What's Happening in Basra? - Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community

hiredgun · 04-02-2008, 12:07 PM

Piggybacking off of the semi-recent 'is the surge working' thread, another look at the very complex situation that has unfolded over the last week in southern Iraq. I thought at least a few of you might be interested in this very insightful article from Malcolm Nance of the Small Wars Journal.

One thing that he touches on but, in my opinion, understates is that Jaysh al-Mahdi aside, the Maliki government in Baghdad itself has a very close relationship with Tehran. Recall the recent state visit of Ahmadinejad to Iraq. The dominant party in the Iraqi Parliament is ISCI, formerly SCIRI, which was founded by Shi'a Iraqi exiles in Tehran with Iranian support. While JAM is often portrayed as an 'Iran-backed militia' in the press, I think it is often lost on folks that if anything, ISCI/Dawa has an even stronger historical relationship with Iran than JAM does.

Enjoy the article; I think Nance is fairly close to the mark here. I am more optimistic than he is that Sadr's intervention to end the fighting is a sign that he can be counted on as an element in some stable governing coalition in the future, rather than remaining forever an entrenched militant spoiler to potential power-sharing deals. But it's all guesses at this point.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Small Wars Journal

The Basrah Gambit – Defining Moment for Iraq or the Jaysh al-Mahdi?

Posted by Malcolm Nance on March 31, 2008 6:58 PM | Permalink| Print

Engaging the Mahdi Militia in Basrah and labeling them as equal to Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a deadly gamble that may leave Iran the winner.

On 19 March, 2008 CNN’s Iraq war correspondent, Kyra Phillips gave a live interview from in front of the crossed Swords at the Tomb of the Unknowns parade ground in Baghdad’s International Zone (IZ). She cheerfully reported that Iraq had somehow changed after five years and the lack of mortar and rocket fire allowed her to broadcast live. Rockets and mortars were a daily occurrence in the heavily fortified center of government over the previous 1,825 days. On this indirect fire free day, Phillips proclaimed, “there was a time twice a day there would be mortar rounds coming into this area. Now, five years later, Kiran, very rarely are you seeing that type of action, mortars or rockets coming in here. And the fact that I'm here live right now tells you this is a sign of progress.”

The media’s definition of “very rarely” would be exactly four days. That Sunday the IZ and surrounding neighborhoods would be bombarded with a 12-hour long barrage of rockets and mortars, which killed 13 civilians in the outlying neighborhoods. The barrages continued throughout the week and embassy workers and residents of the IZ were informed they could not go outside of concrete structures without body armor and helmets – a standing order for the first five years, which somehow needed to be reiterated. Phillip’s ridiculously premature assessment that the surge had dispelled mayhem and resentment of the 2003 invasion, was short-circuited by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), or Mahdi Militia.

The JAM are an armed Shiite paramilitary group that have spent the last five years fighting American forces with Iranian weapons, systematically murdering Sunnah insurgents, conducting ethnic cleansing of non-Shiite civilians and playing bugaboo as an influential part of the Iraqi government. Within days, soon after the death toll of US forces in Iraq crossed 4,000 soldiers, CNN’s rosy predictions were replaced with breathless Breaking News reports from Iraq’s second largest city, Basrah. It was engulfed in brutal combat.

Operation Predictable Outcome

The limited successes of the 2007 Surge, the increased manpower injected into Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), are completely misunderstood by both pundits on the right and the left as well as its progenitor, the White House. This is clearly indicated by attempts by both sides of the political aisle in Washington to hail the combat in southern Iraq as both success and failure. Both sides miss the point entirely.

While some progress related to the Baghdad Security operations and usurping some insurgent groups away from extremism by forming the Sahwa (Awakening) councils contributed to lessened violence, it was the July 2007 truce and the August 2007 unilateral ceasefire announced by the JAM leader, Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr that resulted in the 60% drop in violence that journalists like Kyra Phillips enjoyed until last week.

More interestingly, it was the MNF-I that broke the truce last Tuesday when they felt the Iraqi army ready to take on the JAM in their southern stronghold.

