I was a young man then, and it was clear to me that those innocent souls who were slaughtered by these Nazi extermination squads were killed because they did not share the race, or the religion, or the ideology of their executioners. I thought then that such thinking was pretty terrible. I still think it's pretty terrible today. Of course it affects my judgment when I come to consider the view from the US.

The View from America

America is a great democracy. It consists of very many people, with very many different views. And there is no such thing as the view from the U.S. There is a view from this administration, or from some previous administration. And I can talk to you about that. But, I want to remind you, that when America began in 1776, it was in a Revolution again King George, - King George of England I mean. (Laughter) I don't know why you're laughing.
Because we live in a great democracy, there are those here and in other parts of the world that don't believe in the rule of law. They say that's nonsense, that's idealistic dreaming. If you've got the power, use it. That's the way the world has always been run. Countries have grown by conquest, that's the way to go. That was not the view of Justice Jackson. He said: No more! And he didn't invent that prohibition. The IMT judges went into the question of ex post facto law. The idea that war was impermissible had been an evolving doctrine from the First World War. The legal committee of the League of Nations at the time was unanimous that aggression was a crime, but the best that could be done was to agree that in future it would be punished - regardless of the rank or status of the responsible perpetrator.. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 specifically prohibited the use of armed force.

Truth is that the leaders of important powers in the world today are not prepared to give up their right to use force in their national interests, when they believe it's necessary, or even as a preemptive matter as far as the United States is now concerned. That is the policy of this administration as confirmed by the Quadrennial National Defense Strategy Reviews issued by the President and the Pentagon. We specifically reserve the right to act unilaterally in defense of our national interest when the Administration sees fit. Of course, there are many citizens who think that's correct; that's what Presidents are supposed to do. But, even at the risk of being labeled an idealist or a dreamer, I ask: where is that policy getting us? Have we found peace that way? Have we served our people that way? Have we advanced our reputation worldwide by staying the course to show resolve ?

When I look at the view from America, I see two different trends. Let us first view things, which, in my opinion, do not serve our national interests. The present security strategy of the United States is a repudiation of the most important principle coming out of the Nuremberg trials. If you compare the published national security strategy, with the judgments of the Nuremberg trials, it is clear that they are not compatible. The argument made by "realists" is that times have changed; we live in a nuclear world where the mushroom cloud looms. Terrorists do not respect the law. To meet the new threats they feel they can disregard or stretch the law. They invent new terminology. It's "soft law". Soft law means you're violating the law, but you're trying to find a moral basis in order to justify what you're doing. Well, that's one way to approach it, and there are good lawyers who have taken that position. I think it's a very dangerous practice to allow people to decide that the law doesn't work so they're entitled to ignore it. If the law doesn't work, what you must do is to improve the law; not discard it. Imagine what would happen if every time a judge rendered a bad decision, or they passed a new law, which may have been a bad law, you decided you were entitled to disregard it. What would the world look like? We'd be back to Wild West. That may bring nostalgia in some Texas hearts, but as a policy for peace in the world, I don't think that would be very effective. An illegal act does not become legal when it is done with good intentions.

The main evidence lies in leaked documents relating to a crucial meeting chaired by the Prime Minister in July 2002 - the documents which supported the Sunday Times story, published during this past election campaign, about how Blair promised George W Bush in April that year that Britain would back regime change.

A briefing paper for the ministers and officials at the meeting - this was in effect a British war cabinet - laid out two alternative US war plans. The first, a "generated start", involved a slow build-up of roughly 250,000 troops in Kuwait. Allied aircraft would then mount an air war, which would be followed by a full-scale invasion. The second option was a "running start", in which a continuous air campaign, "initiated by an Iraqi casus belli", would be mounted without any overt military build-up. Allied special forces giving support to Iraqi opposition groups on the ground would be joined by further troops as and when they arrived in theatre, until the regime collapsed. A few days after the meeting, the Americans opted for a hybrid of the two in which the air war would begin, as for a running start, as soon as the Iraqis provided the justification for war, while at the same time an invasion force would be built up, as for a generated start.

