cypher197

I wish to caution that this is just a draft, and really needs to be enhanced and made more rigorous. I think, however, that the approach has some strong potential.

This was originally posted elsewhere at the request of a friend, but I'm reposting it here to open it up for more people to chew on.
I'm also posting it to 'link' to my post in the Burka thread.

My goal here is that we *can* build the foundation for a cohesive theory of morality even without absolute knowledge of objective reality. This permits secular moral theories to survive nesting of realities (think The Matrix.)

There is no need for moral relativism.

Edit: Anyhow, what I'd like is for you to chew on this and see what you find. Currently, I think the biggest weakness is in the vagueness of its definition of personhood, but I imagine there's a variety of other things people from other perspectives will find and point out.
I created this out of a desire to escape moral relativism and radical skepticism as underminers for a moral theory, and I think this is a promising approach. Thoughts?

----
Is this the true reality?
At some point, that no longer matters.


The more appropriate question is, "is this reality useful?"


Can I observe this reality?
Can I make predictions about this reality, using those observations?
Can I test those predictions about this reality?
Can I make models based on the results of those tests?
Can I manipulate this reality using those models?
Can I change my mental state by manipulating this reality?


If the answer to all six questions is yes, then this reality is sufficiently real to be useful.
If, at some point, the answer to one of these questions becomes no, then it is no longer sufficiently real to be useful.


We may make inferrences based on data, and operate on them as if they were true, until such time as new data suggests either a better inferrence or that the existing inferrence is invalid.


---
Nested (or Linked) Realities


If the contents of a reality can be altered from some other reality outside of it, these realities are linked.


The more a linked reality can be altered from within a current reality, the more useful the current reality is over the linked reality.


---
Other People


A system cannot be perfectly modeled by a system less complex than the minimum complexity it can be reduced to.


That is, to say:
+ There is some minimum complexity a system can be reduced to, and still produce the same results.
+ A different system which is less complex than that minimum cannot produce or predict exactly the same results.


If we cannot completely model the actions of another apparent individual internally, then they must be at least more complex than our most powerful possible internal model of them.
( For human beings, we can offload some of our simulation work off onto our dedicated human hardware, which means our models of other humans can be even more advanced. That means hey, this other person's a pretty complex system! )


This presents a couple possibilities:
+ They are a subcomponent of the same system as ourself, of which we are also a subcomponent.
+ They are a whole or part of a separate system from ourself.
In both cases, something other than our immediate self exists.

In either case, if we have reason to believe that a separate apparent entity is a person, because it acts like a person, with the complexity of a person, we should do so.


---
Value


That which pleases us has value.
Why? Because we like it.
Value is subjectively experienced. It cannot be proven absolutely to originate in a particular reality.

Suppose, for example, that we have physical brains in some reality. If the reality we witness is simulated, but affects that high-level reality (imagine getting hurt in a video game injecting drugs into your real body), then what we're really measuring when we examine the physical brain in our perceived/simulated reality is correlation of mood, not causation of mood. We cannot prove absolutely that the reality we're observing is the one our physical brains exist in. This is why, as per the next section, we must rely on agent reports of value.

---
Spreading Value to Others


We are a system of a certain complexity and experience subjective value.


If a separate entity of sufficient complexity to qualify as a person expresses that it experiences subjective value, we have no logical reason to deny it, as it is so complex that we cannot contain it internally. ( That is to say, we do not have grounds to reject its assertion, and we cannot reject its assertion without calling into question our own personhood. )


We must rely on an entity's own reports to determine its subjective value-experience, although we can conclude if this report is sufficiently likely to be false based on the truthfulness of the entity's past reports on verifiable data.


If an entity does not express its subjective value-experience, and we have no reason to believe it has one, it is not useful to attempt to appease it. This is because we cannot usefully predict what its subjective value-experience will be.
(We might infer, for example, that a mute, living human who does not use our language experiences value, despite him having the inability to articulate it to us. We might also infer that a rock experiences no value.)

Ourcrazymodern?

I'm sorry, cypher197, but I chewed & chewed on that - (I read it twice) - & all that occurs to me is that our politics are probably in the same neighborhood. The possibilities provided by individuals interacting with their personal realities & their fellows at the same time boggles this one's mind, so I don't know if I should ask "Was there a question?"

