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Banned
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roachboy, it is a daunting task here to have any "in depth" discussion, even about "single issue", current events, let alone "big picture" "Stuff", like you posted about.
If we are serious about prioritizing our focus, there are no greater priorities than food, water, and fuel supplies...who owns them, invests in them, manipulates them, controls their manufacture and distribution.
As I'll try to illustrate....when it comes to the defense spending, lobbying, scaring us into even more spending on defense, I see that the numbers of dollars providing the incentive to "do what they do", are there...to line their pockets while further compromising our national debt level, actual security, and government spending priorities. It is a "revolving door", into government, out to lobby or work for the contractors, and back into government to steer payments to set up for opportunities after leaving government "service".
In the case of Monsanto, I don't see it....see the money flow.
State Farm Insurance, the privately held, Bloomington, IL insurance giant, with 55 percent of the auto insurance market, has owned, for at least ten years, nearly nine percent of the corruptly managed, agri-Corp, ADM:
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=ADM
So, at least there is something to consider, there, a huge, unaccountable, secretive and monopolistic (only pro baseball and "the business of insurance" are exempt from anti-trust statutes...) insurer, and an entrenched (the Andreas family) management in publicly traded ADM....
Comparing Monsanto to Lockheed, Monsanto has a market cap of $73 billion after a recent seven fold increase in it's share price, but only $12 billion in annual revenue. The articles below indicate that the officers and board members of 1999 are gone. There is no significant "insider" stock ownership, and 86 percent of the share float is owned by "institutions", i.e. mutual and pension funds.
Revenue:
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=MON
Holders:
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=MON
So, on the surface, it looks like Monsanto produces profits beneficial to the "investor class", or the top half of all households in the US.
Hillary is gone, so it only need be said that former Clinton-Gore campaign chair, and Clinton Commerce Sec'ty and trade negotiator, and recent Clinton campaign backer, Mickey Kantor, has been "Mr. Monsanto", as he is so closely affiliated with that company.
But, Obama is not an outsider, when it comes to Monsanto's influence:
Quote:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...501588_pf.html
A Tax Break for Legislators, Whether 'On the Job' or 'Working'
By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum
Tuesday, November 6, 2007; A17
...But two registered lobbyists do help out: Moses Mercado plans to take a leave from Ogilvy Government Relations to assist Obama during the primaries, and Daniel B. Shapiro of Timmons & Co. advises on foreign policy....
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/090300-03.htm
....Similar work is done for Monsanto by Timmons and Company, a Democratic lobby shop that includes Ellen Boyle, former press secretary to Tip O'Neill; William Cable former deputy assistant for legislative affairs to Jimmy Carter; and John S. Orlando, who served as chief of staff to John Dingell, the senior Democrat in the House....
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archi...28/385600.aspx
OBAMA HIRES LOBBYIST
posted: Friday, September 28, 2007 2:11 PM by Domenico Montanaro
...When veteran field organizer Moses Mercado joined Obama’s campaign, but his hire is “making waves,” the Washington Post reports, because of his “other line of work -- as a lobbyist with Ogilvy Government Relations who is registered to represent several dozen big-name clients, including the National Rifle Association, the Carlyle Group, the Blackstone Group, Monsanto, Pfizer Inc., United Health Group, Sempra Energy and Constellation Energy.”....
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Quote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/1999/oct/09/gm.food
How Monsanto's mind was changed
In spring the US giant was sure its GM technology was unbeatable. Then one man convinced the organisation that the game was up
GM food: special report
* John Vidal
* The Guardian,
* Saturday October 9 1999...
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There is a new documentary expose on Monsanto, on youtube:
The World According to Monsanto (part 1 of 10)
Of coarse, roachboy, the actual concentration of stock ownership of Monsanto could be deliberately obscured....there is a precedent for this. The rock that was turned up to attempt to uncover it, last time....by our great-grand-fathers, was only partially lifted, and then quickly and permanently closed again. In 1976, there was talk of taking another look, but that was a long time ago. Today, everyone is a "libertarian", and they all "know what they know". King Reagan would be proud of them!
Quote:
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Originally Posted by roachboy
....i would like to see the next president and next congress connect the dots--the bush administration as an expression of the logic of adaptation particular to the dying national-security state as bureaucratic apparatus and as patronage network--and move to drastically cut it back--....
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Wouldn't that require electing candidates who stood for proposals like the following one, 32 years ago, from Birch Byah, instead of the choices we have to vote for now? McCain is same old, same old, and Obama is a "uniter". Don't we really need someone to represent the great numbers of us who are against the hidden concentration of wealth and power that wants to remain hidden, is using Obama as a means to remain unaccountable, uninvestigated?