The Maliki Gambit

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrived in Basrah on 24 March ahead of what was being labeled “a major security push” that was massive for the Iraqi army. It was a planned gamble to snatch Iraq’s second largest city away from the JAM.

The operations in southern Iraq began when the Iraqi army launched a major offensive on 25 March. This nameless operation, lets call it Operation Predictable Outcome, was launched suddenly and was reported in the press as Iraqi forces being attacked by the JAM. Within hours, 15,000 Iraqi army and police were pushing into the city. Through the media was fooled into believing that Basrah was embroiled in militia fighting and the army was intervening, it would take one announcement from PM Maliki to clear the air. Maliki announced to tribal leaders that this operation against the Mahdi militia was weeks in preparation.

The Basrah operation appeared to be a chance for the Iraqi army to attempt the “seize, clear, control and retain” strategy. Maliki would adopt the same counterinsurgency pattern seen in the 2007 Baghdad Security Plan (BSP), Operation Enforcing the Law (Fadhl al-Qanoon).

The first objective is to neutralize and/or drive out the insurgents and criminal elements like the notorious Garamsheh tribe. The army would then start securing the local population from the insurgents to dry up their base of support, most likely through compounding neighborhoods with Texas barriers, ala Baghdad. The next phase would be to segregate the hot sectors of the city from each other and keeping a heavy boot down on resistant sectors under their control.

If this week’s poor showing is any indicator, they will need far larger involvement of US forces for combat support or a heavy British presence to secure the gains necessary for the core elements of the BSP to take root in Basrah. Depending on how critical this demonstration is to the White House we could see heavy combat between the JAM and MNF-I in the weeks to come.

The Jaysh al-Mahdi’s stiff in-your-face resistance in Basrah may be just a desperate short term response to the government’s offensive. Then again, after months of light skirmishes and training, it may have presented the JAM with a fortuitous opportunity to conduct a major live fire exercise and to evaluate its combat viability for when America withdraws.

The JAM sent a direct message Maliki defense ministry personnel to indicate exactly how personal a stake they have in their Basrah actions. The spokesman for the BSP, Tahseen Sheikhly, was kidnapped from his home after his security detail was slaughtered and his house set afire. He lived in a Shiite neighborhood.

Playing Splinter Cell - Targeting the JAM, Piece by Piece

For the last year the MNF-I has embarked on a campaign to isolate the JAM one cell at a time and bring them to heel through a series of targeted raids. Referring to these groups as “Rogue” or “Splinter” Jaysh al-Mahdi and categorized as belonging to Iranian trained “special groups” they were believed to be roadside bomb laying cells that did not heed the control of Muqtada al-Sadr and went on their own to attack the coalition. It is a neat trick semantically and created a pathway for the coalition to engage the JAM by putting one group at a time under the umbrella of Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). The AIF designation meant they were no better than al-Qaeda and could be killed on sight. This progressive labeling allowed the MNF-I to break JAM units they identified apart from major JAM concentrations and clear areas of interest such as Hillah piecemeal. Cautiously balancing al-Sadr’s popularity, loyalty and willingness to adhere to the cease-fire, these cells would not be attacked as part of the JAM as a whole, but were attacked a little at a time. These were described as just another localized small unit action against a “rogue” JAM unit. Done this way the entire JAM organization is not called to account and “good” JAM units would be tolerated … until attacked later when the entire organization was weakened.

These rogue or splinter JAM cells are alleged to be specially trained groups with direct ties to the Iranian al-Quds paramilitary forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, but they just may be the JAM cells that MNFI has managed to identify as vulnerable or responsible for continuing sectarian operations. However, this play on words appears to have reached a critical breaking point. Considering that Maliki’s Badr Corps is just as closely aligned with Iran as the JAM, it attempt to seize Basrah draws suspicion.

