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Florida law says that ''in no case shall the department [DCF] consent to a sterilization, abortion or termination of life support'' on behalf of a client under department care.
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This is true, the DCF can't legally consent, but (1) a court order overrides any non-consent; and (2) the only reason the DCF needs to consent (in general to medical procedures) is because the parents are absent, and the DCF then needs to take the place of the parents. But abortion is a special case in Florida law in that consent of parents is no longer required.
So: even if we gave DCF the authority that parents are normally given (in terms of consent to medical procedures in general), consent for abortion is still not needed.
So the DCF opposition (if there is any) would seem to have no legal standing.
Here's the relevant state code:
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TITLE 5. JUDICIAL BRANCH (Chs. 25-44)
CHAPTER 39. PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CHILDREN
PART V. TAKING CHILDREN INTO CUSTODY AND SHELTER HEARINGS
Fla. Stat. § 39.407 (2005)
§ 39.407. Medical, psychiatric, and psychological examination and treatment of child; physical or mental examination of parent or person requesting custody of child
(1) When any child is removed from the home and maintained in an out-of-home placement, the department is authorized to have a medical screening performed on the child without authorization from the court and without consent from a parent or legal custodian. Such medical screening shall be performed by a licensed health care professional and shall be to examine the child for injury, illness, and communicable diseases and to determine the need for immunization. The department shall by rule establish the invasiveness of the medical procedures authorized to be performed under this subsection. In no case does this subsection authorize the department to consent to medical treatment for such children.
(2) When the department has performed the medical screening authorized by subsection (1), or when it is otherwise determined by a licensed health care professional that a child who is in an out-of-home placement, but who has not been committed to the department, is in need of medical treatment, including the need for immunization, consent for medical treatment shall be obtained in the following manner:
(a) 1. Consent to medical treatment shall be obtained from a parent or legal custodian of the child; or
2. A court order for such treatment shall be obtained.
(b) If a parent or legal custodian of the child is unavailable and his or her whereabouts cannot be reasonably ascertained, and it is after normal working hours so that a court order cannot reasonably be obtained, an authorized agent of the department shall have the authority to consent to necessary medical treatment, including immunization, for the child. The authority of the department to consent to medical treatment in this circumstance shall be limited to the time reasonably necessary to obtain court authorization.
(c) If a parent or legal custodian of the child is available but refuses to consent to the necessary treatment, including immunization, a court order shall be required unless the situation meets the definition of an emergency in s. 743.064 or the treatment needed is related to suspected abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the child by a parent, caregiver, or legal custodian. In such case, the department shall have the authority to consent to necessary medical treatment. This authority is limited to the time reasonably necessary to obtain court authorization.
In no case shall the department consent to sterilization, abortion, or termination of life support.
. . . .
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And a brief note on the case that made the parental notification law (which is still on the books BTW) unconstitutional (I'll dig up the full case if anyone wants to see it):
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15. Florida's abortion consent for minors law, former Fla. Stat. ch. 390.001(4)(a) (now Fla. Stat. ch. 390.0111) was unconstitutionally vague because it did not require a record hearing on the merits of the petition, did not authorize the court to take any and all evidence which may be useful to its determination, did not specify the subject matter to be covered by that evidence, and did not even require the personal appearance of the minor before the court; the judicial consent procedure failed to provide sufficient safeguards against the possibly arbitrary denial of a petition for waiver of consent and thus did not sufficiently safeguard the pregnant minor's constitutional right of privacy. In re T.W., 543 So. 2d 837, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 2811, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1989).
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Presumably the legislature could fairly easily correct these problems and thereby make the law constitutional. But until it does so, I don't see that the girl has any requirement of consent whatsoever from her parent or guardian, whoever they may be.