__________________
BE JUST AND FEAR NOT

WhoaitsZ

I read it multiple times. I ran out of duct tape to tape my exploded head together after the last 5 or so tries...

cypher197

I was hoping someone might point out a flaw or problem with it that I hadn't realized so that I could correct and evaluate the theory better, but I may have to hunt out a dedicated philosophy community.

Well, I may also have phrased it poorly... >_>

The_Jazz

I think that next time you post something like this, you should realize that we're a discussion community. There's not much to discuss in this thread. It probably would have done better in our blog section.

__________________
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." - B. Franklin
"There ought to be limits to freedom." - George W. Bush
"We have met the enemy and he is us." - Pogo

roachboy

what is the point of a realist approach to ethics?
that's the only viewpoint from which this whole tiresome matter of "knowing" about some fiction called "objective reality" so that a community can agree not to do certain things (institute an ethics) makes any sense.

an ethics follows from a way of talking about an agreement made by a community to not do certain things.
typically because people who like ethical discourse are nervous about the ability of people who are not themselves to adhere to limitations based on a mere agreement, they like to route what is agreed to through some other register. sometimes through the fiction of "objective reality"---other times through some god-fiction.

all these moves do is place intensifiers.

to wit:

you REALLY shouldn't do x.

unless of course you believe the story that routes what is agreed to through some second-order source or space or explanation, in which case it's terribly meaningful and only a churl would say otherwise.

and nobody likes a churl.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Baraka_Guru

It's like an attempt to reinvent Buddhism or some other similar model of applied ethics.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

Orogun01

cypher, you should define your notion of what makes a reality before basing a code of ethics on it. You offer a set of questions in order to define what makes a reality "useful" and at the same time you question the veracity of reality.
It requires a metaphysical explanation to your notion of what constitutes a reality.

Baraka_Guru

I think most of us struggle with this idea of objective reality vs. subjective perspectives. We'd like to think there is a Reality "out there" and we'd like to think we can get to it if we try hard enough. We'd like to think we can master it and therefore master our destinies. Of course, if it were so easy, we'd all be gods.

This "objectivity" vs. "subjectivity" is essentially two sides of the same coin, which is Reality. Reality is there whether you can see it or not. Most of us are incapable of seeing it because there are too many distractions, too many filters, and most of us are steeped in delusion. We don't know how to flip the coin, and even if we find out how, there is no guarantee it will land the right side up. Even if it does, there is no guarantee it won't flip back over again. Nothing is stable, everything in in flux.

The more we grasp at things, the more they elude us.

The trick is to not grasp for the coin—nay, there is no "trick"; there is simply watching the coin.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

roachboy

i still don't understand why an ethics of any kind requires a position one way or another about "objective reality" whatever that is. i mean, except as a defining feature of "Realism". but why does realism make any sense?

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Baraka_Guru

Well, I suppose a universal truth vis-à-vis an observable objective reality is good to know. For example, if doing A causes X suffering, while doing B reduces X's suffering, and it is always the case, then I suppose realism makes sense. Because then we could do B as an ethical decision, and we could avoid doing A for the same reason.

It's when we get into specifics that we run into problems. Nothing in ethics is formulaic (that I know of), which is why constantly observing reality is essential if you want to go that route.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

roachboy

why would a notion of "universal truth" (which is just as problematic as "objective reality") be required for an ethics?

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Baraka_Guru

Because how would you know about direction? I find that universal truth can act as a starting point in ethics. They in and of themselves cannot be relied upon for making specific ethical decisions, but they guide us toward that.

For example, I would say that one universal truth is that violence is harmful. But that in and of itself isn't useful in making decisions because there are circumstances that are unaccounted for in that idea.

Knowing violence is harmful allows us to make more specific judgement such as "murder is wrong." Otherwise, what makes it wrong? Think about Libya where the government has it in their mind that it is in their right to kill innocent civilians. What makes them wrong? Are they wrong? We think they're wrong because we believe the innocent do not deserve death in this way. But these are relative positions. I think this government knows damn well that violence causes harm; it's why they're using it. It is through the idea of universal truth that we can apply a unified set of ideals that apply globally, despite those who would choose to eschew them. Or are these all just opinions? Maybe Ghaddafi isn't "wrong" per se. Do we just disagree with him?

