Sartre/Nietzsche Project Thread

[noodles]

i have a paper coming up soon in class and i've found myself at a frustrating intersection. i've studied these two barrels of laughs for a few weeks. i have two thesies, i only have to write an argument/objection/reply paper on one of the two. i can't come up with any good objections to my argument(s) because i've spent the last month or so discussing the topics and every objection i come up with seems like it has an obvious answer, which is not what i'd consider a GOOD objection. a good one is a brain-buster that isn't something one can brush off with an easy reply. anyway, i'd appreciate some fresh insight and objection ideas on the topics and i'll try and put sufficient background information to help, if more info is needed, i'll provide.

1) Sartre is right in thinking that we have no excuses for the choices we make.
[background info: sartre pushes the idea of radical free will. man can choose to do anything it wants, just circumstances won't necessarily allow a choice to come to fruitition; for example, an inmate can choose to break out of jail but it doesn't mean he will succeed]

2) Nietzsche is correct in thinking that Judeo-Christian beliefs are dominated by reactive forces.
[background info: nietzsche thinks judeo-christian followers' actions are all based on the slave morality. slave morality being a morality that defines a person based on what they are not (for example, the ten commandments: you are good if you are not an adulterer, murderer, etc.), instead of what they are. slave morality is an example of reactive forces. reactive forces are characterized by acting in opposition to and attempting to prevent the fruition of active forces, which are characterized by simply doing their best to attain their goal.]

p.s.: an objection is just an example where the thesis is (possibly) incorrect. i can handle doing the replies myself, if i think the objection is good enough.

[Master_Shake]

So do you want us to object to what you have as Sartre and Nietzsche's contentions, the contentions themselves, or to your interpretation of their contentions?
i.e.
Sartre is incorrect in saying that we have have no excuses for our choices, or
we have excuses for our choices, or
Sartre doesn't say that we have no excuses for our choices.

[noodles]

the first and second example work well.
sartre, though, pretty much flat out says that we have no excuses for our actions, so that third one is pretty much out.

[Master_Shake]

http://www.bluedojo.com/papers/determinism2/ has some decent information on Paul Holbach's essay, "The Illusion of Free Will."

I have personally always responded to the causality rejection of free will.

Consider the action on a pool table. The blow of a cue stick on a billiard ball (event 1) causes the motion of the ball (event 2), which causes the ball to reach the pocket (event 3), where it falls into the netting (event 4). In this model, given the properties of the objects to be acted upon and a set of initial actions, the changes in the system that follow are a matter of actions and reactions, or in other words, a chain of events. To trace causes is to trace the chain. An event that cannot be traced back to preceding events is, in this view, an event without a cause.
Our observations of the world around us support this cause and effect process. Although it is often difficult to locate causes, and although their is rarely only one cause, every effect we observe has been caused by something preceeding it. To assume that our minds operate differently then the rest of our environment, even though our brains are made of the same physical matter as those things around us, is to assume that the mind is the singular object that does not conform to cause and effect. I personally, don't think we're that special.
Even accepting the chaos theory of cause and effect, that slight variations in initial conditions can lead to wildly divergent results, only affects our ability to predict. The fact that much of what we observe may be based on random processes that we are unable to predict does not equal free will.
Peace.

[wilbjammin]

Free will is highly limited by the environment. He talks about how imagination is the limit of of free will within the facticity of life, but I think that imagination is limited by environmental constrains as well. One can only imagine the arguments that Simone de Beauvoir had with him over this coming from a historical perspective of how women have been treated and why certain behaviors have been normalized.

[noodles]

Originally Posted by Master_Shake

http://www.bluedojo.com/papers/determinism2/ has some decent information on Paul Holbach's essay, "The Illusion of Free Will."

I have personally always responded to the causality rejection of free will.

Consider the action on a pool table. The blow of a cue stick on a billiard ball (event 1) causes the motion of the ball (event 2), which causes the ball to reach the pocket (event 3), where it falls into the netting (event 4). In this model, given the properties of the objects to be acted upon and a set of initial actions, the changes in the system that follow are a matter of actions and reactions, or in other words, a chain of events. To trace causes is to trace the chain. An event that cannot be traced back to preceding events is, in this view, an event without a cause.
Our observations of the world around us support this cause and effect process. Although it is often difficult to locate causes, and although their is rarely only one cause, every effect we observe has been caused by something preceeding it. To assume that our minds operate differently then the rest of our environment, even though our brains are made of the same physical matter as those things around us, is to assume that the mind is the singular object that does not conform to cause and effect. I personally, don't think we're that special.
Even accepting the chaos theory of cause and effect, that slight variations in initial conditions can lead to wildly divergent results, only affects our ability to predict. The fact that much of what we observe may be based on random processes that we are unable to predict does not equal free will.
Peace.

interesteing, but i think slightly astray of the topic
in the sartrean view of radical free will, we always have a choice. no matter what. even in a chain of events leading up to whatever the current decision is, there is always a choice. it doesn't mean we can act on this choice, it doesn't mean that it is an easy choice to make, but there is still an uninfluenced choice.

