanders in the field". Doesn't the criticism of these officers, contradict Bush's oft repeated assertiion?

Why, when the following is considered, along wiith the avoided questions above, is there continued willingness (eagerness?) to give Bush and Cheney any benefit of doubt? Why the reluctance to confront them as to what the past plan and the future plan for Iraq really is? They are using our sons and daughters, and our money, to carry out secret plans and goals....

Quote:

http://msnbc.msn.com/id/12319798/
New U.S. Embassy in Iraq cloaked in mystery
Baghdad locale, slated to be completed in 2007, to be largest of its kind
Updated: 5:45 p.m. ET April 14, 2006

BAGHDAD, Iraq - The fortress-like compound rising beside the Tigris River here will be the largest of its kind in the world, the size of Vatican City, with the population of a small town, its own defense force, self-contained power and water, and a precarious perch at the heart of Iraq’s turbulent future.

The new U.S. Embassy also seems as cloaked in secrecy as the ministate in Rome.

“We can’t talk about it. Security reasons,” Roberta Rossi, a spokeswoman at the current embassy, said when asked for information about the project.
Story continues below ↓ advertisement

A British tabloid even told readers the location was being kept secret — news that would surprise Baghdadis who for months have watched the forest of construction cranes at work across the winding Tigris, at the very center of their city and within easy mortar range of anti-U.S. forces in the capital, though fewer explode there these days.

The embassy complex — 21 buildings on 104 acres, according to a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report — is taking shape on riverside parkland in the fortified “Green Zone,” just east of al-Samoud, a former palace of Saddam Hussein’s, and across the road from the building where the ex-dictator is now on trial.

The Republican Palace, where U.S. Embassy functions are temporarily housed in cubicles among the chandelier-hung rooms, is less than a mile away in the 4-square-mile zone, an enclave of American and Iraqi government offices and lodgings ringed by miles of concrete barriers.

5,500 employees at the embassy
The 5,500 Americans and Iraqis working at the embassy, almost half listed as security, are far more numerous than at any other U.S. mission worldwide. They rarely venture out into the “Red Zone,” that is, violence-torn Iraq.

This huge American contingent at the center of power has drawn criticism.

“The presence of a massive U.S. embassy — by far the largest in the world — co-located in the Green Zone with the Iraqi government is seen by Iraqis as an indication of who actually exercises power in their country,” the International Crisis Group, a European-based research group, said in one of its periodic reports on Iraq.

State Department spokesman Justin Higgins defended the size of the embassy, old and new, saying it’s indicative of the work facing the United States here.

“It’s somewhat self-evident that there’s going to be a fairly sizable commitment to Iraq by the U.S. government in all forms for several years,” he said in Washington.

Higgins noted that large numbers of non-diplomats work at the mission — hundreds of military personnel and dozens of FBI agents, for example, along with representatives of the Agriculture, Commerce and other U.S. federal departments.

They sleep in hundreds of trailers or “containerized” quarters scattered around the Green Zone. But next year embassy staff will move into six apartment buildings in the new complex, which has been under construction since mid-2005 with a target completion date of June 2007.

Iraq’s interim government transferred the land to U.S. ownership in October 2004, under an agreement whose terms were not disclosed.

“Embassy Baghdad” will dwarf new U.S. embassies elsewhere, projects that typically cover 10 acres. The embassy’s 104 acres is six times larger than the United Nations compound in New York, and two-thirds the acreage of Washington’s National Mall.

Estimated cost of over $1 billion....

Quote:

http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/ap/...ap2610580.html
Expanding Bases Put Focus on U.S. in Iraq
By CHARLES J. HANLEY , 03.21.2006, 11:48 AM

The concrete goes on forever, vanishing into the noonday glare, 2 million cubic feet of it, a mile-long slab that's now the home of up to 120 U.S. helicopters, a "heli-park" as good as any back in the States. At another giant base, al-Asad in Iraq's western desert, the 17,000 troops and workers come and go in a kind of bustling American town, with a Burger King, Pizza Hut and a car dealership, stop signs, traffic regulations and young bikers clogging the roads.

At a third hub down south, Tallil, they're planning a new mess hall, one that will seat 6,000 hungry airmen and soldiers for chow.

Are the Americans here to stay? Air Force mechanic Josh Remy is sure of it as he looks around Balad.

"I think we'll be here forever," the 19-year-old airman from Wilkes-Barre, Pa., told a visitor to his base.

