noahfor

Hey. I have to write a four page answer to each of the following two question for a philosophy of science class I am taking. The thing is I don't even know where to begin. I barely understand the concepts involved or even the questions themselves. I've been to all the classes. I just have a hard time understanding the professor. He's from Greece I think, and I sometimes can't hear through his accent and he uses strange grammar, and we don't even have a text for the class and he doesn't tell us where anything is written about these things. I'm not asking for the answers, but just a little help in making me understand. Even the name of a book would help. The professor encourages discussion among students outside of class, so this is kind of the name thing. I don't know anyone in class, and I don't have the class again before this is due so there is no way I can talk to anyone from class. Here:

1. Important developments in mathematics and in physics roughly from the middle of the 19th century to the first two decades of the 20th appeared as undermining the Kantian conception on the foundations of mathematics and of natural science in general. Which aspects of Kant's approach were particularly touched? In what way were they touched? Give some specific examples coming from both mathematics and physics.

Ok, I know the aspects are synthetic apriori and intuitions, but I don't really understand where they fit in to anything. They are just free floating concepts to me, not attached to anything. He doesn't ever go past the surface with this stuff. I know that non euclidian geometries, theories of infinities bigger than other infinities, and relativity theory, all are contrary to intuition, but again I don't know how this fits in to anything or what it fits in to.

2. The philosophical approach of logical empiricism aimed at our making understand(see the strange grammar) how totally unexpected developments in natural science, like the advent of relativity theory and of quantum mechanics, could come about. To achieve such understanding, logical empiricism tried to analyze the logical structure of mature science. In what way can this analysis help us achieve such understanding? What is the role of experience in the approach of logical empiricism? What conception of scientific progress does this approach imply?

I don't understand this at all. Relativity theory came about because that's the way things are. The role of experience is one of the basis for all theory, right? If anyone knows a good book on logic, but not how to do logic, like not A ^ ~B, but somehting about the philosophy of logic, let me know.

All this material was presented in like 4-5 hour long lectures, and he just never seemed to go as deep as he wants us to go in these questions. I just wasn't expecting this at all. I knew we were getting a take home test today, but I had no idea we were going to have to do research or anything. Thanks.

politicophile

Wow, those questions are far too difficult for me to answer off the top of my head.

I can give you some references, though:

I would look in:
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Critique of Practical Reason

These are they most directly relevant Kantian works on metaphysics and are probably your best shot.

I'm sorry I couldn't be more helpful. Good luck!

__________________
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. ~John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

roachboy

these are kinda technical questions---i may be able to help, but i have to say that i have never heard of "logical empiricism"--i know about empiricism, and i know about logical positivism, but not "logical empiricism"--what is it?

and i feel a little funny about writing someone's paper for them.
just saying.
but i'd be interested in the response to the above and will think about the questions in the interim.
not that it will result in anything...more a gatuituous existential update.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

noahfor

Logical Empiricism and Logical Positivism are the same thing. Like I said, I think, I don't want anyone to write the paper for me. I'm just trying to understand the material so that I can write the paper. He wants a four page paper, but I feel like he hasn't even given us four pages worth of information, and he said he wants us to get straight to the point, so it's not like he wants us to BS. I'm really just hoping someone can teach me because I can't seem to learn from him.

asaris

Boy I'm rusty on my Kant. Anyway, the Critique of Practical Reason will be useless. What you want is the Critique of Pure Reason, primarily the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant grounds parts of the TA on geometry, so the development of non-Euclidean geometries was widely seen as undermining the foundations of Kantian metaphysics. IIRC, the Third Critique also has some information about Kant's views on natural science, but I'm pretty much only familiar with the Critiques, and not much beyond those. If you want to (and are allowed to) look at a secondary source, you can't really go wrong with Allan Wood. Paul Guyer is good as well.

Something to remember is that when Kant (or, more accurately, Kant's translators) uses the word 'intuition', he doesn't mean what we typically mean by the word. IIRC, he means something closer to sense data. Bear in mind also the ways in which the Transcendental Aesthetic is fundamental to Kant's later work in the KrV.

It might help if you said a little bit more about the class in general. What level is it, and what works of Kant's have you been studying?