The record of the July meeting in London, however, contains a revealing passage in which Geoff Hoon, then defence secretary, tells his colleagues in plain terms that "the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime". What is meant by "spikes of activity" becomes clear in the light of information elicited from the government by the Liberal Democrat Sir Menzies Campbell, who asked the Ministry of Defence about British and American air activity in 2002 in the southern no-fly zone of Iraq - the zone created to protect southern Shias after Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed their 1991 uprising against him.

The MoD response shows that in March 2002 no bombs were dropped, and in April only 0.3 tonnes of ordnance used. The figure rose to 7.3 tonnes in May, however, then to 10.4 in June, dipping to 9.5 in July before rising again to 14.1 in August. Suddenly, in other words, US and British air forces were in action over Iraq.

What was going on? There were very strict rules of engagement in the no-fly zones. The allied pilots were authorised to fire missiles at any Iraqi air defence weapon or radar that fired at them or locked on to their aircraft. As was noted in Foreign Office legal advice appended to the July 2002 briefing paper, they were only "entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force is a necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems".

That May, however, Donald Rumsfeld had ordered a more aggressive approach, authorising allied aircraft to attack Iraqi command and control centres as well as actual air defences. The US defence secretary later said this was simply to prevent the Iraqis attacking allied aircraft, but Hoon's remark gives the game away. In reality, as he explained, the "spikes of activity" were designed "to put pressure on the regime".

What happened next was dramatic. In September, the amount of ordnance used in the southern no-fly zone increased sharply to 54.6 tonnes. It declined in October to 17.7 tonnes before rising again to 33.6 tonnes in November and 53.2 tonnes in December. The spikes were getting taller and taller.

In fact, as it became clear that Saddam Hussein would not provide them with the justification they needed to launch the air war, we can see that the allies simply launched it anyway, beneath the cloak of the no-fly zone.

In the early hours of 5 September, for example, more than a hundred allied aircraft attacked the H-3 airfield, the main air defence site in western Iraq. Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias, it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected.

It would be another nine weeks before Blair and Bush went to the UN to try to persuade it to authorise military action, but the air war had begun anyway. The number of raids shot up, from four a month to 30, with allied aircraft repeatedly returning to sites they had already hit to finish them off. Senior British officials insist that no RAF aircraft opened fire until it was at least locked on to by an Iraqi radar, but it is difficult to see how the systematic targeting of Iraqi installations could have constituted "a necessary and proportionate response".

The Prime Minister promised that Britain would be alongside the Americans "when the shooting starts".

The raid seemed designed to destroy air defences to allow easy access for special forces helicopters to fly into Iraq via Jordan or Saudi Arabia to hunt down Scud missiles before a possible war within the next few months.

The raid seemed designed to destroy air defences to allow easy access for special forces helicopters to fly into Iraq via Jordan or Saudi Arabia to hunt down Scud missiles before a possible war within the next few months.

Although only 12 aircraft dropped precision-guided bombs on to the H3 airfield, 240 miles west of Baghdad and close to Jordan, many support aircraft took part.

The strikes were carried out by nine American F15 Strike Eagles and three RAF Tornado GR4 ground attack aircraft flying from Kuwait.

At least seven types of aircraft took part. Fighter cover was provided by US F-16 Fighting Falcons and RAF Tornado F3s from Saudi Arabia. RAF VC10 tanker aircraft flying from Bahrain were among the support aircraft.

These also included EA6b Prowlers, which send out signals to confuse enemy radar, and E3a Awacs aircraft that co-ordinate operations and carry out reconnaissance of any response.

RAF Tornados also took part in the reconnaissance. American central command refused to go into detail about the number of aircraft involved in the raid.

It said: "Coalition strikes in the no-fly zones are executed as a self-defence measure in response to Iraqi hostile threats and acts against coalition forces and their aircraft."

The Pentagon said that the raid was launched in "response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone".

Iraq had made 130 attempts to shoot down coalition aircraft this year.

The Ministry of Defence in London refused to confirm that RAF aircraft had taken part, but defence sources said that Tornado ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft played a key role. The attack on what the American central command described as an "air defence command and control facility" was the first time that a target in western Iraq had been attacked during the patrols of the southern no-fly zone.

Until yesterday, all strikes had been against air defence sites in the south, around Basra, Amara, Nassairya and Baghdad.

Central command said it was still assessing the damage caused by the attack. If the air defence installation was not destroyed, a second raid is expected.