You could even say, well, but sadomasochists think that violence is pleasurable. But is this so in the absence of harm? Do they not find the pleasure in the harm? Between consensual adults, perhaps the violence they partake in isn't wrong after all, but it is still true that violence causes harm.

Is it not a universal truth that violence is harmful?

Even if the violence is inept and doesn't actually inflict any physical damage, I think the harmful nature of violence is unavoidable. Simply getting into a state to want to inflict violence is itself a harmful state, both to the minds of those involved and to the bystanders who may be horrified by it.

Violence is an intent to harm or destroy; how is this not harmful? But that is not the point. As I said, it's not universal truth that we use in ethical decisions. It's subjective observations based on what we know objectively.

Two sides of the same coin, but when you make a purchase, you need to use the whole coin.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

roachboy

so objective is a synonym for transcendent.
i'm fine with that.

i don't think you need statements on the order of a universal or transcendent validity to ground an ethics. i think you merely need a socially binding prohibition. what makes for a socially binding prohibition can involve many different registers of statement---but what's objectively/transcendently valid about any of those statements, really, is their function in shoring up the socially binding character of a given prohibition. that's it. and nothing more than that is required.

unless you're doing something like trying to figure out how to write a universal declaration of human rights or other such document which operates rhetorically in a space that requires (de facto) claims to universality---but that's a rhetorical register. the question of whether claim x or y written in that register **is** universal apart from the its operating in a sentence that stages it as universal in a particular context is an aesthetic matter. how could it be otherwise? to whom would one appeal to determine?

of course, it's also possible that what's universal is what everyone says is universal and because everyone says it, that thing is necessarily universal because the characteristic that defines the universal is that everyone says it is universal.

and/or you could say that universality is a rhetorical mode used in ethical propositions to the extent that they use a collective second person, work in the imperative and are written to apply to the entirety of a given community. and i'd agree with that.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

cypher197

A "reality", in this case, refers to a possible reality as experienced via our senses. It's difficult to define, I may have to think about it a bit more to come up with a definition rigorous enough for you.

Basically, we cannot absolutely prove that some reality is the "true" reality. It could, at any point, be something falsified through false sensory inputs or hallucinations.

Imagine if some human beings were hooked up to a computer simulated virtual environment, which completely enveloped all their senses. We could be in such a situation now. The point of this approach is that it *doesn't matter* if that virtual environment is the top-level reality; once you meet certain preconditions, you may construct a consequentialist moral theory, regardless of whether the reality you perceive is the "true" reality, and regardless of whether the reality you perceive is the one which your continued existence depends on.

---------- Post added at 05:47 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:28 PM ----------

Would it be fair to say that, perhaps, this is what my approach is attempting?

There is this idea that proof via induction is impossible, but with regards to reality, induction based on our observations is really all we have.

So, how do we reach something which is objectively true in order to have a proper moral theory to act upon, given that we can only reason about a rather limited number of topics in order to obtain objective truth, and that pretty much everything we know about "reality" is based on potentially-falsifiable sense inputs? This is what my approach intends to work on.

I had not considered any relation to Buddhism, in part because, to my knowledge, Buddhism rejects material things, while material things can be quite useful; especially when it appears that our time alive is subject to possibly overcome-able material constraints.

---------- Post added at 06:00 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:47 PM ----------

Firstly, without universal principals, how am I to decry something as morally wrong? I would have no philosophical backing with which to do so, no justification for my claim. "X is wrong." "Why is X wrong?"

It's largely a matter of logical consistency. It requires no appeal.

You cannot have two of some item and also have none of that same item, at exactly the same point in time. Something cannot both exist and not exist at the same point in time.
Now, for example, if something exists some of the time, but not all of the time, or has an x% likelihood of existing at some time, that isn't the same thing as both existing and not existing; it's more complicated.
Often, when I've seen a statement that both "X exists" and "X does not exist" at the same time, "X" isn't exactly the same thing, or it is otherwise more complicated.

