Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post

noahfor · 02-25-2006, 10:32 PM

Here is my essay on the second question. It's a 1.5 pages too short, but in my experience teachers don't really care. It's not very good, but I figured I'd get this one done quickly, and then try and do a really good job on the Kant one.

In language, complex propositions can be concluded from sets of other of true atomic propositions by appealing only to the logical relationships between these atomic proposition, and not their individual meanings. Logical empiricists held the view that the logical structure of the world mirrored the logical structure of language. Thus, logical empiricists believed that complex truths about the world could be deduced from combinations of atomic truths about the world. By using this belief in trying to understand the logical structure of science, one finds that this is the way in which theories are generated from hypotheses. However, scientific hypotheses are proposed as universal truths, which cannot be concluded from empirical evidence. But, logical empiricists explain this problem away by proposing that hypotheses are generated inductively. Induction relies on the assumption that the truth of a universal proposition is supported by specific instances of the proposition. In summary, universal propositions in the form of hypotheses are generated inductively from experience, and since logical empiricists believed that the logical structure of language mirrored the logical structure of world, if the hypotheses are treated as true atomic propositions, then true complex propositions, in the form of scientific theories, can be deduced and interpreted as truths about the world.
The weakness in this structure lies in the fact that certain truth of a hypothesis can never be gained from empirical evidence. Though, since the theories are deduced from hypotheses, empirical evidence in support of a theory would support the hypothesis on which it is based, and evidence which negates a theory would render the hypothesis, on which it is based, untrue. For this reason, theories are tested empirically by experiment. Theories serve as a means of finding new ways to empirically test hypotheses.
For example, from experience, we generate the hypothesis that all matter is composed of particles. It is important to note that our experience does not entail the hypothesis; it only supports it, insomuch as a specific occurrence supports a general rule. From the hypothesis and the analytic truth: “what is composed of particles will behave as though it is composed of particles,” we logically deduce the theory: “all matter will behave as though it is composed of particles.” We test the theory experimentally, and find that the evidence supports the theory, so we adopt the theory as scientific “fact.”
However, in recent history we have discovered that all matter is not composed of particles nor does all matter behave as though it is composed of particles. Electrons, which are material, have been observed as exhibiting non-particle-like behavior. From the principles outlined prior, we can see how such an unexpected fact can exist. We have said that empirical evidence never entails a universal truth because not all of what a universal truth applies to can be observed. Empirical evidence in support of a universal proposition only makes it more probable that the proposition is true. Thus, there is always the possibility that what has not been observed may stand in opposition to the proposition. In the case of the electron, since it was hard to observe, its negative relationship with our original proposition remained hidden for a long time, which made the discovery all the more unexpected.
In light of the electron’s observed behavior, one cannot propose: “no matter behaves as though it is composed of particles.” This proposition would oppose empirical evidence that has already been gathered. Any new theory must comply with all experiential evidence. In the logical empiricists’ view, experience is fact. Theory is assumption that rests on these facts, and so can never violate them. Any new theory must be based on both the new and old experiential evidence. Hence, scientific progress can be seen as cumulative, and new theories can be viewed as being stronger than old ones because they are based on more empirical evidence.
There is a certain feature about our theory which makes its refutation so “unexpected,” and that feature is that it is experientially verified (in the weak sense) every day, by every person. Every day, we experience matter as behaving like particles, and so this behavior becomes part of the common sense. This common sense is manifested as a sentimental understanding of the way things must work, a sense that things must reasonably act this way. I believe that this is why it is hard to understand why unexpected developments can happen, because they violate our own personal understanding.

02-25-2006, 10:32 PM	#16 (permalink)
noahfor Addict	Here is my essay on the second question. It's a 1.5 pages too short, but in my experience teachers don't really care. It's not very good, but I figured I'd get this one done quickly, and then try and do a really good job on the Kant one. In language, complex propositions can be concluded from sets of other of true atomic propositions by appealing only to the logical relationships between these atomic proposition, and not their individual meanings. Logical empiricists held the view that the logical structure of the world mirrored the logical structure of language. Thus, logical empiricists believed that complex truths about the world could be deduced from combinations of atomic truths about the world. By using this belief in trying to understand the logical structure of science, one finds that this is the way in which theories are generated from hypotheses. However, scientific hypotheses are proposed as universal truths, which cannot be concluded from empirical evidence. But, logical empiricists explain this problem away by proposing that hypotheses are generated inductively. Induction relies on the assumption that the truth of a universal proposition is supported by specific instances of the proposition. In summary, universal propositions in the form of hypotheses are generated inductively from experience, and since logical empiricists believed that the logical structure of language mirrored the logical structure of world, if the hypotheses are treated as true atomic propositions, then true complex propositions, in the form of scientific theories, can be deduced and interpreted as truths about the world. The weakness in this structure lies in the fact that certain truth of a hypothesis can never be gained from empirical evidence. Though, since the theories are deduced from hypotheses, empirical evidence in support of a theory would support the hypothesis on which it is based, and evidence which negates a theory would render the hypothesis, on which it is based, untrue. For this reason, theories are tested empirically by experiment. Theories serve as a means of finding new ways to empirically test hypotheses. For example, from experience, we generate the hypothesis that all matter is composed of particles. It is important to note that our experience does not entail the hypothesis; it only supports it, insomuch as a specific occurrence supports a general rule. From the hypothesis and the analytic truth: “what is composed of particles will behave as though it is composed of particles,” we logically deduce the theory: “all matter will behave as though it is composed of particles.” We test the theory experimentally, and find that the evidence supports the theory, so we adopt the theory as scientific “fact.” However, in recent history we have discovered that all matter is not composed of particles nor does all matter behave as though it is composed of particles. Electrons, which are material, have been observed as exhibiting non-particle-like behavior. From the principles outlined prior, we can see how such an unexpected fact can exist. We have said that empirical evidence never entails a universal truth because not all of what a universal truth applies to can be observed. Empirical evidence in support of a universal proposition only makes it more probable that the proposition is true. Thus, there is always the possibility that what has not been observed may stand in opposition to the proposition. In the case of the electron, since it was hard to observe, its negative relationship with our original proposition remained hidden for a long time, which made the discovery all the more unexpected. In light of the electron’s observed behavior, one cannot propose: “no matter behaves as though it is composed of particles.” This proposition would oppose empirical evidence that has already been gathered. Any new theory must comply with all experiential evidence. In the logical empiricists’ view, experience is fact. Theory is assumption that rests on these facts, and so can never violate them. Any new theory must be based on both the new and old experiential evidence. Hence, scientific progress can be seen as cumulative, and new theories can be viewed as being stronger than old ones because they are based on more empirical evidence. There is a certain feature about our theory which makes its refutation so “unexpected,” and that feature is that it is experientially verified (in the weak sense) every day, by every person. Every day, we experience matter as behaving like particles, and so this behavior becomes part of the common sense. This common sense is manifested as a sentimental understanding of the way things must work, a sense that things must reasonably act this way. I believe that this is why it is hard to understand why unexpected developments can happen, because they violate our own personal understanding.