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

noahfor

Thanks alot. It's a 1000 level Philosophy elective for undergraduates, which at Pitt means it's a higher level undergraduate course course. It's called topics in the Philosophy of Science, but the class seems for like an introductory course. The thing is we haven't been studying any texts at all. The stuff we have talked about is in Critique of Pure Reason, but we were not expected to read it or even look at it. He teaches all the material like he is summarizing it. At first, I was always anticipating really diving into the material. I'm thinking something like: "ok the introduction is over, now it's time for the body," but we never get there. He went over Relativity Theory, Non Euclidian Geometries, Cantor Set Theories, all in one hour. Luckily I have had classes on those things, so I get them. We have had only one class devoted to Kant and it was weeks ago. For logical positivism he just drew a diagram and went over it like ten times.

I have taken other 1000 level philosophy classes and have had no problems. I have no problem reading what I need to read, but this was unanticipated and I only have a week to do it. I knew we were getting a take home test today, but I figured he'd want some dorky little paragraphs because that's what I feel he gives us.

He fails to build up these theories and cpncepts out of what we already know, nor does he put them in context.

I'd like to write my first paper using this structure: Before Kant, Kant, How developments in science undermined Kant. I only know the last part though.

Here is what the lecture on Kant was like:

- copernican turn
-critical philosophy
-transendental philosophy

subject --- faculties )
receptivity --- passive )---concepts
spontaneity --- active )

Conditions of possibility

_Judgements_
1)intuition + concepts
2)a priori "before experience" analytic
a posteriori "after expereince" synthetic

synthetic a priori

And that's it. He'll always say that Kant did this or this person said this, but that he's not going to go into detail about it. He said something about categories, and then said we didn't need to know it or that it wasn't for this class, but clearly we do need it. It's just frustrating because I'd go as deep as he wanted to take it and work through whatever books I had to, but he made it seem like it wasn't that kind of course.

Also, I don't have well built concepts, so when I hear something said, like "analytic," I just get some vague notion, but to use that word to build other concepts one has to know its exact definition or exactly how it is being used, and I can't do that fast enough when there are so many of these concepts being thrown around.

SERPENT7

noah,
I would deffinatly talk to your teacher about your concerns. It sounds like he is not giving enough guidence. If that is not productive, ask other faculty w/in the philosophy department. Or, talk to his department head. How long has he been teaching? (These sound like 'new teacher' type errors.)

asaris

Yeah, I agree with Serpent7. It sounds like he's assuming quite a bit of knowledge on the part of the students.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

roachboy

this sounds to me like a logical positivism paper that foregrounds how kant came to function as the exemplar of an earlier philosophy of science. if that's true, then it really isn't a kant paper, but a rereading of kant via the logical positivists. are you reading anyone who wrote on the philo of mathematics (russell, etc.?)--i frankly dont know how i would go about this paper without such referencepoints--without them, it seems like you are being asked to derive the logical positivist critique of kant. which is strange, both in itself and in that logial positivism encompasses a range of work--it is a kind of loose category.

btw: i didnt mean what i wrote earlier to be a criticism--i was simply noting a concern.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

noahfor

It's two essays, one for each of the questions posted in the original post. Yea, what you said about logical positivism being a loose category, that scares me, because the Kant I can find, but the logical positivism, where's that. We aren't reading anyone. We just get these summary lectures.

I always get the feeling that he's holding back because he thinks we can't handle this stuff for real, but that he is using an assignment that he used in a class in which he didn't hold back, and they actually studied texts.

I definitely am not going to talking to him or anyone in the philosophy department because I'm super shy. It's probably the right thing to do, but I just can't.

But thanks guys.

I'm pretty sure I can do the Kant essay now, but number two I'm having a hard time understanding because how can logical empiricism try to understand the logical structure of mature? science when logical empiricism is the logical structure of science? Or isn't it?

CSflim

Taking this attitude is really not a good idea. You should try and get over it.

But anyway, how about email? Could you email your lecturer if you are too shy to speak to him in person? Have you talked to your classmates about this assignment? Are they having similar difficulties?
Do you have a class rep or anything similar? Could he/she talk to the professor if you don't feel comfortable doing so?

__________________

noahfor

No, I have not talked to any classmates. Infact, I've never talked to any classmates from any of the classes I've ever had, or any professors, and this is my sixth smester. I'm very aware that this is a problem. I'll try emailing him, but since he didn't give us he's email address I've always doubted that he checks it. There is no class rep or TA, as we call them.

Has anyone ever seen the episode of the simpsons in which Homer goes back to college? Homer's professor IS this guy, in appearance and voice.

Well, does anyone know of any books about logical positivism that could be read and understood in a few days?

Zeraph

Write this for your paper.