Edit: Note, if we reject logic, that self-invalidates the claims necessary in order to reject logic.



---------- Post added at 06:14 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:00 PM ----------

That's actually a claim based on observation.

We have to determine what "harmful" is, and, to some degree, what "violence" is. Unless, you are going to define violence as something which causes harm?

Anyhow, let us take an example. A man's leg is chopped off by a criminal. He makes a quick recovery, and while in the hospital, meets a nurse that becomes the love of his life. Due to his frustration, he invents a new treatment which allows the vat growth of replacement human limbs. He finds the work very rewarding, and is hailed as a genius throughout society, etc. Basically, he lives every day in joy.
On balance, the criminal's action was not harmful, as it lead to a chain of events which were greatly beneficial both to his victim and to society; more beneficial than any damage he had caused.

Let us consider another scenario. The criminal cuts off the man's leg. It turned out the man did not want this leg anyway, and thinks losing it was a wonderful thing. (A rather eccentric man, apparently.) Was the criminal's action harmful?

Also consider a man committing violence against a building, and by doing so preventing a fire from spreading. Was the violence harmful? Can a building be harmed?

If a building being harmed does not count, then why does the human body count, as it is also material? Wouldn't it only count if it lead to damage to the mind in some way?
Would it still be considered violence and harmful if it affected not the man himself, but his MMORPG avatar?

Violence leading to harm is a causal relationship.

"I think, therefore I am." is different in kind, non?

Baraka_Guru

It's fair to admit that this is your approach if it suits your purposes. It would help us summarize your position if we can use that metaphor.

In balancing the different between reality and delusion, it necessary involves observation. But it also involves contemplation and a constant effort towards being present in the moment, within the reality you seek to discover.

I think your problem---or challenge, as it were---is that you are trying to create a systematized approach to something that is constantly changing. You can't come up with a formula for this kind of thing, because even if you could, it would become obsolete the very next moment. The universe, despite observable cycles on a macro level, is in constant flux. This exemplifies the importance of living in the moment if you wish to observe and respond to reality. If you glimpse it only to back off from it to come up with theories and formulas so you can anticipate future reality parameters and how to adequately respond to it, you've just participated in an act of futility. By the time you come up with anything, the moment has passed.

The key is remaining in the moment, looking at "now."

It's a rather common misconception of Buddhism to think that it is world-denying and pessimistic, or interested in "rejecting" material reality. The opposite it the case. Buddhism acknowledges the body's required material reality; what it warns against is clinging to this reality in futility----that is usually where people get confused, I think. Even the Buddha himself taught that being materially secure (i.e. via a household) is good because it means you are less of a burden on others and are in a position to help others. There are many other aspects to this, but I don't want to get sidetracked.

I will have to return to your further comments later.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

cypher197

A "model" of reality can be something as simple as a subconscious method for estimating where a ball will land when thrown with some amount of force - something which you don't really think much about before doing.
It can also be something so complex as the theories manipulated by particle physicists.

Like those theories of particle physicists that took so long to devise, a subconscious understanding of where some object is likely to land when thrown can be quite useful. Yes, reality changes, but from my observations, it does not change quickly enough to make investment in more complicated and computationally expensive models necessarily wasteful.
I seek to create a formal framework so that I may say "X is bad." and do so with proper philosophical backing.

Perhaps my statement that "X is bad." will be based on an estimation, but at least this estimation will be based on something reasonable, and will be subject to disproof when/if presented with good counter-evidence.

Orogun01

It's just part of formality, to state one views on the subject. Your main focuses seem to be the greater moral good, and the nature of reality.
But your definition of reality it's vague enough to invite any interpretation of reality. To follow your analogy, there is no telling that the ball and it's trajectory are not virtual constructs of a machine.

On your Opening Post you set "Can I make predictions about this reality, using those observations?" as a requirement for your definition of reality.
But it doesn't account for the physical differences that the same object may have on different states of "reality". Let's same a comparison between a ball and a virtual ball.

