Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post - Military Criticism of Civilian Leadership

Knight Dragon · 04-16-2006, 10:44 AM

This can be a fairly complicated issue. There are several tiers of dynamics at play here.

First is the issue of candor. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, officers are obligated to be upfront and honest. The true issue is one of discretion rather than careerism. In other words, you don't openly disagree with the commanding officer in the presence of his subordinate commanders and staff just as you wouldn't do so with the CEO in the presence of the board members. Instead, discretion and judgment calls for voicing a dissenting opinion in the privacy of the commander's office. And if called on to express your view during the meeting, diplomacy suggests raising the issue of disagreement ("sir, I'm not convinced that this is the best method") and then giving a graceful way out ("I'd like to follow up with further discussion after the meeting, if it's okay with you) rather than putting the commander on the spot. Because when a commander is put on the spot, the commander will win...every time...regardless of whether or not the final decision is the right one or not. I know that naysayers will say that if a commander cannot stomach dissent, then that officer shouldn't be in command. True; however, what I'm talking about here is a professional obligation by the dissenter to present a winning argument in a way that doesn't put the commander on the spot and a professional obligation by the commander to be reasonable to criticism and dissent. Both must work together. And contrary to some of the perceptions in here, it works this way more often than not within the military decision-making process.

The second issue is one of public dissent while in the military as opposed to once separated or retired from the military. This is difficult to explain to those who have never served in the military or even those who have but never made it a full career. In simple terms, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, which serves as The Law for soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen, specifically outlaws conduct that publicly embarrasses or contradicts established military policy. During the Clinton administration, several active duty officers made the dumb mistake of criticizing the President. This was a gross violation of the UCMJ, and they were punished accordingly. What we have here are the views, opinions and criticisms of private citizens. Even though still subject to the UCMJ, these retired generals are protected whenever they voice their opinions as they have so far. They are subject to the UCMJ should they compromise classified information or exchange proprietary information (e.g. technical or other information which would give a private contractor an advantage when bidding for a government contract), and none of this applies to this argument.

The third issue is the one of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military leadership. There's always been a traditional understanding that the civilian leadership issues the broad goals and objectives while the military leadership works out the details to successfully accomplish those missions. The working assumption was that the civilian leadership didn't get involved in the eaches of the mission as long as they didn't violate any of the broad guidance (e.g. capturing prisoners assumes that they will be treated in accordance to the UCMJ---this shouldn't have to be spelled out, it is an implied task). However, it appears that Rumsfeld is digging deeper into the inner workings of the military than have his predecessors, and this rubs generals the wrong way. It comes across as micromanagement and interference, and perhaps it is. However, this leads into the next issue....

The fourth issue is the modernization of the US military and readiness to fight in the 21st century. This is perhaps the most contentious of all issues and, I would argue, the true root of all of this debate. There are two major schools of thought: one that envisions future wars along the lines of highly technological armies pitted against each other in multidimensional battle spaces and the other that sees Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq as the new version of modernized warfare. These still require modern technologies, but rather than combatting massive armies, the war is against guerrillas and terrorists. Many of the current military leaders in the Pentagon resist this notion and see the Vietnams, Somalias, Bosnias, Afghanistans and Iraqs as temporary deviations from the true future war: a high-tech showdown between massive armies pitted against each other in some ultimate Armageddon. Rumsfeld sought to transform the military from a cumbersome, large-scale massive force to a faster, lighter, highly maneuverable one that could adapt quickly to rapidly changing situations and successfully fight on a multi-dimensional scale. This is contrary to the traditional mindset that has existed in the Pentagon ever since World War II.

Is Rumsfeld 100% correct? Not necessarily. He needs to be willing to accept certain realities when radically changing the long-prevailing mindset embedded in military leadership, doctrine, tactics, principles, techniques and tradition. But the military officers have to accept the fact that the failure to adapt to change means certain death on the battlefield. The basic building block for military maneuvers has been divisions and brigades complemented by supporting elements that span the range of combined forces (air forces, marine forces, naval forces, special forces). What is needed is a radical change that perhaps eliminates separate forces and embodies combined forces that require little tailoring as opposed to more elaborate task organization. In other words, a battalion or brigade-size multi-service force that already has its own air, marine, naval and special operations assets. This would require a radical change in the very foundations of military thinking. And this goes against the grain of many current military leaders; it forces them out of their comfort zones that have been codified by all of the major conflicts from the Revolutionary War to the first phase of the war in Iraq. In short, the current military leadership still does not think outside of the box. The current military leadership still clings to a concept of warfare based primarily on 20th century experiences.

Like it or not, Vietnam was a precursor of future wars, and we conveniently categorized it as a temporary deviation from traditional warfare. We need to review Vietnam and pay attention to its painful lessons if we are to succeed in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Again, not saying that Rumsfeld has a clear and definitive view as I've articulated here. However, Rumsfeld is trying to change the prevailing military mindset and is coming across a lot of stiff resistance.

The issue is not the war in Iraq itself. That's just the catalyst being used to inflame public opinion against Rumsfeld. The issue is the degree of influence a secretary of defense has when managing the Pentagon and the military services, especially when that secretary is trying to reshape the military.