Page 1:
Logical Empiricism

Dear professor, instead of answering your questions I will write a proof for logical empiricism. Observe empirically the logic of the answers from 2 questions posed to students of a class with no resources and no notes because we can't understand you.

Page 2: [blank]
Page 3: [blank]
Page 4: [blank]


....................

politicophile

As they say, the first step is admitting you have a problem. I too am in my sixth semester, and while I can't speak for everyone, I will say that out-of-class interactions with my professors are an absolutely critical part of both my academic and non-academic life at the college. I can't urge you strongly enough to go to this guy's office during his scheduled office hours to talk. He's just a person like everyone else.

When I was younger, I had a major problem with nervousness and I'll be the first to admit that my professors didn't see much of me during my freshman year. Eventually, however, I discovered how beneficial interactions outside of classtime could be. Please, please, try to overcome your nervousness. It'll help you out with a lot more than just this paper!

__________________
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. ~John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

noahfor

I have been trying to get over the problem for some time. It's like I have no intuitive sense of what to do socially, so when I'm a social situation I'm very akward and robotic, which makes me not want to be in social situations even more, so every time I'm in one it strengthens my desire to avoid them. I have even worse problems though, and I am getting help for them, though nothing seems to help.

Another thing is this: The professor is always making it seem that the failure of the michelson-morely experiment to prove the existence of the ether is the foundation for relativity theory.

Am I incorrect in thinking that if the speed of light was constant for all observers, even if the ether was proven to exist, that relativity theory would still hold.

Also, how do the calssical empiricists account for logical or mathmatical knowledge? Is it by combination of sense data? For instance I have certain sense data that I call two, combine it with other sense data I call two, and call the new thing four. Then, how do they account for the notion of combination. What is sense data for combination?

Also, what is reason. Every time it is used I just get some vague idea, thinking math logic, just some vague vibe. I need a well structured, rich, clear conception of reason to really understand this stuff.

And, why are the apriori intuitions of time and space neccessary preconditions for experience. I can understand how visual experience implies some spacial "understanding," but what about sound? Do I need to "know where" in order to hear?

Are space and time apriori knowledge, or is knowledge a more strict concept. Does knowledge have to take the form of predication?

Is 1+1 = 2 an anlaytic judgement because the concept of two contains the relation to the concpet of one?

If only one question is answered, let it be this one: How does Kant come to the conclusion that sythetic aprior judgements are possible? He's not just saying that we can make them, but that we can KNOW them, right? His example is "every happening has a cause". How does he conclude that we know that?

noahfor

Here is my essay on the second question. It's a 1.5 pages too short, but in my experience teachers don't really care. It's not very good, but I figured I'd get this one done quickly, and then try and do a really good job on the Kant one.

In language, complex propositions can be concluded from sets of other of true atomic propositions by appealing only to the logical relationships between these atomic proposition, and not their individual meanings. Logical empiricists held the view that the logical structure of the world mirrored the logical structure of language. Thus, logical empiricists believed that complex truths about the world could be deduced from combinations of atomic truths about the world. By using this belief in trying to understand the logical structure of science, one finds that this is the way in which theories are generated from hypotheses. However, scientific hypotheses are proposed as universal truths, which cannot be concluded from empirical evidence. But, logical empiricists explain this problem away by proposing that hypotheses are generated inductively. Induction relies on the assumption that the truth of a universal proposition is supported by specific instances of the proposition. In summary, universal propositions in the form of hypotheses are generated inductively from experience, and since logical empiricists believed that the logical structure of language mirrored the logical structure of world, if the hypotheses are treated as true atomic propositions, then true complex propositions, in the form of scientific theories, can be deduced and interpreted as truths about the world.
The weakness in this structure lies in the fact that certain truth of a hypothesis can never be gained from empirical evidence. Though, since the theories are deduced from hypotheses, empirical evidence in support of a theory would support the hypothesis on which it is based, and evidence which negates a theory would render the hypothesis, on which it is based, untrue. For this reason, theories are tested empirically by experiment. Theories serve as a means of finding new ways to empirically test hypotheses.
For example, from experience, we generate the hypothesis that all matter is composed of particles. It is important to note that our experience does not entail the hypothesis; it only supports it, insomuch as a specific occurrence supports a general rule. From the hypothesis and the analytic truth: “what is composed of particles will behave as though it is composed of particles,” we logically deduce the theory: “all matter will behave as though it is composed of particles.” We test the theory experimentally, and find that the evidence supports the theory, so we adopt the theory as scientific “fact.”
However, in recent history we have discovered that all matter is not composed of particles nor does all matter behave as though it is composed of particles. Electrons, which are material, have been observed as exhibiting non-particle-like behavior. From the principles outlined prior, we can see how such an unexpected fact can exist. We have said that empirical evidence never entails a universal truth because not all of what a universal truth applies to can be observed. Empirical evidence in support of a universal proposition only makes it more probable that the proposition is true. Thus, there is always the possibility that what has not been observed may stand in opposition to the proposition. In the case of the electron, since it was hard to observe, its negative relationship with our original proposition remained hidden for a long time, which made the discovery all the more unexpected.
In light of the electron’s observed behavior, one cannot propose: “no matter behaves as though it is composed of particles.” This proposition would oppose empirical evidence that has already been gathered. Any new theory must comply with all experiential evidence. In the logical empiricists’ view, experience is fact. Theory is assumption that rests on these facts, and so can never violate them. Any new theory must be based on both the new and old experiential evidence. Hence, scientific progress can be seen as cumulative, and new theories can be viewed as being stronger than old ones because they are based on more empirical evidence.
There is a certain feature about our theory which makes its refutation so “unexpected,” and that feature is that it is experientially verified (in the weak sense) every day, by every person. Every day, we experience matter as behaving like particles, and so this behavior becomes part of the common sense. This common sense is manifested as a sentimental understanding of the way things must work, a sense that things must reasonably act this way. I believe that this is why it is hard to understand why unexpected developments can happen, because they violate our own personal understanding.