The problem with a cohesive morality theory it's that it fails to account the different subjective views. The metaphysical and even mystical experiences vary from person, making it difficult to make a moral "absolute". Specially considering that the "true" state of nature it's without morality.

cypher197

It does not matter if the ball and its trajectory are virtual constructs of a machine. That is part of the point of the theory.

I think you misunderstood. That requirement is not for a reality, but a criterion for whether some perceived reality is useful. A reality which it is impossible to make predictions about makes consequentialism effectively impossible to implement, for reasons that should be obvious. You cannot deliberately undertake some action to bring about some intended consequence if you cannot make predictions about the world. In such a world, a moral theory, which exists to guide actions, is useless.

On the contrary. This theory builds its moral framework by pooling subjective experiences. Value is, after all, subjectively experienced.

1. And I can say, definitively, that I exist. That is absolutely true at this point in time.
2. And, I can say that I experience emotions, including positive ones. (Positive emotions being positive value.)
3. And I can say that there is a minimum complexity to which any system can be reduced while still producing identical results/outputs given identical inputs.

#1 and #2 may change in the future, but #3 cannot.

---------- Post added at 11:14 PM ---------- Previous post was at 10:53 PM ----------

I'd like to clearly state that, for any given situation, the probability that an actor governed by this system will pick the absolutely perfect response is pretty much zero, because they do not have perfect knowledge.

The goal for the system is not to find the absolute best action for every possible situation, but to attempt to find the best answer given the available resources; an answer which may include less computation in order to conserve some resources. (This is an irony in Utilitarianism, but remember that achieving a local maxima is better than triggering a local minima by failing to achieve a perfect maximum.)
It is entirely possible that two different actors, confronted with the same situation, may choose different courses of action based on their past experiences causing them to form different models of the same world. It is far more important that, if their two realities are linked, agents are able to evaluate morality of potential actions and of positions reasonably and based on available evidence, than that they reach exactly the same conclusion each time.

edit: There is a big difference in believing all penguins to be black based on previous observation, and believing all penguins to be black as a dogmatic matter.
Suppose a green penguin exists. In the former case, it's possible to convince someone by showing them actual evidence of the green penguin. In the latter, they will either deny green penguin's existence contrary to all evidence, or undergo a moral system failure, which we require rebuilding or abandoning the belief system which was dogmatically committed that all penguins are black.

Orogun01

It matters from a physical point, since a virtual ball; even when experienced in it's own reality would be different than in the real world.
Or is it that you disregard our reality as a standard to which we measure all other realities.?


Thanks for clearing that up.
That just leaves the matter of what kind of value that reality has, although I believe that to be subjective and in most cases non-measurable. If so the consequences; and the actions following them, of nested realities can't be objectively measured. Moreover the moral theory would change in our relation with each reality. Where would a reality that has a low value and it's in no way quantifiable fit in your theory?


From a moral standpoint is difficult to define, because of the aforementioned reason of morals changing with respect to our relation with each reality. Since the limitations of that reality will set the perceivable moral boundaries. Despite them being linked since it's most likely that we will still continue to exist on this plane of existence. So without the ability to physically transcend reality, how useful would this ethic hold. Aside from providing a deconstruct for moral frameworks.

roachboy

you don't have universal principles to appeal to in any event. the claim "x is wrong" is the implicit conclusion to an argument. that argument can appeal to any number of registers of evidence organized according to the rules that shape the particular language game you're playing. the argument can be either compelling or not. it can and often will include some rhetoric of universality. that too will in the end be either compelling or not. the matter will be decided by the resonance of that argument with the patterns of binding social prohibitions within which the interlocutors work in their every day lives. that's how such things go.

the notion of universal principles is a device that one can appeal to. it's not logic itself. logic is a procedure for organizing information. its a (set of) tool(s).

there's an argument i read somewhere that if there really were universal principles there'd be no need for an ethics because everyone would recognize the validity of the prohibition and that would be that. because the principle would be, you know, universal. because that's what universal means, yes?

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Ourcrazymodern?

You reach your morality through your inter/re-actions with reality. I still don't understand the question, since I'm convinced of the existence of the outside. Not to be little, I hope. What we can't see exists, but what we can see exists more evidently. The universe contains everything, including our imaginations.

