Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - History lesson: How we botched the occupation

- Tilted Politics (https://thetfp.com/tfp/tilted-politics/)

- - History lesson: How we botched the occupation (https://thetfp.com/tfp/tilted-politics/34457-history-lesson-how-we-botched-occupation.html)

History lesson: How we botched the occupation

Quote:

Saturday Evening Post
January 26, 1946

How We Botched the German Occupation
By Demaree Bess

Berlin

Everywhere I’ve traveled recently in Germany I’ve run into Americans, ranging from generals down to privates, who ask perplexedly, “What are we Americans supposed to be doing here? Are we going to take over this place and stay here forever?”

Judging by reports received here from the United States, this perplexity of Americans in Germany is matching by the perplexity of Americans at home. We have got into this German job without understanding what we were tackling or why. Imagine how incredulous we would have been if anybody had told us---even so recently as five years ago---that hundreds of thousands of Americans would be camped in the middle of Europe in 1946, completely responsible for the conduct and welfare of approximately 20,000,000 Germans?

How does it happened that even some of our topmost officials in Germany admit that they don’t know what they are doing here? The answer can be expressed, I believe, in one word---secrecy. . . .

Mr. Stimson probably has had more experience in international affairs than any other American. Before being appointed to head the War Department for the second time, he had also served as Secretary of State and had been Governor General of the Philippines. Thus he was familiar with the military requirements, the political implications and the practical problems involved in administering an alien and distant territory under wartime conditions. Mr. Hull, appreciating the value of Mr. Stimson’s experience in world affairs, was inclined to defer to his judgment in most of the matters under dispute. Mr. Morgenthau, on the other hand, gradually became the chief spokesman for the advocates of an American-imposed revolution in Germany.

His so-called Morgenthau plan, which has since been widely publicized, was not just the personal policy of the former Secretary of the Treasury. It combined the ideas of a sizable group of aggressive Americans which included some conservative big businessmen as well as left-wing theorists. The group supporting Mr. Morgenthau’s ideas included Americans of all races, creeds and political beliefs. It is doubtful whether Mr. Morgenthau could recall today the source of some of the most explosive ideas which he gradually adopted.

However that may be, the Cabinet committee soon found itself in disagreement, with Secretaries Stimson and Hull on one side and Mr. Morgenthau on the other. Hints of this disagreement leaked out at the time and the issue was represented as a “hard peace” versus a “soft peace,” but actually that was not the issue at all. In fact, the major disagreement then was over the question of procedure, and did not directly concern long-term economic and financial policies. The three Cabinet members were equally anxious to make sure that Germany should be deprived of the means for waging another war, nut Secretaries Stimson and Hull were determined not to bite off more than we could chew at one time. They wanted to reduce the original occupation plans to the simplest possible form, with three primary objectives in mind: (1) agreement by all the Allies upon a joint occupation; (2) provision of some hope for the German people that they might develop a decent life for themselves once they became completely demilitarized; and (3) the obligation not to burden the American people with more commitments than they might later prove willing to accept.

While these discussions were proceeding, however, Mr. Morgenthau became convinced that we should go into Germany with a complete blueprint, worked out in exhaustive detail, providing for an economic and industrial revolution so drastic that it would affect not only Germany but almost every other country in Europe. He wanted us to adopt this blueprint for ourselves and to use every conceivable means to pressure upon our Allies to get them to accept it. Whenever he was outvoted in the Cabinet committee, he had the immense advantage---as an intimate friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt---of being able to go through the side door of the White House and sell his ideas directly to the President. . . .

The French, unconvinced that the atomic bomb has opened an entirely new era, are insisting upon establishing buffer states between themselves and Germany. To this end, they’re trying to make a friend of the Germans in their zone and to encourage them to organize separatist movements.

The British, conscious, of the broader aspects of Western Europe’s economic situation, are devising schemes to revive German economic life in their zones, particularly in the Ruhr. In order to provide immediately for some of the things which Western Europeans so urgently require, they’re trying to establish some kind of international combine to operate Ruhr industries and coal mines---a proposal which they compare to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Russians, grappling with the enormous tasks of reconstructing their own war-wracked homeland, are carrying off from their zone all the machines and tools and animals which they can use in Russia. While the Russians reduce the labor surplus in their zone by sending skilled German workers to Russia, they also encourage the remaining Germans to revive political and economic life with due attention to Russian models.

It is only in the American zone that the “pastoral economy” is emerging, which some Americans had visioned for the whole of Germany. Although the Potsdam Declaration technically superseded the American directive JCS 1067, in practice this directive never has been superseded, so far as Americans are concerned. We still are committed to apply in our zone a blue print which was designed for the whole of Germany, but which was never accepted by any of our Allies. This directive is chiefly concerned with tearing things down rather than building things up, and in the absence of any common policy for the whole of Germany, our particular zone is threatened with “planned chaos.”

No wonder so many Americans are asking, “What are we doing in Germany?” They can see that the Russians and British and French are initiating projects which promise some direct benefits to them in their zones. But when they look at our zone they see only headaches. These peculiar problems of the American zone will be discussed in a subsequent article.

How did the old saying go - about not learning from history - if you don't learn from history it will be repeated - I can't find the quote but the posted article sounds almost as if it were written today. Do we ever learn anything at all from the past?