Quote:
http://www.4president.org/brochures/...76brochure.htm
Birch Bayh for President 1976 Campaign Brochure
...Our economy is at a crucial turning point. The problems of skyrocketing energy and food costs and the inability of the free market to function effectively have led me to conclude that recent policy failures are the result of an outdated view of the American economy. Therefore, I am proposing the establishment of a Temporary National Economic Committee -- similar to the Committee established by President Roosevelt in 1938 -- to publicly investigate the concentration of economic power in America today....
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...764913,00.html
Thirteen Families
Monday, Oct. 28, 1940
...He wrote an erudite bombshell of questionable accuracy titled America's 60 Families, watched his subjects squirm while Secretary Ickes and then Assistant Attorney General Jackson quoted it with gusto. Within less than a year the families were sprawled under more powerful microscopes as the Temporary National Economic Committee made a study of corporate practices and controls....
...Last week the Securities and Exchange Commission published its report to null a 121-page study of "The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Non-Financial* Corporations." Based on 1937 figures, it whittled the Lundberg roster to 13 families, was considerably less personal than his census of Du Pont bathrooms, considerably more dogged in tracking down actual shareholdings (Lundberg had estimated fortunes by 1924 tax returns). It found:
» Of an estimated 8,500,000 U. S. stockholders, less than 75,000 (.06% of the population) own fully one-half of all corporate stock held by individuals. The majority of the voting power in the average large corporation is in the hands of not much over 1% of the shareholders. But some of the biggest and best-known corporations are exceptions (i.e., widely held, without visible centralized control): A. T. & T., Anaconda, Bethlehem Steel, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, Goodyear, R. C. A., U. S. Steel, Pennsylvania Railroad, etc....
....» The 13 most potent family groups' holdings were worth $2,700,000,000, comprised over 8% of the stock of the 200 corporations: Fords, $624,975,000; Du Fonts, $573,690,000; Rockefellers, $396,583,000; Mellons, $390,943,000; McCormicks (International Harvester), $111,102,000; Hartfords (A. & P.), $105,702,000; Harknesses (Standard Oil), $104,891,000; Dukes (tobacco, power), $89,459,000; Pews (Sun Oil), $75,628,000; Pitcairns (Pittsburgh Plate Glass), $65,576,000; Clarks (Singer), $57,215,000; Reynolds (tobacco), $54,766,000; Kresses (S. H. Kress), $50,044,000.
» Three groups—Du Fonts, Mellons, Rockefellers—have shareholdings valued at nearly $1,400,000,000, control, directly or indirectly, 15 of the 200 corporations.
To this day....67 years later....the SEC records are still sealed:
http://www.archives.gov/research/gui...roups/144.html
Records of the Temporary National Economic Committee [TNEC]
Search ARC for Entries from this Record Group
(Record Group 144)
1938-41
645 cu. ft.
Overview of Records Locations
Table of Contents
* 144.1 ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
* 144.2 RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE 1938-41 967 lin. ft.
144.1 ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Established: As a joint Congressional-Executive branch committee, composed of members of both houses of Congress and representatives of several Executive departments and commissions, by joint resolution of Congress, June 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 705). Functions: Studied monopoly and concentration of economic power, and made recommendations for legislation.
Abolished: April 3, 1941, by expiration of extension granted by joint resolution, December 16, 1940 (54 Stat. 1225). Liquidation deadline of December 31, 1941, set by Additional Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1941, May 24, 1941 (55 Stat. 200).
144.2 RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE
1938-41
967 lin. ft.
Textual Records: General records, 1938-41. Preliminary and final reports, 1938-41. Records relating to committee hearings, 1938- 40. Records relating to special studies and published monographs, 1938-41. Industrial problems information file ("Industry File"), 1938-41. Questionnaires, 1938-39. Personnel and accounting records, 1938-41. Records of investigations and special studies of insurance, investment banking, and corporate practices by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1938-41. Records of hearings and special studies by the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Labor, 1938-41.
Specific Restrictions: As specified by the SEC, no one, except government officials for official purposes, may have access to records created and filed by the SEC on behalf of the TNEC, except for the following: certain records relating to the insurance study, consisting of replies to formal questionnaires (but not including replies to questionnaires sent to state supervisory officials and replies to the questionnaire of February 9, 1940, to life insurance agents); exhibits, including rate books and form insurance policies; and all conventional-form annual statements....
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Lockheed's corruption and agenda seems much more straightforward, and there is much more money in it for the "players":
Lockheed has a market cap of $43 billion, and annual revenue of $43 billion.
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=LMT
Again though, institutions own 86 percent of the shares:
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=LMT
How One Defense Contractor Colluded with the Coast Guard to set back It's Entire Fleet of Ships, Aircraft, and Communications Upgrades by 5 Years:
Reading the following, during what is purported to be a "time of war"...the saga of what happens to whistleblower and Lockheed program director, Michael Dekort, culminating in the receipt of a final Lockheed "blowoff" letter, authored by recently hired, former US Attorney General, and now highly paid Lockheed General Counsel, James Comey, should trigger a reaction is all of us here that causes our partisan divide to instantly vaporize.