Yakk

The "ether" at the time was the frame of reference against which the speed of light was to be measured -- the medium in which light propogates.

The michelson-morely experiment attempted to determine the velocity of the Earth through the ether. It failed.

The experiment assumed that the speed of light was not uniform for every observer, but it was uniform with respect to "the ether", the medium in which light travelled. But when they ran it, the results where inconsistent with their assumptions.

If there was no universal frame of reference against which light's speed was measured... it sort of led to relativity.

While something called "the ether" and the theory of relativity could both exist at the same time, the "ether" that the m-m experiment was looking for is inconsistent with the theory of relativity.

__________________
Last edited by JHVH : 10-29-4004 BC at 09:00 PM. Reason: Time for a rest.

noahfor

Here is my essay on the Kant, if anyone cares. It's not good either, but I had a hard time understanding the relationship between non-Euclidean geometries and Kant that would make the geometries existence undermine Kant. I don't really even think they do.

Propositions can be either analytic or synthetic. An analytic proposition is one whose truth is contained within the meaning of its parts, and states nothing more than its parts alone. For instance, “If A then A” is true because states nothing more than “If A,” and so it is analytic. An analytic proposition is necessarily true. A synthetic proposition is one that states more than its parts alone. For instance, “If A then B” cannot be known by reference to its parts because nothing of A’s relationship with B is contained within A, and so it is synthetic. As well, proposition can be either a priori or a posteriori. A proposition is a priori if its truth does not depend on experience. A proposition is a posteriori if its truth can only be concluded by reference to experience.
There are four possible combinations of the types of propositions: analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori, synthetic a priori, and synthetic a posteriori. Analytic a priori propositions are possible because, by definition of an analytic proposition, their truth is necessitated by the meaning of their parts and not by any connection to experience. For the same reason analytic a posteriori propositions are not possible. From common experience we know that synthetic a posteriori propositions are possible. That leaves one last possible combination, synthetic a priori. Kant claims that not only are synthetic a priori propositions possible, but that they are also the basis for all of mathematics and natural science.
Kant believes that all perceptions must take place within space and time, but that the sense data which supplies the material for perception does not contain any information about its existing in space and time. Instead, Kant believes that space and time are structures that are added to perception in order to facilitate our understanding of sense data, and that space and time are understood a priori. Kant calls space and time intuitions. He argues that synthetic propositions can be made whose truth can be verified by reference only to space and time, and since space and time are understood a priori, these propositions will also be a priori. For instance, “Space has three dimensions.” can be verified by our understanding of space, and is synthetic because there is nothing of three-dimensionality inherent in the concept of space. It is Kant’s belief that all mathematical and geometrical propositions are synthetic a priori propositions generated and verified in this manner.
Of the synthetic a priori propositions based on the spatial intuition, were Euclid’s postulates, on which all of Euclidean geometry is based. However, in the 1800’s geometers began experimenting with geometries in which Euclid’s fifth postulate – “If two lines are drawn which intersect a third in such a way that the sum of the inner angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the two lines inevitably must intersect each other on that side if extended far enough” – is excluded. They found that by proposing a space shaped like a sphere, defining a line as great circle around the surface of the sphere, and a point as two opposite points on the sphere, they could create consistent geometries in which there are no parallel lines.
In Kant’s view it is our understanding of space that provides the basis for geometrical synthetic a priori propositions, such as Euclid’s fifth postulate, and it is the a priori nature of the spatial intuition that makes propositions based on it a priori, and a proposition derived from a non-Euclidean geometry, such as “no parallel lines are possible” can be seen as being of the same sort to propositions that are Euclidean in nature, except for the space that they describe. However, in the case of non-Euclidean propositions, the positions are not based on our intuitive space, but are also not based on any experienced space, so they must be analytically true. Thus, due to their equivalency to non-Euclidean propositions, Euclidean propositions must also be analytic in nature.
Kant also proposes that synthetic a priori propositions are the basis for the natural sciences. These, however, are not based on the intuitions, but on something he calls Categories. The Categories are to propositions what the intuitions are to perceptions, and that is the extent to which I understand them. From the categories, Kant believes propositions such as “Every happening has a cause.” can be known. It is on statements like this one that Newtonian physics is based. However, with the development of quantum mechanics we have learned that some happenings do not have a cause. For instance, the decay of an atomic nucleus happens completely by chance, and even if all the physical circumstances surrounding the nucleus of an atomic known, one could still not predict with certainty whether, at a given time, it would decay or not. Thus, Kant’s proposition “Every happening has a cause.” is falsified. Hence, it was never known, and whatever method used in obtaining the supposed knowledge failed to obtain any knowledge at all.