The Iraqi people suspect the same. Strong majorities tell pollsters they'd like to see a timetable for U.S. troops to leave, but believe Washington plans to keep military bases in their country.

The question of America's future in Iraq looms larger as the U.S. military enters the fourth year of its war here, waged first to oust President Saddam Hussein, and now to crush an Iraqi insurgency.

Ibrahim al-Jaafari, interim prime minister, has said he opposes permanent foreign bases. A wide range of American opinion is against them as well. Such bases would be a "stupid" provocation, says Gen. Anthony Zinni, former U.S. Mideast commander and a critic of the original U.S. invasion.....

Knight Dragon · 04-17-2006, 04:37 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by host

It is frustrating to attempt a thorough discussion here. I perceive an interest in "leaving out" key considerations, vital to examining what is really going on in the "controversy" created by retired senior officers recently calling for Rumsfeld to resign.

Probably the most important considerations that are "left out" are:
1.)The secrecy of the Bush administration, as to the actual reasons for invading and occupying Iraq, and the long term plan for the U.S. military role in Iraq. (See supporting articles, below.)

Secrecy will always exist in government under any administration. State secrets are defined in terms of damage to the national security that either compromise national interests or allow others to exploit weaknesses that adversely affect our national interests. And wartime administrations are more secretive than peacetime administrations. I don't see how this fits in the argument; I accept secrecy as something that comes with the territory.

Quote:

Originally Posted by host

2.)Bush and Cheney appointed Rumsfeld, directed his agenda, approved and co-planned his decisions....he continues in his position on their approval, and they will appoint and supervise his successor, if Rumsfeld is fired. The buck stops at the desks of the co-presidents.

If you take a closer look at the criticisms, they are focused on Rumsfeld's management style and not so much on the broad policy decisions being made about Iraq. While I agree that Bush is the one who appointed Rumsfeld to the position, the criticisms from the general officers are aimed specifically at the way Rumsfeld is running the Pentagon and not so much how the war is being prosecuted.

Quote:

Originally Posted by host

3.)Turning the wave of tardy, public dissent of combat "flag" officers, into something trivial, as in "if every officer is bitching that his own plan wasn't adopted?" seems like an attempt to avoid recognition and discussion of the controversy. Are some of the most respected, experienced, and involved, former senior combat officers, now criticizing Rumsfeld in unison....or not? If the critics are inconsequential in stature there is no controversy. If they were the former key military leaders who Rumsfeld ordered to war, in 2003, at the behest of Bush/Cheney, isn't it important to ask why they call for Rumsfeld's firing, instead of minimizing their stature?

First of all, I don't agree that anyone is trying to trivialize the dissent. Nor do I think that it is as simple as sour grapes because a certain officer's war plan was rejected. These are seasoned warriors and experienced commanders who understand the essence of warplanning. I believe they accept the war in Iraq from a strictly military perspective and aren't wrapped up in the politics behind the reasons for invading Iraq. I don't see that as trivializing or belittling their views at all. I think that as the Pentagon was trying to overhaul a military and two combat actions arose in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question that surfaces is whether you continue with change or temporarily stop the change and revert back to the old ways. It all depends on which point of the transition they are at. I see it as a comfort zone for generals resistant to change. While I have the utmost respect for General Shinseki, he was more about cosmetic changes than true changes. The black beret fiasco was proof of that. I wasn't surprised at the idea that he would be forced into retirement; I was surprised that it actually happened because at that level, flag officers enjoy a high degree of political immunity.

Quote:

Originally Posted by host

4.)Did the former officers, turned critics, at this late date, harbor their objections to flawed or unworkable Iraq invasion and post invasion plans and orders, 3 years ago? If they did, did any of them have the option to resign in protest, and then publicly voice similar objections to the ones that they voice now about Rumsfeld's flawed leadership? What has changed to prompt them to voice dissent from the safety of measured, post retirement timetables, vs. sudden resignations in protest, in 2003?

I seriously doubt any of them considered the Iraq invasion as unworkable. And I think this is the heart of our disagreement. You see it as centered on the Iraq war itself, and I see it as focused on the power shift taking place inside the Pentagon with the Iraq war serving as a catalyst to the debate.

Quote:

Originally Posted by host

5.)Why do the officers' criticism stop at Rumsfeld? If they are letting it all out now, why are none of the officers critisizing the POTUS who appointed and continues to support Rumsfeld? How can they avoid criticism of their former CIC, Bush....who said over and over, that he leaves troop levels and military strategy to "commanders in the field". Doesn't the criticism of these officers, contradict Bush's oft repeated assertiion?