We should be able to quickly reach a universal consensus that Comey chose his own earning opportunity over what a former "terrorism prosecutor", like he used to be at the DOJ should be thinking, asking, and doing, instead of simply "blowing off", Michael Dekort.
Comey made a choice to continue the denial and the lack of cooperation with the whistleblower who tried to stop certain death and injury to Coast Guard crewman manning this flawed fleet of ships.
We could unite behind planning a field trip to burn his god damned new house down, erecting a big banner on his lawn advising that he sided with defense programs saboteurs and profiteers, during a time of war!
Quote:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpag...B63&sec=&spon=
June 26, 2002
COMPANY NEWS; LOCKHEED AND NORTHROP WIN $17 BILLION MILITARY JOB
The Coast Guard awarded a $17 billion contract to two military contractors for new ships, aircraft and communications equipment yesterday to help guard against a terrorist attack. The contract, the largest ever awarded by the Coast Guard, was won by Integrated Coast Guard Systems, a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. The Coast Guard will buy deep-water ships, airplanes, helicopters and unmanned surveillance aircraft; upgrade some existing ships and aircraft; and buy sophisticated communications and surveillance equipment. The new fleet and the equipment will allow the Coast Guard to stop ships away from the coastline; instantly run lists of crew members and cargo shipments through intelligence databases; and check for biological, chemical or radiological materials.
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Quote:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/us...nt&oref=slogin
December 9, 2006
Failure to Navigate
Billions Later, Plan to Remake the Coast Guard Fleet Stumbles
By ERIC LIPTON
Correction Appended
WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 — Four years after the Coast Guard began an effort to replace nearly its entire fleet of ships, planes and helicopters, the modernization program heralded as a model of government innovation is foundering.
The initial venture — converting rusting 110-foot patrol boats, the workhorses of the Coast Guard, into more versatile 123-foot cutters — has been canceled after hull cracks and engine failures made the first eight boats unseaworthy.
Plans to build a new class of 147-foot ships with an innovative hull have been halted after the design was found to be flawed.
And the first completed new ship — a $564 million behemoth christened last month — has structural weaknesses that some Coast Guard engineers believe may threaten its safety and limit its life span, unless costly repairs are made.
The problems have helped swell the costs of the fleet-building program to a projected $24 billion, from $17 billion, and delayed the arrival of any new ships or aircraft.
That has compromised the Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its mission, which greatly expanded after the 2001 attacks to include guarding the nation’s shores against terrorists. The service has been forced to cut back on patrols and, at times, ignore tips from other federal agencies about drug smugglers. The difficulties will only grow more acute in the next few years as old boats fail and replacements are not ready.
Adm. Thad W. Allen, who took over as Coast Guard commandant in May, acknowledged that the program had been troubled and said that he had begun to address the problems. “You will see changes shortly in the Coast Guard in our acquisition organization,” Admiral Allen said. “It will be significantly different than we have done in the past.”
The modernization effort was a bold experiment, called Deepwater, to build the equivalent of a modest navy — 91 new ships, 124 small boats, 195 new or rebuilt helicopters and planes and 49 unmanned aerial vehicles.
Instead of doing it piecemeal, the Coast Guard decided to package everything, in hopes that the fleet would be better integrated and its multibillion price would command attention from a Congress and White House traditionally more focused on other military branches. And instead of managing the project itself, the Coast Guard hired Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, two of the nation’s largest military contractors, to plan, supervise and deliver the new vessels and helicopters.
Many retired Coast Guard officials, former company executives and government auditors fault that privatization model, saying it allowed the contractors at times to put their interests ahead of the Guard’s.
“This is the fleecing of America,” said Anthony D’Armiento, a systems engineer who has worked for Northrop and the Coast Guard on the project. “It is the worst contract arrangement I’ve seen in all my 20 plus years in naval engineering.”....
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Quote:
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticl...=1198058693078
Lockheed Employee's YouTube Video Sounds Ethics Alarm
After a Lockheed engineer uncovered problems with the Deepwater shipbuilding project, the company didn't want to hear about it
David Hechler
Corporate Counsel
December 20, 2007
....These days Lockheed Martin's new general counsel speaks often about ethics to audiences inside and outside the company. In fact, his Mr. Clean persona is undoubtedly one of the factors that made James Comey an attractive hire in October 2005, following the retirement of longtime GC Frank Menaker. As a former U.S. Attorney and deputy attorney general, Comey brought to the job political and managerial experience, and a reputation for integrity. Comey chairs the steering committee that oversees the ethics department and related issues -- which presumably included the Deepwater hearings. But Comey's own involvement in the affair remains unclear. The only record is a short letter the GC sent DeKort in June 2006 on behalf of the board of directors, saying the issues he'd raised were considered and that "no further action is warranted." That correspondence was the last word DeKort received from Lockheed on Deepwater. (Comey agreed to a wide-ranging interview during the summer on the challenges of his previous job and his transition in-house, but declined to discuss Deepwater.)
http://www.corpcounsel-digital.com/c.../sample/?pg=98
A careful look at DeKort's background might have convinced his superiors to pay attention. He grew up the adopted son of a childless couple who later had three children of their own. His adoptive parents treated him differently from their natural children, depriving him of luxuries and even basic necessities, he says. DeKort survived by using his intelligence and sharp tongue -- setting a template for his professional life.