As well as blinding Iraqi radar to any special forces helicopters, the loss of the H3 installation would allow allied aircraft mounting major raids on Iraq a trouble-free route into the country.

In a further sign that America was preparing for war, a Pentagon official confirmed that heavy armour, ammunition and other equipment had been moved to Kuwait from huge stores in Qatar.

Thomas White, the army secretary, said: "We have done a lot with pre-positioned stocks in the Gulf, making sure that they are in the right spot to support whatever the president wants to do."

Any war on Iraq is likely to begin with a gradual intensification of attacks on air defences. But yesterday's raid appears more likely to be related to the special forces Scud hunts.

It was the SAS which specialised in the attempts to hunt down the Scuds during the Gulf war. Although the raids were largely unsuccessful, they spawned a series of rival books by former members of the regiment.

The aggressive tactics were ordered by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who disclosed in September that he had urged commanders to focus their retaliatory strikes not just on Iraqi radar and missile systems but also on air defense communications centers in an attempt to degrade Iraq's air defense network.

Last month, U.S. military officials acknowledged that they used an incident of Iraqi fire on jets patrolling the northern no-fly zone to justify a retaliatory strike in the south. The tactic represented another escalation of enforcement activity by the Bush administration.

"The Iraqi regime has increased its attacks on the coalition, so the coalition has increased its efforts to protect its pilots," said Jim Wilkinson, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command in Tampa. "Every coalition action is in direct response to Iraqi hostile acts against our pilots, or the regime's attempts to materially improve is military infrastructure south of the 33rd parallel."

Anthony H. Cordesman, a former defense official at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the increased U.S. air attacks are about far more than retaliation. "You enforce containment when you carry out these strikes, and you deter Iraq from any kind of military adventure," Cordesman said. "And when you conduct these strikes, you are preparing part of the battleground for a war. But it doesn't mean that you've gone to war, and it doesn't mean war is inevitable."

Degrading air defenses in southern Iraq, said Loren B. Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute with ties to defense contractors and the Pentagon, will enable the U.S. military "to send in almost anything its wants -- bombers, fighters and helicopters with Special Operations Forces." Freedom of movement across the border for U.S. aircraft would be especially important in a war against Iraq, Thompson said, since the Pentagon envisions flying thousands of troops into airfields inside Iraq aboard slow-moving C-17 transports.

Retired Air Force Col. John Warden, a key figure in planning the U.S. air campaign against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, said every radar system and missile destroyed by U.S. aircraft will help war planners. "Anything that would need to be knocked out that is knocked out now saves some sorties once the war starts," Warden said. "I suspect some of the attacks are really just an intensification of the tit for tat that has gone on for a long time -- but with some obvious value in the event of a war."

The U.S. military established the no-fly zone over southern Iraq in 1991 and over northern Iraq in 1992 to enforce U.N. resolutions to protect Shiites and Kurds from attack by the Iraqi military and to keep Baghdad from moving its forces toward Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Over much of the past decade, U.S. and British warplanes have patrolled the zones and engaged in periodic airstrikes against Iraqi targets, but nothing on the scale of the past five months.

Virtually all of the attacks occur in the southern no-fly zone out of deference to Turkey, which allows U.S. and British aircraft to patrol the northern no-fly zone from Turkish bases and exercises some control over the operation.

The United Nations does not recognize the no-fly zones or the U.S. assertion that it is enforcing U.N. resolutions. Last fall, Russia's foreign ministry said escalating attacks by U.S. and British warplanes against Iraqi air defenses have made it more difficult for U.N. efforts to resume weapons inspections in Iraq.

Iraq says it fires at the aircraft because they are violating Iraqi airspace. "Not many people realize that a war has been going on for the last several years in the no-fly zone," Gen. Amir Saadi, a top Hussein adviser, said in a December interview. "The very people that Britain and the United States claim to be protecting, they're killing them, maiming them, depriving them of their normal livelihood and also destroying the infrastructure which is there to serve them."

U.S. military officials say they go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties. They would not comment on how much the attacks have degraded Iraq's air defenses. But they said Iraq continues to maintain "integrated" air defenses using new technology acquired in spite of weapons sanctions and tactics to avoid detection and attack.