Have to ask these officers these questions. Their criticisms are carefully worded. Could be to avoid any direct criticism of the President or it could be that their beef is solely limited to Donald Rumsfeld. Keep in mind that these senior military officers also have a lot of political savvy. And keep in mind that they deny any conspiracy even though the timing of their comments is too coincidental to avoid the speculation that they have orchestrated this among themselves. I don't think the American public cares about the power struggle inside the Pentagon and would dismiss such arguments as whining. However, by adding the emotionally-charged topic of deaths in Iraq, the argument suddenly gains an audience even if that audience, as I assert, can't see the true argument behind the scenes. Think about it: these are combat veterans who are now suddenly concerned about the death toll of our troops on the ground. When did they become so concerned? Was it when the death toll crested 1000? Was it when it approached 2000? These generals clearly understand that from a strict military planning perspective, the number of those killed and wounded so far are well within the acceptable bounds of combat operations. These figures are, from a combat readiness perspective, trivial. I think they are using these numbers to politically rally American opinion to their true aim: limiting civilian influence over military operations.

And that's the heart and soul of this discussion, IMHO. The military works for the civilian leadership, including Rumsfeld, Congress and President Bush. While I don't expect Rumsfeld to tell commanders how to carry out their missions, there has to be a give-and-take between the civilian leadership and military leadership in achieving certain national goals and objectives.

The same things happened during the Clinton administration. But that's a story for another time.

politicophile · 04-22-2006, 12:00 PM

Everyone applauds generals for standing up to the errors of the nation's civilian leaders... so long as one shares the generals' views. Since there is no risk of a military dictatorship developing in the U.S., we are more inclined to side with the generals in instances like this. Remember, however, that while the military should be given the authority to conduct tactical campaigns as they see fit, the political leadership governing those tactical campaigns absolutely must remain independent of the military.

Ample · 04-22-2006, 12:17 PM

I am ex military, and know all the rules about how any military member is not to criticize anyone in their chain of command. I’m going to presume that most of these generals were in the military for about thirty years. That is a long time to have a set mindset, or have to hold your tongue. Even though these generals are retired. I don’t think they would publicly say what they have said unless they felt the Rummy was doing a terrible job.

I applaud the generals for making such a bold move. Being a retired general is a pretty exclusive club, and this for sure will make them outsiders, but they stood up for what they believe in, and that is what is important.

roachboy · 04-22-2006, 02:19 PM

Quote:

Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld
By THOM SHANKER and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON, April 22 ? The revolt by retired generals who publicly criticized Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has opened an extraordinary debate among younger officers, in military academies, in the armed services' staff colleges and even in command posts and mess halls in Iraq.

Junior and midlevel officers are discussing whether the war plans for Iraq reflected unvarnished military advice, whether the retired generals should have spoken out, whether active-duty generals will feel free to state their views in private sessions with the civilian leaders and, most divisive of all, whether Mr. Rumsfeld should resign.

In recent weeks, military correspondents of The Times discussed these issues with dozens of younger officers and cadets in classrooms and with combat units in the field, as well as in informal conversations at the Pentagon and in e-mail exchanges and telephone calls.

To protect their careers, the officers were granted anonymity so they could speak frankly about the debates they have had and have heard. The stances that emerged are anything but uniform, although all seem colored by deep concern over the quality of civil-military relations, and the way ahead in Iraq.

The discussions often flare with anger, particularly among many midlevel officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and face the prospect of additional tours of duty.

"This is about the moral bankruptcy of general officers who lived through the Vietnam era yet refused to advise our civilian leadership properly," said one Army major in the Special Forces who has served two combat tours. "I can only hope that my generation does better someday."

An Army major who is an intelligence specialist said: "The history I will take away from this is that the current crop of generals failed to stand up and say, 'We cannot do this mission.' They confused the cultural can-do attitude with their responsibilities as leaders to delay the start of the war until we had an adequate force. I think the backlash against the general officers will be seen in the resignation of officers" who might otherwise have stayed in uniform.

One Army colonel enrolled in a Defense Department university said an informal poll among his classmates indicated that about 25 percent believed that Mr. Rumsfeld should resign, and 75 percent believed that he should remain. But of the second group, two-thirds thought he should acknowledge errors that were made and "show that he is not the intolerant and inflexible person some paint him to be," the colonel said.