He escaped by joining the Navy. He won various awards there, and his self-confidence soared. And the lack of a college degree didn't seem to hold him back. After his 1989 discharge, he soon landed a job as a communications engineer at the U.S. Department of State. Then he jumped to Lockheed Martin in 1992 and rose through the ranks until he left in August 2006. "I didn't get there washing someone's car or marrying their daughter," he says.
His greatest honor is one he'll receive in early 2008. The Society on Social Implications of Technology -- a part of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the leading engineers association -- voted to give him the Carl Barus Award for Outstanding Service in the Public Interest. It's in recognition of his efforts to fix the Deepwater project and will be only the ninth time the award has been given since 1978.
....In February 2006 DeKort phoned the hotline of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's inspector general. Within a week the IG dispatched three auditors to meet with him. (The IG's office confirms that DeKort's complaint prompted it to open an investigation.) But six months later, the IG's office had yet to release a report, and DeKort feared that the probe was going nowhere. Finally he contacted the press and elected officials -- to no avail. It seemed the end of the line.
That's when he hit on a desperate gambit: YouTube. He sat down at his desk before a $30 Web cam and read the short script he'd prepared. "What I am going to tell you," he began, glancing up at the camera, "is going to seem preposterous and unbelievable." In plain language he described the flaws he discovered in the 123-foot cutter conversion. Cameras installed on top of the boats' pilot houses to monitor security left gaping blind spots, he told viewers. He held up his one visual aid: an illustration of the ship that highlighted the two blind spots. He detailed more problems: The cutters were supposed to include a communications system that would safeguard classified transmissions, and all external equipment was supposed to survive extreme temperatures. But these features were also unreliable. Worst of all: "Since the program leverages its design to be common on as many ships or aircraft as possible, these mistakes are probably being pushed forward onto other ships or aircraft," he told YouTube viewers.
The 10-minute video changed everything, albeit slowly. After it was posted online in August 2006, a trickle of newspaper and television reports followed that focused mostly on the novelty of a whistleblower using the Web site. But the coverage seemed to resuscitate the IG's inquiry. The office finally produced a report on the 123-foot cutter conversions in February 2007. It gave Lockheed a pass on the cameras and the security flaws, citing vagueness in the contract's specifications. However, the report backed DeKort on the external equipment issue and another problem he'd identified: Not all the cable was "low-smoke," as required, to minimize the amount of smoke in the event of a fire.
By the time the IG report was released, problems with the 123-foot cutters were beyond dispute. No sooner had the Coast Guard taken delivery of the first eight (of a projected 49) in 2005 than it pulled them from service because their enlarged hulls had buckled, and the entire conversion was soon scrapped. DeKort's allegations upped the ante, painting his company as not only incompetent but unethical, which raised the ire of politicians mindful of wasted taxpayer dollars. ....
....Even if there are no legal ramifications, Deepwater already hurt Lockheed's business when the company was removed from managing the $24 billion project. And the impact may affect other contracts as well. Federal acquisition regulations say a company's ethics should be considered when the government awards a contract. In August the Federal Aviation Administration bypassed Lockheed Martin and awarded a contract worth up to $1.8 billion to ITT Corporation for work on a next-generation air traffic control system. (The FAA says it does not comment on why companies don't get contracts.) Philip Finnegan, a defense analyst from the Teal Group Corp. in Fairfax, Va., was surprised that the market leader suffered this loss, speculating that the company's performance problems might have been a factor. While he says it's impossible to draw a direct connection, he notes, "Deepwater was a black eye."
What happened? How did the country's largest defense contractor, and its model ethics program, miss so many opportunities to fix Deepwater, which has become synonymous with "fiasco"? Through a spokesman, Lockheed Martin declined to answer questions about Deepwater for this article, saying the company stands behind the comments it has made in the public record. In those statements, Lockheed Martin maintains that it informed the Coast Guard of every potential problem, and in each instance the service branch considered its options, including the additional time and cost required to make changes, and agreed to variations from the contract.....
.....The chair of the awards committee was Janet Rochester, a recently retired engineer from Lockheed Martin. The connection to her old company made her feel "very uncomfortable," Rochester acknowledges, adding, "I'm very disappointed by this whole affair." But she and her colleagues researched Deepwater carefully, and she fully supports the award, she says.