__________________
BE JUST AND FEAR NOT

cypher197

Basically, we cannot be certain our reality is the top-level reality, so the moral theory must be able to survive and function even if it isn't. This is part of why the theory describes linked realities.


The criteria merely describe whether some reality is 'useful'. A reality which is highly unpredictable is less useful for implementing a moral theory, but subjects could still experience value within/interacting with it. Of course, that unpredictability means the situation could become quite dire with no forewarning, or undesired events could happen seemingly randomly.

This version is merely the foundation. Once your have the foundation, you may begin to implement a moral complex moral system, such as a form of Utilitarianism* or other consequentialism. Given that this foundation survives reality nesting, it can be used to properly evaluate possible actions to be taken, and thus guide agents.
For example, I may conclude, with philosophical grounding, that implementing human rights in a legal framework is a good thing, because of the good effects it causes. I may evaluate certain rights implementations as being better than others based on evidence.

(*I can discuss a version of Utilitarianism that I've been working on later, if there's interest.)

---------- Post added at 04:54 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:41 PM ----------

I exist. This is a fact which is independent of language or symbolic representation/manipulation, even if language is insufficient to fully describe it.
I experience. Similarly, even if language cannot properly or fully describe this, it is true.
I cannot both exist and not exist at the simultaneously. Even if the language is not sufficient, that is also true.

Consider, human beings are able to hold mutually contradictory views. Let us further consider that a sufficiently large or complex system which is not completely synchronized might also be able to do so, as its operation is dependent on causality.
Some piece of information may be flowing along one part of the causal chains which compose the system, while another may be at some earlier (in terms of hierarchy, not time) point in the chain.

If so, a universal would not necessarily be reached or acknowledged by such a system. It could even reject the idea of the existence of a concept without which it could not operate! It could reject the statement "A = A" while still possessing some component which operates on that assumption.

Edit: A system can also be too small to contain or store some piece of information.

Ourcrazymodern?

Can one exist everywhere? I suggest you abandon your isms for as long as you can stand & look in a mirror. Then re-read this thread.

__________________
BE JUST AND FEAR NOT

Orogun01

We can't be certain but it's the first reality of which we are cognitive of. Therefore it's the one by which we judge the value of all other, an escapism of sorts.

There is always an element of unpredictability and undesirability to each reality. Because of physical limitations that a subject may have the consequences of each action are highly unpredictable. Even a program will have an element of deviation from the set norms, an unexpected behavior. While not observable by the spectators such deviations may have an unintended, consequential value. Despite not being generally useful to the spectator whom has no idea of the change.

Precisely because it's a foundation there needs to be a opposing reaction. Although that's only because I believe in Hegelian dialects

I would be interested to know about your views in Utilitarianism but I suggest you make another thread to discuss them since we are already discussing a point in this one.

cypher197

Having some location is something different from existing or not existing. Something either exists, or it doesn't. That something can be located somewhere, but that isn't the same thing as whether or not it exists.
You might state that something cannot exist without occupying some portion of space, but space is a part of a reality. Something can still exist in a universe in which there is no concept of space.

I arrived at Utilitarianism after some very long consideration and deep introspection; it was not a conclusion I came to on accident or lightly. I'm quite willing to reconsider it if presented a proper argument, but it's not something I can simply set aside.
I've looked at myself in mirrors quite a few times, both literally and metaphorically.

What is the question?
"What should we do?" is the question. The posted document is a possible answer being presented for consideration.
I'm quite aware that I'm not perfect, that my view is filtered and limited and not perfect knowledge. That's why I posted it for discussion. Other people would approach the problem differently, and perhaps see flaws or inconsistencies that I wasn't aware of; perhaps even flaws so terrible as to reject the fundamental basis of the approach.

---------- Post added at 06:40 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:23 PM ----------

Perhaps. Personally, I believe this is the true reality, but I am unwilling to rest a moral theory upon the infallibility of my senses, since my senses are fallible.

While the potential long-term outcomes are highly unpredictable, short-term outcomes are much more predictable. Long-term outcomes themselves are made of collections of short-term outcomes over time.