Many officers who blame Mr. Rumsfeld are not faulting President Bush ? in contrast to the situation in the 1960's, when both President Lyndon B. Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara drew criticism over Vietnam from the officer corps. (Mr. McNamara, like Mr. Rumsfeld, was also resented from the outset for his attempts to reshape the military itself.)

But some are furiously criticizing both, along with the military leadership, like the Army major in the Special Forces. "I believe that a large number of officers hate Rumsfeld as much as I do, and would like to see him go," he said.

"The Army, however, went gently into that good night of Iraq without saying a word," he added, summarizing conversations with other officers. "For that reason, most of us know that we have to share the burden of responsibility for this tragedy. And at the end of the day, it wasn't Rumsfeld who sent us to war, it was the president. Officers know better than anyone else that the buck stops at the top. I think we are too deep into this for Rumsfeld's resignation to mean much.

"But this is all academic. Most officers would acknowledge that we cannot leave Iraq, regardless of their thoughts on the invasion. We destroyed the internal security of that state, so now we have to restore it. Otherwise, we will just return later, when it is even more terrible."

The debates are fueled by the desire to mete out blame for the situation in Iraq, a drawn-out war that has taken many military lives and has no clear end in sight. A midgrade officer who has served two tours in Iraq said a number of his cohorts were angered last month when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that "tactical errors, a thousand of them, I am sure," had been made in Iraq.

"We have not lost a single tactical engagement on the ground in Iraq," the officer said, noting that the definition of tactical missions is specific movements against an enemy target. "The mistakes have all been at the strategic and political levels."

Many officers said a crisis of leadership extended to serious questions about top generals' commitment to sustain a seasoned officer corps that was being deployed on repeated tours to the long-term counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the rest of the government did not appear to be on the same wartime footing.

"We are forced to develop innovative ways to convince, coerce and cajole officers to stay in to support a war effort of national-level importance that is being done without a defensewide, governmentwide or nationwide commitment of resources," said one Army officer with experience in Iraq.

Another Army major who served in Iraq said a fresh round of debates about the future of the American military had also broken out. Simply put, the question is whether the focus should be, as Mr. Rumsfeld believes, on a lean high-tech force with an eye toward possible opponents like China, or on troop-heavy counterinsurgency missions more suited to hunting terrorists, with spies and boots on the ground.

In general, the Army and Marines support maintaining beefy ground forces, while the Navy and Air Force ? the beneficiaries of much of the high-tech arsenal ? favor the leaner approach. And some worry that those arguments have become too fierce.

"I think what has the potential for scarring relations is the two visions of warfare ? one that envisions near-perfect situational awareness and technology dominance, and the other that sees future war as grubby, dirty and chaotic," the major said. "These visions require vastly different forces. The tension comes when we only have the money to build one of these forces, Who gets the cash?"

Some senior officers said part of their own discussions were about fears for the immediate future, centering on the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld has surrounded himself with senior officers who share his views and are personally invested in his policies.

"If civilian officials feel as if they could be faced with a revolt of sorts, they will select officers who are like-minded," said another Army officer who has served in Iraq. "They will, as a result, get the military advice they want based on whom they appoint."

Kori Schake, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who teaches Army cadets at West Point, said some of the debates revolved around the issues raised in "Dereliction of Duty," a book that analyzes why the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed unable or unwilling to challenge civilian decisions during the war in Vietnam. Published in 1997, the book was written by Col. H. R. McMaster, who recently returned from a year in Iraq as commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment.

"It's a fundamentally healthy debate," Ms. Schake said. "Junior officers look around at the senior leadership and say, 'Are these people I admire, that I want to be like?' "

These younger officers "are debating the standard of leadership," she said. "Is it good enough to do only what civilian masters tell you to do? Or do you have a responsibility to shape that policy, and what actions should you undertake if you believe they are making mistakes?"

The conflicts some officers express reflect the culture of commander and subordinate that sometimes baffles the civilian world. No class craves strong leadership more than the military.

"I feel conflicted by this debate, and I think a lot of my colleagues are also conflicted," said an Army colonel completing a year at one of the military's advanced schools. He expressed discomfort at the recent public criticism of Mr. Rumsfeld and the Iraq war planning by retired generals, including Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold, the former operations officer for the Joint Chiefs, who wrote, in Time magazine, "My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions ? or bury the results."

But the colonel said his classmates were also aware of how the Rumsfeld Pentagon quashed dissenting views that many argued were proved correct, and prescient, like those of Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the former Army chief of staff. He was shunted aside after telling Congress, before the invasion, that it would take several hundred thousand troops to secure and stabilize Iraq.