DeKort was assigned to Deepwater in the summer of 2003. The design of the cutters was complete, and most of the equipment had been purchased for the first batch of boats. DeKort was checking final details when he noticed that the radios were constantly exposed to the elements, but weren't waterproof. Yet, when he pointed this out, management told him the radios were part of the "design of record" and that changes would cost time and money, DeKort says. Instead of replacing them, the team ordered more. DeKort's notes and Lockheed e-mails show that from October 2003 to February 2004, he tried repeatedly to change managers' minds. Shortly before the first boat was scheduled for delivery, nature intervened during a test run -- it rained. Several radios shorted out.
It was only then that Lockheed broke down and replaced them, he testified before the House committee. But managers' attitudes hadn't changed. Between August 2003 and February 2004, DeKort complained about the surveillance cameras, the low-smoke cables, the insecure communications, and the exposed equipment. Invariably, project managers minimized problems and maximized the importance of staying on schedule, according to DeKort's testimony and e-mails.
Over time, management responses grew clipped. "No one likes it but its [sic] there," wrote one manager in an e-mailed response to DeKort's complaint about the external equipment. "We all need to move on." Unable to make headway, DeKort finally asked to be reassigned.
In April of that year, he received a performance evaluation significantly lower than his previous ones. "You're doing the right thing," DeKort remembers his manager telling him when he asked for support in pursuing the Deepwater problems, "but it's going to come back to bite you." After the weak performance appraisal, he was told he would no longer get the same caliber of work assignments. In August he made an ethics complaint, citing the Deepwater issues and retribution.
His transfer the same month came with a pleasant (if temporary) surprise: DeKort was promoted to software engineering manager at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (better known as NORAD) in Colorado Springs....
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Quote:
http://transportation.house.gov/Medi...0Testimony.pdf
House Transportation Committee Hearing April 18, 2007
pg 1
Statement package for Michael DeKort
The first problem was the fact that we had purchased non-weatherproof radios for
the Short Range Prosecutors or SRPs. The boats are small open air craft that are
constantly exposed to the environment. Upon first hearing about this issue, I have to
admit, I found it too incredible to believe. Who would put a non-weatherproof radio, the
primary means of communication for the crew, on a boat with no protection from the
elements? The individual who brought this to my attention strongly suggested I look in
to it no matter how incredible it sounded. I called the supplier of the radio who informed
me it was true. We had purchased 4 radios – for the first 4 SRPs – and they were not
weatherproof. As a matter of fact, the vendor asked me not to use the radios on any of
the SRPs – which would eventually total 91 in all. Upon informing Lockheed
management that the radios need to be replaced, I was told there was a “design of record”
– this meant the customer had accepted our designs at the conclusion of the critical
design review – and that we would make no changes that would cause cost or schedule
impacts. As a matter of fact, we ordered 5 more radios after I went to management about
the problem in order to prepare for the next set of boats we were contracted to modify. I
tried for several months to get the radios replaced. Just before delivery of the first 123
and its associated SRP, the customer asked to test the system. Coincidently, it rained on
test day. During the testing several radios shorted out. It should be noted that had we not
tested the boats in the rain on that day we would have delivered that system and it would
have failed the first time it was used. After this, I was told we would go back to the radio
that originally came with the SRPs. I believe that this example, more than any other,
Page 3
demonstrates the lengths the ICGS parties were willing to go to hold schedule and budget
while sacrificing the safety and security of the crew.
Page 4
During the late review of the equipment for compliance, well after the
design review and purchase of the equipment, we found the very first item we looked in
to would not meet the environmental requirements. Given this failure we feared the rest
of the equipment may not meet the environmental requirements. Let me state this in
simple terms. This meant the Coast Guard ships that utilized this equipment would not
operate in conditions that could include heavy rain, heavy seas, high winds and extreme
temperatures. When I brought this information to Lockheed management, they directed
me and my team to stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the equipment met these
requirements. This meant that all of the externally mounted equipment being used for
critical communication, command and control and navigation systems might fail in harsh
environments. Since that time we have learned through the DHS IG report on the 123s
that 30 items on the 123s, and at least a dozen items installed on the SRPs did meet
environmental requirements. In addition to their technical and contractual findings, the
IG also made some of Lockheed Martin’s responses on this issue known in the report.
Incredibly the IG states that Lockheed Martin incorrectly stated in their self-certification
documents that there were no applicable requirements stipulating what the environmental
requirements were in regard to weather and they actually stated that they viewed the
certification of those requirements as “not really beneficial”. In addition, the IG states
that the Coast Guard did not know the boats were non-compliant until July of 2005 – 1.5
years after the first 123 was delivered. The report also states that none of these problems
were fixed. Not on any of the delivered 8 boats. That along with the issue not being
called out in the DD-250 acceptance documents supports my supposition that Lockheed
Martin purposefully withheld this information from the Coast Guard. Finally, the IG
states that Lockheed’s position on them passing the self-certification without testing these
items was the right thing to do because they thought the tests would be “time consuming,
expensive and of limited value”. Bear in mind that the contractors have stated time and
time again in front of this and other oversight committees that they do not practice self-
certification.