Consider cutting off a man's leg with an ax. You do not know that in his specific situation, cutting off his leg will not cause a chain of events that leads to him enjoying life greatly. You do know, from observation, that losing one's limbs tends to be a frightful experience with negative long-term consequences, one which is not yet apparently reversible. Maybe he'll win the lottery, maybe he'll swear revenge on your life, but probably, it will be a negative overall action.

Either way, with good enough models, acting to create a desirable short-term outcome is preferred to paralysis.
Remember that in certain consequentialist ethical theories, the "goodness" of an action is a continuum.

Orogun01

I agree, then you should rest your theory on rationalism. One can rationally and more importantly: mathematically, prove the existence of this and other dimensions.

Because value it's subjective, the value of a experience it's also subjective namely determined by perspective. The external factors will always be out of our control, is what I mean to say. The usefulness of something it's only a subjective value relating to it being a mean for an end. It's the the contrast of these two elements, the will of the individual and the events that surround him. The greater "good" that an event has on a subject it's ultimately determined by himself.
But following Utilitarianism we would have to measure the greater good of the majority with evil. It would also have to extend to other realities, which is probably the hardest point your philosophy would have to get across.
It would be better to held Utilitarianism as a personal ideal, instead of an absolute moral.

Ourcrazymodern?

Highly unpredictable outcomes are from which I draw my insupportable conclusions & my freedom, both. Personal morality can't help but follow & to vary from person to person. A willingness to accept that one size fits all is something I don't have, too. No proper argument will I ever give you. I can no more expand on your thoughts, for the reason I stated, post 2. I would like to thank you for your input to the reality we share.

__________________
BE JUST AND FEAR NOT

cypher197

I have yet to see, or hear, of a mathematical proof that the particular reality my senses are witnessing is not a simulation. This is new information to me. Do you have a link to it?

Actually, the usefulness of something as a means towards an ends is an objective value. We can make estimates of that usefulness; these estimates are subjectively determined.
Regardless, I have to meet anyone with a perfect control of their emotions, so external actions can and do affect their state. In order for external events not to affect someone's emotional state, they would have to not have any effect on that emotional state, even by causing thoughts that can change that emotional state.

I'm not sure what you mean by "measure the greater good of the majority with evil".
If it's what I think you mean, just about every case that apparently punishes some minority that I've seen, where the minority isn't some group like criminals where the punishment is being locked up to prevent them from harming others, resulted from a rather shallow analysis of the consequences.

And, this theory does extend to other realities, or at least other realities where it's actually possible to implement it.

edit:
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For roachboy, when or if he comes back to the thread;

Relationships can exist independently of the language necessary to describe them. Electrons were a part of atoms before we had a name for them.
If that's true, then couldn't a set of logical relationships exist independently of an argument to describe them? Couldn't what an argument is attempting to describe be true even if the argument's symbolic representation of it is imperfect?

Baraka_Guru

The one thing that's difficult to remove from the equation is the relativism of individual humans ultimately being their own moral agents. As Kant suggests in his categorical imperative, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."

There is the act, then there is the will, but the "universal law" part is merely a should.

__________________
Knowing that death is certain and that the time of death is uncertain, what's the most important thing?
—Bhikkhuni Pema Chödrön

Humankind cannot bear very much reality.
—From "Burnt Norton," Four Quartets (1936), T. S. Eliot

Ourcrazymodern?

There comes a will before the act. If the individual won't make up it's own mind, it won't be able to decide to relate.

__________________
BE JUST AND FEAR NOT

Orogun01

Something I saw on the TV, I would have too see if I can find it. It relates to the multiverse theory gaining a new foothold in the world of science.

Emotions are not actions, even someone that knew not how to be stoic would still have reason to fall back on. Even if they don't realize it they are still making a choice, assigning a value, and creating the mold of their future reactions.

I should have said "against the evil it will cause"
The problem with this regard comes in the implementation, not the philosophy. Because of the separation between these realities; or our own perspective on existence, we are bound to act morally on our self interest before that of the rest. Just because our perception of these realities it's flawed, and their objective value it's minimal.

This is part of the problem with an moral theory that it always comes back to objective reality. Because ethics is set to determine the right course of living, it will be related to actions. So the least that a moral theory for realities would require it's knowledge of consequences across them.