I think the take home lesson from the above article is obvious.

"Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it." -George Santayana

You know this actually DOES have the potential to be an interesting topic.:) But we have to keep in mind that, at that time, the success of the occupation was NOT a genuine certainty. We can look back from the future and say "This succeeded, therefore Iraq will succeed as well - it is preordained because of these similarities between the two."

If you wanted to be really true to this WWII success analogy though, you'd have to say "Iraq is rebuilt and then a few years later a wall is built in Baghdad with America and (eg) Iran on either side for the next 40 years.

There are other similarities too. One that struck me was from this 1945 meeting between Allen Dulles of the OSS and the Council on Foreign Relations:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200311...f-germany.html

Quote:

As soon as you attempt to get Germany to tick and to make arrangements for a government, the lack of men becomes apparent at once. Most men of the caliber required suffer a political taint. When we discover someone whose ability and politics are alike acceptable, we usually find as we did in one case that the man has been living abroad for the past ten years and is hopelessly out of touch with the local situation. We have already found out that you can't run railroads without taking in some Party members.

(the rest of the article is a good read btw, but a bit long. Let me know if it should be posted.)

Now in our "history lesson mode", you could take this as an indictment of the relationship between the Bush Administration and Ahmed Chalabi and the US decision to not involve the now dangerously idle Iraqi Army in reconstruction efforts.

And of course the biggest problem with making comparisons is the fact that the German occupation was, by its very nature, a multinational effort with the country divided into zones. We could easily ask, would reconstruction have succeeded if only one country had been doing the job?

So there were people yelling " the sky is falling" back then too? LOL

I really don't see the Iranian wall - I think that Iran, like the Soviet Union, is rotting from within but, I don't see it taking nearly so long. If we are successful in Iraq - and self-government takes hold, Iran will follow in short order - the younger generation has already hd enough and all they need is a hint at the possibility of success and things will change. I heard this discussion played out earlier today on one of the news media and they also looked at the reconstruction of Japan - marveling at the wisdom of MacArthur in leaving Hirohito in power - at least as a figure head....this would never have worked in Iraq - leaving Saddam as anything other than a corpse will never bring closure to the Iraqi people.

A reminder...

This is a Site-Wide "rule" and is referenced in several significant locations.

When posting a quote - be sure to include your own views on the material from the start. What one may consider obvious is not an acceptable justification for changing this established "rule".

The relevant conclusion to draw from this article is that the occupation need not fail *if* the proper policy is implemented.

You see, in 1946 the famed Marshall Plan (widely credited with Germany and Japan's economic recovery) had yet to be implemented. Instead, like today, the leadership was ambivalant about how to proceed. Fortunately, the proper steps were taken then.

The question is: does Bush have the mettle to stick it out in Iraq through some tough times, or will he fold a la "peace with honor" in Vietnam or Reagan's Beirut tragedy?

Right now the signal from the administration is one of "Iraqification" meaning an overly rapid turnover to Iraqi leadership of dubious democratic standing.

I hope that this is merely an election strategy and not Bush's heartfelt policy, because if we removed Sadaam just to allow damn Chalabi or some minority theocracy to gain power than it will truly have been for naught.

Let's not even mention WMDs or the "al Qaida ties," it goes without saying that intelligence was distorted. The question is where do we go from here - its too late to rehash the rationale for war except for scoring political points.

I will echo what JamesS said.

In 1946, the German occupation was failing. Most of europe was pretty much in economic collapse. Our occupation was being criticised in all major media outlets, like that saturday evening post article. Because of our failure, we changed our policies in response to these criticisms and to the reality we faced. In june of 1947 the Marshall Plan was enacted.

So, yes there are parallels. We did botch the occupation now, just as we did then. There is intense criticism now just as there was then.
So what we need is a major overhaul of our actions in Iraq much like we did in 1946 with the Marshall plan to get this Iraq situation under control.

So yes, the history lesson is obvious
"Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it." -George Santayana

Let's learn from our history.

Quote:

Originally posted by Liquor Dealer
I really don't see the Iranian wall

There is a nice wall rising in Israel though....That has to be the ultimate irony.

The thing that bothers me about some of the Iraq Occupation criticism is that it is still a working process. People are running around pointing their fingers saying we've failed, or the president really screwed this one up, blah blah blah. Meanwhile its an ongoing process. Its not going well, but it isn't a failure. Not yet. Calling it a failure at this point is dooming it to failure. We need to think of how it could be better.

Quote:

Originally posted by Conclamo Ludus
The thing that bothers me about some of the Iraq Occupation criticism is that it is still a working process. People are running around pointing their fingers saying we've failed, or the president really screwed this one up, blah blah blah. Meanwhile its an ongoing process. Its not going well, but it isn't a failure. Not yet. Calling it a failure at this point is dooming it to failure. We need to think of how it could be better.

I'm not sure its even going so badly. You hear from the men there and it sounds like its going pretty well. The press for the most part isn't covering the accomplishments, only what blew up and who was killed. Imagine listening to a football game where they only reported what your team did wrong, even if you were winning you would never know by listening. Some of it is media-bias, but I think some of it is that the reporters don't want to leave the safety of Al-Rashid hotel. They are still in Saddam Iraq mode, where you stay there and read press releases.

Although the article is interesting, and makes a good point.. The differences between Iraq and Germany are HUGE