Where does this situation leave us? Had the hulls not cracked or the cracks not
appeared for some time, ICGS would have delivered 49 123s and 91 SRPs with the
problems I describe. In addition to that, the Deepwater project is a “System of Systems”
effort. What this means is that the contractor is directed to deliver solutions that would
provide common equipment sets for all C4ISR systems. Said differently, all the
equipments for like systems need to match unless there is an overwhelming reason not to.
This means that every faulty system I have described here will be installed on every other
maritime asset delivered over the lifetime of the effort. This includes the FRCs, the
OPCs and the NSCs. If we don’t stop this from happening ICGS will deliver assets with
these and other problems. I believe this could cripple the effectiveness of the Coast
Guard and their ability to perform their missions for decades to come.
How have the ICGS parties reacted to the totality of these allegations? At first
Lockheed and the US Coast Guard, as stated by the ICGS organization, responded to my
allegations by saying they were baseless, had no merit, or that all of the issues were
handled contractually. That evolved after the IG report came out to them stating that the
requirements had grey areas and later by actually deciding, after the system were
accepted and problems were found, that in some cases the Coast Guard exaggerated their
needs – as was their comment regarding the environmental survivability problems.
Up until the announcement yesterday I had heard a lot of discussion about
changing the ICGS contract structure, fixing the requirements, reorganizing the Coast
Guard, and adding more oversight. While all of those things are beneficial, they in no
way solve the root problem. Had the ICGS listened to the Engineering Logistics Center
(ELC) and my recommendations, there would be no problems on these boats. We
wouldn’t be talking about more oversight or making sweeping changes. Instead, we
would be discussing what a model program Deepwater is. I guarantee you that had the
changes that were made up until yesterday’s announcement been made 4 or 5 years ago,
it wouldn’t have mattered. Even with the incestuous ICGS arrangement, the less than
perfect requirements, and minimal oversight, there was plenty of structure in place and
information available to do the right thing. It is not practical to think one can provide an
iron clad set of requirements and an associated contract that will avoid all problems. All
that was needed were leaders who were competent and ethical in any one of the key
contractor or Coast Guard positions. Any one of dozens of people could have simply
Page 6
done the right thing on this effort and changed the course of events that followed. It is
because of this that I strongly suggest your focus shift to one of accountability in an effort
to provide a deterrent. No matter what structure these parties put in place. No matter
what spin they come up with, or promises they make, no matter how many people you
spend tax payer dollars to employ to provide more oversight, it still comes down to
people. We wouldn’t need more oversight if the ICGS parties would have done as
promised when they bid this effort. They told the Coast Guard we know you have a lack
of personnel with the right skills. Let us help you. Let us be your trusted agent. Let us
help write the requirements so we can provide you cutting edge solutions. Let us write the
test procedures and self-certify so we can meet the challenges we all face in a post 9/11
world. In the end, people have to do the right thing and know that when they don’t the
consequences will be swift and appropriate. I strongly believe that, especially in a time
of war, the conduct of these organizations has been appalling. As such, I would hope that
this committee, and any other relevant agency with jurisdiction, will do the right thing
and hold people and these organizations accountable. All defense contractors and
employees of the government need to know that high ethical standards are not matters of
convenience. If you do not hold these people and organizations accountable, you will
simply be repackaging the same problems, and have no way of ensuring the problems
don’t happen again on this or any other effort.
In closing I am offering to help in any way I can to remedy these issues. As I told
the Commandant Allen’s staff and Lockheed Martin before my employment was
terminated, I want to be part of the fix. With the right people in place, in the right
positions, this project can be put back on track rapidly.
I believe it at this time that we will be putting up for display the timeline of events
relative to my notifications of the appropriate leadership within Lockheed Martin. Before
I start that final part of my presentation, I would like to thank you again for the
opportunity to testify and look forward to answering your questions.
pg 44
Response from Board of Directors – 6/26/2006
Scanned – portion retyped here
Dear Mr. DeKort
This responds to your undated letter to the Nominating and Corporate Governance
Committee of the Lockheed Martin Corporation Board of Directors, which was received by the
Corporate Secretary’s office on April 21, 2006.
The Board considers the issues addressed in your letter and determined that the
Corporation’s responses to those issues, beginning in October 2004 and continuing to the
present, were appropriate and no further action is warranted. Each of the issues has been
disclosed to the Coast guard and the resolution of each issue was coordinated with and was or is
being resolved to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard customer.