Thanks to everyone that helped me out.

cybersharp

Will try to respond soon, I know the terms but I havent studied in quite awhile.

__________________
0PtIcAl

Nimetic

I've no background in philosophy... but can I take a guess at the second topic?


Here are some guesses. I'm working backwards from your question...

1) Sure relativity matches observed reality.. to date. Ditto quantum theory. These seem to differ somewhat from previous physics however in that earlier theories were easier to visualize, and were more analogous to the world as we see it in the day-to-day sense.

So in some ways... relativity and QM/QT are the world as we observe it. In other ways... they describe a world quite different to the one which we observe (with our five senses).

2) Going to the question you got asked. The term "mature science" stands out. Also the concept re scientific progress.

Twentieth century physics essentially turned some previous knowledge on it's head. I'm sure that this occurred in sciences before - but still, changes of this magnitude are probably rare. The implications perhaps are that

- science was not as mature as Kant thought

- scientific progress is perhaps not as steady or evolutionary/incremental
as was thought - instead proceeding through jumps
and pehaps even reversals (I have to consider the latter further)

- relativity, a key jump, was in many ways due to a flash of insight
that was later honed by reason. This is a debateable
area sure, but if you look at the initial postulates of special
relativity it is hard not to see this as a big jump. Einstein makes
a jump that might or might not be described as "absurd". Luckily
it all works out ok.

Ok. These were my guesses. I've been vague due to the space (and hour). There are huge gaps, and it may be totally wrong re Kant. Hope it helps though.

braindamage351

If only one question is answered, let it be this one: How does Kant come to the conclusion that sythetic aprior judgements are possible? He's not just saying that we can make them, but that we can KNOW them, right? His example is "every happening has a cause". How does he conclude that we know that?

I recently bought The Critique of Pure Reason, but I haven't actually read it at all, yet. Although I don't really know the terminology, I can tell you this much:

The whole idea behind synthetic a priori knowledge is that you can take normal (I think analytic is the word for it) a priori knowledge, and derive further things from it. In the case of that one example, he takes the most basic a priori facts (or whatever he calls them), space and time, and derives from them the synthetic a priori fact that every happening has a cause. Because if absolutely everything operates in both space and time at all times, nothing is truly isolated, and everything must be part of a continuous chain of events.

I think what the theory of Relativity and other theories like it did to screw with Kant's theory was show that we <i>can</i> know things that don't fit with our functions of perception. We don't figure them out directly, but we can discover them through math and science.

And yes, the most important step in making the theory of Relativity possible was figuring out how screwy light was. If Einstein had been born 50 years earlier he never would have come up with any of those theories.