Others contend that the military's own failings are equally at fault. A field-grade officer now serving in Iraq said he thought it was incorrect for the retired generals to call for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation. His position, he said, is that "if there is a judgment to be cast, it rests as much upon the shoulders of our senior military leaders."

That officer, like several others interviewed, emphasized that while these issues often occupied officers' minds, the debate had not hobbled the military's ability to function in Iraq. "No impact here that I can see regarding this subject," he said.

source: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/wa...rtner=homepage

interesting dimension, this.
i dont think the fact of a division between military and civilian dimensions of military policy (whatever) is at issue--the questions are about the particular relations that obtain, and apparently have obtained for some time (despite internal conflict) between these levels and within each. much of which comes down to who is in control and how the matters connected to the meaning of control are understood.

the article is interesting, though--i'd be curious to see more from other folk.

04-15-2006, 07:51 PM	#2 (permalink)
pocon1 Banned	nothing to say Last edited by pocon1; 07-06-2008 at 09:32 PM..

04-16-2006, 09:31 AM	#4 (permalink)
Marvelous Marv Cunning Runt Location: Taking a mulligan	I recently talked with a retired four-star who told me he thought Rumsfeld was the worst secretary of defense since McNamara. My observation (and no, I don't know every senior officer) is that the military leaders do not consider Bush and Cheney to be the problem that you do, and they most certainly are not using Rumsfeld as a "smokescreen." __________________ "The problem with socialism is that you eventually run out of other people's money." Margaret Thatcher

04-16-2006, 02:44 PM	#6 (permalink)
1010011010 Psycho Location: Virginia Beach, VA	"Well. Why didn't they speak up when they had the chance?" you ask? UCMJ Article 88 : CONTEMPT TOWARD OFFICIALS "Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." Because it would have been a CRIME for them to speak up. __________________ *Simple Machines in Higher Dimensions*

04-16-2006, 07:07 PM	#7 (permalink)
irateplatypus can't help but laugh Location: dar al-harb	Knight Dragon, Thanks for taking time to give us all that synopsis. Military transformation is not only a hot topic for staff-geeks in the pentagon, it is definitely being felt at the unit level. Thought about starting thread on that several times, didn't think TFP had an audience connected with the military enough to spark enough discussion. About presenting conflicting/dissenting voice to superior officers: not only will the commander win everytime, you also have to face the real possibility that his plan will have life-or-death consequences for those involved in his decision. carrying out such orders is much easier if the leadership is seen to have a single voice. how can we ask the enlisted troops to carry out the mission if every officer is bitching that his own plan wasn't adopted? __________________ If you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly, you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance for survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves. ~ Winston Churchill

04-22-2006, 12:00 PM	#10 (permalink)
politicophile Addict	Everyone applauds generals for standing up to the errors of the nation's civilian leaders... so long as one shares the generals' views. Since there is no risk of a military dictatorship developing in the U.S., we are more inclined to side with the generals in instances like this. Remember, however, that while the military should be given the authority to conduct tactical campaigns as they see fit, the political leadership governing those tactical campaigns absolutely must remain independent of the military. __________________ The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. ~John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