Sincerely,
James B. Comey
Quote:
http://www.washingtonian.com/article...rden/5844.html
Luxury Homes: December 2007
By Mary Clare Fleury
Former top Justice official James Comey bought this McLean house for $2.2. million. Photographs by David Pipkin
....In Virginia: James B. Comey, a key figure in the scandal surrounding former attorney general Alberto Gonzales, and his wife, Patrice, bought a house on Kirby Road in McLean for $2.2 million. Comey, who was a top aide to Gonzales and predecessor John Ashcroft, testified this year about Gonzales’s hospital-room visit to persuade Ashcroft to certify the legality of the Bush administration’s warrantless-wiretapping program. Comey resigned from the administration in 2005 and became general counsel and senior vice president for Lockheed Martin.....
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pg 46
Response to DHS IG 123 C4ISR Report
My response to the IG findings - notes
Overall
The IG agreed with all of my points technically and contractually on two of them
In the past LM and the CG have said that my issues “had no merit”, “were baseless” and
that the CG had closed all the matters contractually.
The report states that LM self-certified a known faulty C4ISR system - one that would
cause safety and security issues which would put the CG and nation at risk
The report states that the CG was unaware of some issues and their ramifications as late
as 2006. This is incorrect. LM and the CG were notified about every one of these issues by me
in 2003. They were notified through official briefings and the shared ICGS problem reporting
system.
I was told by LM before being removed from the program and the Matagorda was
accepted that all of my issues would be clearly identified on the acceptance documents – the DD-
250s. Given the outcome of the report it appears they did not do so.
I contend that the ICGS parties conspired to not only deliver all 49 123s and all 91 SRPs
in this condition but were, or are, headed down the path of making the same systems match on all
of the other sea going assets like the NSC and FRC (dictated contractually by the Systems of
Systems approach). I believe they did this knowingly and willfully.
To this day – as the report sates – none of the issues had been fixed on any of the 123s.
While the parties concerned may say this is due to the hull cracks and the ships being taken out
of service – they did not know this until after the first two (or more) boats were delivered. (The
IG supports this by stating that the parties had no knowledge at the time I raised these issues and
they were delivering them on them first couple boats that the hulls would crack and all 8 123s
would go to Key West)
Specific report points ,,,,,
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Quote:
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/0...elays_080226w/
C4ISR problems could delay cutter construction
By Philip Ewing - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Feb 27, 2008 6:05:27 EST
The Coast Guard may endure more delays in completing its inaugural national security cutter, the Bertholf, because of shielding and security problems with the ship’s command and communications suite, according to an announcement posted Monday on a Coast Guard Web site.
Inspections by the Coast Guard, contractors and the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command have “identified discrepancies that will be added to the list of [information assurance] remediation actions that need to be completed prior to final onboard testing,” the announcement said. “While there is some risk to Bertholf’s delivery schedule posed by resolution of these remediation actions, the government and industry are working collaboratively and proactively to aggressively address this risk.”
The news was the first time the Coast Guard appeared to confirm rumors, simmering for weeks around Capitol Hill and on the Internet, that the systems aboard the Bertholf did not comply with federal and Department of Defense information-security standards, known as TEMPEST. Spokespeople for the Coast Guard and contractor Lockheed Martin had separately denied to Navy Times that there would be problems with the C4ISR systems on the ship.....
....Some of the “issues” came from inspections that took place before the systems were installed. Ritter said senior Coast Guard officials and Integrated Coast Guard Systems would have to work out the details about whether those issues would delay the Bertholf’s delivery, which is scheduled for this spring, and whether they would be repaired before or after the Coast Guard accepted the ship.
ICGS spokeswoman Megan Mitchell said she expected the ship to adhere to its planned spring delivery and summer commissioning
“There is no risk to the Bertholf’s delivery schedule, and we are working with the Coast Guard to make sure the ship is delivered on schedule,” Mitchell said. From the perspective of the joint Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman concern, she said, the ship’s construction was proceeding apace.
Whether or not there are delays, the ship will be in “special commission status” when it enters the fleet, so that it can operate the systems it needs to get from the yard in Pascagoula, Miss., to its new homeport in Alameda, Calif. Until it satisfies the TEMPEST and information assurance requirements, the cutter cannot take on any Coast Guard missions.
Coast Guard officials have said they’re pleased with the way the Bertholf’s other systems, including its engines and weapons, performed on test trips into the Gulf of Mexico.
Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen, asked Feb. 14 after his annual state of the Coast Guard about the rumors of problems with the Bertholf, said he knew the cutter would only be able to take on its full mission set after it satisfied its “information assurance” requirements, but that he was confident the ship would be the lifesaving service’s best-ever first-in-class cutter.
Ritter said he believes that’s still the case.
“This is a: ‘here is the truth, we’re putting it out,’” Ritter said. “If we had published an article that said: ‘National security cutter, everything works on it, it’s the greatest thing since sliced bread’ — for one thing, everybody would rip that apart. But if you’re gonna say up front that, hey, this is a great cutter, it’s gone through builder’s trials and machinery trials, and actually it’s done pretty good on the systems that were operating then, and we’re really excited about adding this capability to our fleet. We know there are still some things to be worked on, but that’s not unusual, but we want people to know there are some things that need to be addressed, and we’re addressing them.”