[noodles]

Originally Posted by wilbjammin

Free will is highly limited by the environment. He talks about how imagination is the limit of of free will within the facticity of life, but I think that imagination is limited by environmental constrains as well. One can only imagine the arguments that Simone de Beauvoir had with him over this coming from a historical perspective of how women have been treated and why certain behaviors have been normalized.

a good objection. the reply is an interesting one. sartre separated the body (being) and the mind (nothingness). the choices that went on in the mind had little to no interaction with the body, where the capability to actually carry out these choices lies.
(i would say that) sartre will state quite plainly that the environment does not limit any choices. if you care to give me a specific environmental example, i'll see if it'll pass the test of my understanding of sartre's philosophy.

p.s.: thanks for the responses, guys, i do appreciate them. if i'm being dismissive of the responses, its because thats what the paper is all about feel free to continue to argue your point as it may lead to a deeper one that is an even better objection.

[wilbjammin]

Example: You're an upper-middle class woman sometime in the 1800s. You grow up in a family that teaches you that success for a woman is to get married. All of your friends talk to you constantly about how they can't wait to be married, how they want their marriage to be huge, how they want their invitations, etc. You have never in your whole life even considered not getting married and being an individual independent of a husband.

Someone asks you to marry him - he's of the right class, your parents like him, your friends like him, so you marry him.

Environmentally, you have been limited creatively by not seeing any viable alternatives to the typical "go get married" attitude, you haven't seen "successful" women that haven't been married, and you've never imagined yourself not getting married. This is severely going to limit your choices, even though it is theoretically true that you could say "no, I'm not getting married" and you use your immense creative well to create alternate realities - you won't. Our radical freedom is always limited by our unwillingness to consider ideas because we haven't seen these alternate ideas in practice, or we have been so "programmed" by our environment that we've been taught (brainwashed) that there is only one thing that we're actually free to do. I think most of us feel limited in this way, and it takes a special kind of brilliance (or sociopathic tendancies) that the average person doesn't have to break out of this mold.

Additionally: There is a really great book by Lakoff and Johnson that argues that you cannot uphold the seperation of mind and body called Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.

[noodles]

Originally Posted by wilbjammin

Example: You're an upper-middle class woman sometime in the 1800s. You grow up in a family that teaches you that success for a woman is to get married. All of your friends talk to you constantly about how they can't wait to be married, how they want their marriage to be huge, how they want their invitations, etc. You have never in your whole life even considered not getting married and being an individual independent of a husband.

Someone asks you to marry him - he's of the right class, your parents like him, your friends like him, so you marry him.

Environmentally, you have been limited creatively by not seeing any viable alternatives to the typical "go get married" attitude, you haven't seen "successful" women that haven't been married, and you've never imagined yourself not getting married. This is severely going to limit your choices, even though it is theoretically true that you could say "no, I'm not getting married" and you use your immense creative well to create alternate realities - you won't. Our radical freedom is always limited by our unwillingness to consider ideas because we haven't seen these alternate ideas in practice, or we have been so "programmed" by our environment that we've been taught (brainwashed) that there is only one thing that we're actually free to do. I think most of us feel limited in this way, and it takes a special kind of brilliance (or sociopathic tendancies) that the average person doesn't have to break out of this mold.

Additionally: There is a really great book by Lakoff and Johnson that argues that you cannot uphold the seperation of mind and body called Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.

i believe this is what sartre refers to as "bad faith". the indivudial in question is telling itself that there really is only one viable choice, to get married, when in realtity, the option to get not get married is also a choice.

[wilbjammin]

Originally Posted by noodles

i believe this is what sartre refers to as "bad faith". the indivudial in question is telling itself that there really is only one viable choice, to get married, when in realtity, the option to get not get married is also a choice.

Yes, but even conceiving of the other choice requires an imagination that has room for that view of reality.

[noodles]

Originally Posted by wilbjammin

Yes, but even conceiving of the other choice requires an imagination that has room for that view of reality.

interesting point. i get the gist of it though the example you provided isn't quite the same

i also came up with a good argument: people with OCD.

[roachboy]

the characterization of sartre above makes him sound like a platonist, who understands that the concept of free will entails a manifold (unconditioned free will) that is limited by the situation (the occaision as kierkegaard said) but in a problematic way (awareness of the fact of limitation)....this underlying conception is best criticized by wittgenstein in philosophical investigations, in his rejection of the notion of meaning in favor of usage.

on the nietzsche matter: i am not sure what exactly you mean by "reactive"....clarify maybe?

[asaris]

Sartre's certainly not a Platonist; the main problem with your formulation, roachboy, is that for Sartre, what the situation itself is is dependant on our choices.

As far as an objection to Sartre's notion of radical freedom -- Sartre says that once in a great while, we undergo a 'radical conversion', a fundamental shift in the way we view the world. Because its so fundamental, there can't be any reasons for the shift. This is, for Sartre, the paradigm of what freedom is. But how do we distinguish the sort of freedom of radical conversion from mere randomness?