04-16-2006, 10:44 AM	#5 (permalink)
Knight Dragon Upright	This can be a fairly complicated issue. There are several tiers of dynamics at play here. First is the issue of candor. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, officers are obligated to be upfront and honest. The true issue is one of discretion rather than careerism. In other words, you don't openly disagree with the commanding officer in the presence of his subordinate commanders and staff just as you wouldn't do so with the CEO in the presence of the board members. Instead, discretion and judgment calls for voicing a dissenting opinion in the privacy of the commander's office. And if called on to express your view during the meeting, diplomacy suggests raising the issue of disagreement ("sir, I'm not convinced that this is the best method") and then giving a graceful way out ("I'd like to follow up with further discussion after the meeting, if it's okay with you) rather than putting the commander on the spot. Because when a commander is put on the spot, the commander will win...every time...regardless of whether or not the final decision is the right one or not. I know that naysayers will say that if a commander cannot stomach dissent, then that officer shouldn't be in command. True; however, what I'm talking about here is a professional obligation by the dissenter to present a winning argument in a way that doesn't put the commander on the spot and a professional obligation by the commander to be reasonable to criticism and dissent. Both must work together. And contrary to some of the perceptions in here, it works this way more often than not within the military decision-making process. The second issue is one of public dissent while in the military as opposed to once separated or retired from the military. This is difficult to explain to those who have never served in the military or even those who have but never made it a full career. In simple terms, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, which serves as The Law for soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen, specifically outlaws conduct that publicly embarrasses or contradicts established military policy. During the Clinton administration, several active duty officers made the dumb mistake of criticizing the President. This was a gross violation of the UCMJ, and they were punished accordingly. What we have here are the views, opinions and criticisms of private citizens. Even though still subject to the UCMJ, these retired generals are protected whenever they voice their opinions as they have so far. They are subject to the UCMJ should they compromise classified information or exchange proprietary information (e.g. technical or other information which would give a private contractor an advantage when bidding for a government contract), and none of this applies to this argument. The third issue is the one of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military leadership. There's always been a traditional understanding that the civilian leadership issues the broad goals and objectives while the military leadership works out the details to successfully accomplish those missions. The working assumption was that the civilian leadership didn't get involved in the eaches of the mission as long as they didn't violate any of the broad guidance (e.g. capturing prisoners assumes that they will be treated in accordance to the UCMJ---this shouldn't have to be spelled out, it is an implied task). However, it appears that Rumsfeld is digging deeper into the inner workings of the military than have his predecessors, and this rubs generals the wrong way. It comes across as micromanagement and interference, and perhaps it is. However, this leads into the next issue.... The fourth issue is the modernization of the US military and readiness to fight in the 21st century. This is perhaps the most contentious of all issues and, I would argue, the true root of all of this debate. There are two major schools of thought: one that envisions future wars along the lines of highly technological armies pitted against each other in multidimensional battle spaces and the other that sees Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq as the new version of modernized warfare. These still require modern technologies, but rather than combatting massive armies, the war is against guerrillas and terrorists. Many of the current military leaders in the Pentagon resist this notion and see the Vietnams, Somalias, Bosnias, Afghanistans and Iraqs as temporary deviations from the true future war: a high-tech showdown between massive armies pitted against each other in some ultimate Armageddon. Rumsfeld sought to transform the military from a cumbersome, large-scale massive force to a faster, lighter, highly maneuverable one that could adapt quickly to rapidly changing situations and successfully fight on a multi-dimensional scale. This is contrary to the traditional mindset that has existed in the Pentagon ever since World War II. Is Rumsfeld 100% correct? Not necessarily. He needs to be willing to accept certain realities when radically changing the long-prevailing mindset embedded in military leadership, doctrine, tactics, principles, techniques and tradition. But the military officers have to accept the fact that the failure to adapt to change means certain death on the battlefield. The basic building block for military maneuvers has been divisions and brigades complemented by supporting elements that span the range of combined forces (air forces, marine forces, naval forces, special forces). What is needed is a radical change that perhaps eliminates separate forces and embodies combined forces that require little tailoring as opposed to more elaborate task organization. In other words, a battalion or brigade-size multi-service force that already has its own air, marine, naval and special operations assets. This would require a radical change in the very foundations of military thinking. And this goes against the grain of many current military leaders; it forces them out of their comfort zones that have been codified by all of the major conflicts from the Revolutionary War to the first phase of the war in Iraq. In short, the current military leadership still does not think outside of the box. The current military leadership still clings to a concept of warfare based primarily on 20th century experiences. Like it or not, Vietnam was a precursor of future wars, and we conveniently categorized it as a temporary deviation from traditional warfare. We need to review Vietnam and pay attention to its painful lessons if we are to succeed in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, not saying that Rumsfeld has a clear and definitive view as I've articulated here. However, Rumsfeld is trying to change the prevailing military mindset and is coming across a lot of stiff resistance. The issue is not the war in Iraq itself. That's just the catalyst being used to inflame public opinion against Rumsfeld. The issue is the degree of influence a secretary of defense has when managing the Pentagon and the military services, especially when that secretary is trying to reshape the military.

04-22-2006, 12:17 PM	#11 (permalink)
Ample Psycho Location: In your closet	I am ex military, and know all the rules about how any military member is not to criticize anyone in their chain of command. I’m going to presume that most of these generals were in the military for about thirty years. That is a long time to have a set mindset, or have to hold your tongue. Even though these generals are retired. I don’t think they would publicly say what they have said unless they felt the Rummy was doing a terrible job. I applaud the generals for making such a bold move. Being a retired general is a pretty exclusive club, and this for sure will make them outsiders, but they stood up for what they believe in, and that is what is important.