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Quote:
http://equalcivilrights.blogspot.com...on-todays.html
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Michael DeKort Speaks Out on Today's Burtholf Developments
.... The CG and ICGS knowingly let someone not cleared by the NSA to waive failures the Navy recommended not waiving. Had the hulls not cracked 49 123s would be like this and now the NSCs - with the FRCs next. These tempest failures pose an extreme risk for secure comms compromise. Isn't that a bad thing in a time of war and with so many new enemies bent of harming us with any info they can get their hands on? Like I said at the hearing this isn't about more oversight it is about better oversight. This C4ISR stuff isn't really that hard to do for professionals that do it for a living. (Ironically the reason why LM got in this hole is that they cut their own C4ISR org out of the project during the bid and keep going without them). What we need most of all is leadership with balls and ethics.
Lastly. Do you know who the LM president of the organization who has run Deepwater C4ISR from inception is? Fred Moosally. Do a Google of that name and "Iowa". Also - do you know who their lead counsel has been for almost 3 years? James Comey. Look him up to. Odd that someone heralded for having high ethics and balls would now defend something so indefensible.
We need a clean sweep. It needs to be firm and very public. Then and only then do we get this fixed and provide a visible deterrent against it occurring again......
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Quote:
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/0...guards-sh.html
Help Me Unravel the Coast Guard's Shady 'Whodunnit'
By David Axe May 14, 2008 | 10:42:00
How did a notoriously-troubled Coast Guard ship suddenly pass a rigorous Navy inspection, and get approval to sail? It's a mystery I could use your help unraveling.
A couple months ago, allegations surfaced the Coast Guard's new flagship cutter, Bertholf (pictured), had problems with its unsecured communications systems http://washingtontimes.com/article/2...4478468/1001-- problems that would delay that ship's entry into service. The Coast Guard responded by blasting the reporters who raised the issues. Then, three months later, the service proudly announced that Bertholf had passed a rigorous Navy inspection -- and would be accepted. https://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/201676/
But the circumstances surrounding the over-budget vessel's handover are... well, a little odd, to say the least. Nothing is definite. But, from what I can tell, it appears that Coast Guard or contractor engineers engaged in some under-the-cover-of-darkness shenanigans to make sure the ship was ready for the Navy inspectors.
The first clue that something was amiss came when Defense News reported this little nugget http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...46&c=SEA&s=TOP in the wake of Bertholf's May 8 acceptance:
Quote:
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[Admiral Gary] Blore took pains to point out that systems testing, grouped under the heading of "information assurance," is continuing on the Bertholf and that, while progress is being made, the work won't be completed for some time.
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If the communications problems are ongoing, then why did the notoriously-strict Navy "InSurv" inspection board give Bertholf a pass?
Navy Times http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/0...nsurv_050108p/ came up with a possible answer:
Quote:
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Much of the information systems gear was not yet installed when InSurv came onboard, according to the [Coast Guard's acceptance] report, nor did Navy inspectors conduct full tests on the ship’s radios ...
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Aha! So the ship wasn't even complete at the time of the inspection. That's shady enough. But what if the ship had been complete ... and then the Coast Guard realized that it would never pass in its current state? If that were the case, it would take some serious misdirection to avoid the inspectors' sharp eyes. Unless, of course, the faulty comms systems somehow disappeared on the eve of the inspection, leaving the ship admittedly incomplete, but otherwise mostly flawless.
That's exactly what happened, according to an anonymous tip relayed to me last week. The tipster, who left me no way to contact them, said that Bertholf's communications systems had been fully installed as of this spring, but were yanked out of the ship in the weeks preceding InSurv's visit ... and then apparently re-installed after the inspectors had left.
In other words, the Coast Guard might have cheated on their biggest ship's final exam, leaving us taxpayers owning a flawed, half-billion-dollar vessel. (If the tipster is dead-on, that is -- a major, major if.) I want to know:
Quote:
1) What were the circumstances surrounding the "un-installation" of Bertholf's communications systems?
2) Who exactly yanked the systems, and when?
3) Who ordered the cheat, and what was their rationale?
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I've asked the Coast Guard and the Navy, and both declined comment. So I'm putting out a call to all Coasties, Navy inspectors, shipyard workers and industry types who have any knowledge of the Bertholf inspections. Can anyone help me answer any of the questions outlined above? Better still, does anybody have documents or other proof to confirm the cheats? If so, contact me at david_axe-at-hotmail.com. I promise total protection and anonymity to any source.
It's a mystery exactly how Bertholf went from hopelessly flawed to passing a Navy inspection with flying colors. Together we can solve it.
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Last edited by host; 06-08-2008 at 08:30 PM..
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06-07-2008, 06:07 PM