[roachboy]

i know, asaris--that is why i framed what i wrote as being about the characterization of sartre, not about sartre. but i found the characteriztion interesting enough to comment on. i am not sure where the characterization is situated with reference to sartre's work--there are a number of phases to it, with differing formulations of basic questions. it sounds like the thread is oriented around earlier work, but i am not sure. knowing this would help, actually.

and i still do not understand what is meant by "reactive" in the nietzsche argument.

[asaris]

Sorry, roachboy. I should have picked up on that, but I was in a hurry. Anything I say about Sartre is based on Being and Nothingness since that's the only work of Sartre's I've read (though I've seen No Exit). Whether or not that's what the original poster has in mind, I don't know. The Nietzsche argument seems like a non-starter to me. Nietzsche, or, to be precise, early and middle Nietzsche, had a more nuanced view of Christianity than his later writings would lead you to believe. The best example I can think of, which occurs rather early in The Gay Science, talks about the ascetic and paints him in a pretty positive light.

As far as what 'reactive' means, I would guess he's referring to the idea that "slave morality" is formulated in reaction to "master morality". As far as objections to Nietzsche's characterization of this in the Geneaology, there are two ways I'd go. Either using some variation of Hegel's master/slave dialectic or the simpler line of reasoning that, if the slave morality won out, that must mean that the slave morality is really the strongest and therefore best exemplifies the will to power. They more or less amount to the same objection, though the Hegelian is going to be the more sophisticated.

[noodles]

indeed, i'm only starting to study sartre and its admittedly basic and therefore narrow in its viewpoint. if you guys have anything to add, feel free. i'd love to get a little more info on radical conversion.

ok, forces in nietzsche. nietzsche in <u>the genealogy of morals</u> describes two types of forces that are present in the world: active and reactive. active forces seek to go to the limit of their abilities; reactive forces seek to separate active forces from what they seek to accomplish. people, events, historical epochs are all products of the dynamics of forces. forces have a "will to power" which is the process by which forces attempt take ahold of practices to express themselves.

one can take the doctorine of forces either ethically or as an ontological doctorine, his writing never specifies which he believes in: using it to evaluate whats going on in the world as either active or reactive or that forces actually exist and they're doing their thing right now.

i know its a really cursory and garbled explanation, but i'm in a hurry hopefully it helps

[noodles]

Originally Posted by asaris

Sorry, roachboy. I should have picked up on that, but I was in a hurry. Anything I say about Sartre is based on Being and Nothingness since that's the only work of Sartre's I've read (though I've seen No Exit). Whether or not that's what the original poster has in mind, I don't know. The Nietzsche argument seems like a non-starter to me. Nietzsche, or, to be precise, early and middle Nietzsche, had a more nuanced view of Christianity than his later writings would lead you to believe. The best example I can think of, which occurs rather early in The Gay Science, talks about the ascetic and paints him in a pretty positive light.

As far as what 'reactive' means, I would guess he's referring to the idea that "slave morality" is formulated in reaction to "master morality". As far as objections to Nietzsche's characterization of this in the Geneaology, there are two ways I'd go. Either using some variation of Hegel's master/slave dialectic or the simpler line of reasoning that, if the slave morality won out, that must mean that the slave morality is really the strongest and therefore best exemplifies the will to power. They more or less amount to the same objection, though the Hegelian is going to be the more sophisticated.

i've read sartre's essay on existentialism, where most of my ideas are coming from, and some of being and nothingness.

slave and master morality are dominated by reactive and actove forces, respectively. slave morality can be summed up with the statement "you are bad, therefore i am good". master (noble) morality as "i am good". master morality simply does what it does, knowing its actions are good though they aren't defined by anything. slave morality defines itself by what it is not (i.e.: 10 commandments; "thou shalt not...").

[noodles]

i'd also like to add that i don't really think the nietzsche topic is one i can pursue effectively. in the sartre topic, all i need to prove is one counterexample. in the nietzsche topic, i'd need to find a way to prove the tradition is not dominated by reactive forces and i don't really know how to do this.

[RedbeardUH]

I would presume your topic is finished by now, but just in case you still need help....
A good argument against Sartre would be the social forces of norm. Yes (assuming free will) an individual can choose to "marry" or "not marry," but that same individual cannot choose the definition of "marry" or "not marry." They are socially contrived. The individual has no power over language.

Ponder this: The fact that the English language has a subject/verb requirement (ie: I (sub) am (verb) our thought and language becomes very influenced by this. Other languages with their different structural language have different philosopical-linguistical restraints.

On Nietzche, you should read Jaque Derrida's essays on play. The one flaw (that I've found) in Nietzche's writing is that he eliminates Metaphysics entirely. Yet, because language is entirely arbitrary and relative, it implies a metaphyics of its own. But if you thought Nietzsche/Sartre were hard, Derrida is harder than Chinese algebra