04-16-2006, 10:44 AM	#5 (permalink)
Knight Dragon Upright	This can be a fairly complicated issue. There are several tiers of dynamics at play here. First is the issue of candor. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, officers are obligated to be upfront and honest. The true issue is one of discretion rather than careerism. In other words, you don't openly disagree with the commanding officer in the presence of his subordinate commanders and staff just as you wouldn't do so with the CEO in the presence of the board members. Instead, discretion and judgment calls for voicing a dissenting opinion in the privacy of the commander's office. And if called on to express your view during the meeting, diplomacy suggests raising the issue of disagreement ("sir, I'm not convinced that this is the best method") and then giving a graceful way out ("I'd like to follow up with further discussion after the meeting, if it's okay with you) rather than putting the commander on the spot. Because when a commander is put on the spot, the commander will win...every time...regardless of whether or not the final decision is the right one or not. I know that naysayers will say that if a commander cannot stomach dissent, then that officer shouldn't be in command. True; however, what I'm talking about here is a professional obligation by the dissenter to present a winning argument in a way that doesn't put the commander on the spot and a professional obligation by the commander to be reasonable to criticism and dissent. Both must work together. And contrary to some of the perceptions in here, it works this way more often than not within the military decision-making process. The second issue is one of public dissent while in the military as opposed to once separated or retired from the military. This is difficult to explain to those who have never served in the military or even those who have but never made it a full career. In simple terms, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, which serves as The Law for soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen, specifically outlaws conduct that publicly embarrasses or contradicts established military policy. During the Clinton administration, several active duty officers made the dumb mistake of criticizing the President. This was a gross violation of the UCMJ, and they were punished accordingly. What we have here are the views, opinions and criticisms of private citizens. Even though still subject to the UCMJ, these retired generals are protected whenever they voice their opinions as they have so far. They are subject to the UCMJ should they compromise classified information or exchange proprietary information (e.g. technical or other information which would give a private contractor an advantage when bidding for a government contract), and none of this applies to this argument. The third issue is the one of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military leadership. There's always been a traditional understanding that the civilian leadership issues the broad goals and objectives while the military leadership works out the details to successfully accomplish those missions. The working assumption was that the civilian leadership didn't get involved in the eaches of the mission as long as they didn't violate any of the broad guidance (e.g. capturing prisoners assumes that they will be treated in accordance to the UCMJ---this shouldn't have to be spelled out, it is an implied task). However, it appears that Rumsfeld is digging deeper into the inner workings of the military than have his predecessors, and this rubs generals the wrong way. It comes across as micromanagement and interference, and perhaps it is. However, this leads into the next issue.... The fourth issue is the modernization of the US military and readiness to fight in the 21st century. This is perhaps the most contentious of all issues and, I would argue, the true root of all of this debate. There are two major schools of thought: one that envisions future wars along the lines of highly technological armies pitted against each other in multidimensional battle spaces and the other that sees Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq as the new version of modernized warfare. These still require modern technologies, but rather than combatting massive armies, the war is against guerrillas and terrorists. Many of the current military leaders in the Pentagon resist this notion and see the Vietnams, Somalias, Bosnias, Afghanistans and Iraqs as temporary deviations from the true future war: a high-tech showdown between massive armies pitted against each other in some ultimate Armageddon. Rumsfeld sought to transform the military from a cumbersome, large-scale massive force to a faster, lighter, highly maneuverable one that could adapt quickly to rapidly changing situations and successfully fight on a multi-dimensional scale. This is contrary to the traditional mindset that has existed in the Pentagon ever since World War II. Is Rumsfeld 100% correct? Not necessarily. He needs to be willing to accept certain realities when radically changing the long-prevailing mindset embedded in military leadership, doctrine, tactics, principles, techniques and tradition. But the military officers have to accept the fact that the failure to adapt to change means certain death on the battlefield. The basic building block for military maneuvers has been divisions and brigades complemented by supporting elements that span the range of combined forces (air forces, marine forces, naval forces, special forces). What is needed is a radical change that perhaps eliminates separate forces and embodies combined forces that require little tailoring as opposed to more elaborate task organization. In other words, a battalion or brigade-size multi-service force that already has its own air, marine, naval and special operations assets. This would require a radical change in the very foundations of military thinking. And this goes against the grain of many current military leaders; it forces them out of their comfort zones that have been codified by all of the major conflicts from the Revolutionary War to the first phase of the war in Iraq. In short, the current military leadership still does not think outside of the box. The current military leadership still clings to a concept of warfare based primarily on 20th century experiences. Like it or not, Vietnam was a precursor of future wars, and we conveniently categorized it as a temporary deviation from traditional warfare. We need to review Vietnam and pay attention to its painful lessons if we are to succeed in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, not saying that Rumsfeld has a clear and definitive view as I've articulated here. However, Rumsfeld is trying to change the prevailing military mindset and is coming across a lot of stiff resistance. The issue is not the war in Iraq itself. That's just the catalyst being used to inflame public opinion against Rumsfeld. The issue is the degree of influence a secretary of defense has when managing the Pentagon and the military services, especially when that secretary is trying to reshape the military.