It does not help that Maliki has described the popular Shiite militia as al-Qaeda-like, “Unfortunately we were talking about Al-Qaeda but there are some among us who are worse than Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is killing innocents, Al-Qaeda is destroying establishments and they (Shiite gunmen) also.” My discussions this week with Iraqi Shiite friends trapped in Basrah and Baghdad is that most Shiites in Southern Iraq do not see it that way. They see this as a fight between two rival militias, the Badr Corps (aka Maliki and the Iraqi army) and the JAM. The JAM sees only one group being attacked this week and that is the infrastructure of the JAM in Basrah itself.

Its Always Tea Time at Basrah Airport

After news of the Iraqi army offensive stalling, reports surfaced that the US wanted Britain to take part in a surge of its own in southern Iraq, to be supported by the US Marines if need be. As of this writing, the British forces are having none of it. With the exception of a few patrols supporting IA forces and a battery of artillery fire against JAM mortar positions, the British in Basrah remain stubbornly on the sidelines. This is through no fault of their own, as the war remains equally as unpopular in the UK as it does in America.

News of a demand for a British surge became known as reports of a second combined US-Iraqi army offensive was taking place in Mosul against Iraqi Sunnah insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq. In effect, there are now Northern and Southern offensives underway in Iraq indicating a major shift in strategy to retake and secure all sectors of Iraq, most likely by September. Combined with the Baghdad and western provinces operations MNF-I is gesticulating like a wrestler who tentatively pins down an opponent’s wrists (Baghdad and Anbar) but is flailing to pin everything else.

This operation is in no way part of General David Petraeus’s 2007 surge. This altogether different animal is a nation-wide offensive in the two largest contested cities in Iraq. If successful, the dual arm strategy could empower PM Maliki with military control of all of Iraq’s non-Kurdish areas. On the other hand should the JAM as a body throw its full combat weight against the Maliki government in Basrah and start to widely deploy their caches of closely cherished Iranian supplied EFP-IEDs and RPGs southern Iraq from Basrah to al-Kut could fall to the JAM.

Denial Warfare

By the weekend, the Pentagon was trying to spin the Iraqi Army defeats as a sign of the success of the surge in Baghdad. Pentagon press spokesman (and ex-ABC news White House correspondent) Geoff Morrell, stated that the Iraqi army operations were a result of the PM Maliki’s desire to take back Iraq’s second largest city and a sure sign that the US strategy in Iraq was working. Morrell stated "Citizens down there have been living in a city of chaos and corruption for some time and they and the prime minister clearly have had enough of it … I think at this early stage, it looks as though it is a by-product of the success of the surge."

That’s an amazing statement considering Basrah has JAM forces in the Hayaniyah, Jumhuriya, Five Mile, Downtown, al-Ma`qal, al-Janinah, and al-Kazirah sections of the city as well as reports they control the road from al-Amarah, another JAM stronghold north of the city. No one who has ever been to Basrah would predict that the Iraqi Army, even with US Special Operations support would penetrate the Hiyaniyah district, a large swath of poverty-filled slums dominated by the JAM. Iraqi and US Special Operations had to spearhead the offensive there and still have yet to make more than limited headway. The British tried for five years and now have retired comfortably at Basrah airport.

Where will the Basrah offensives against the Mahdi Militia take MNF-I? Is it possible they will force all of southern Iraq into rebellion again? This played out badly in 2004 as Petraeus’ predecessor was ordered by the White House to invade Fallujah while inartfully attempting to arrest al-Sadr. That resulted in the JAM set the entirety of the south afire. A rebellion took months to quell.

Political Aspects of Chaos

Like all good insurgencies, the Iraqi offensive has a broad political component to it as well. However, the American political scene is more critical than that if Maliki and Sadr. The timing of this offensive comes almost a year to date with the beginning of Operation Enforcing the Law, the current surge effort in Baghdad. A successful operation which does not see the Iraqi army completely routed from Basrah would give General Petraeus yet another opportunity to claim before Congress that he needs an additional six months (… by September) to secure the gains of the offensives in Basrah and Mosul and no lessening manpower so he can secure the gains of those gains.

Coming before the election, it could also play well to the we-are-winning-in-Iraq-meme of Senator John McCain. An Iraqi army defeat would only give him cause to demand more time, blood and money so they can gain proficiency.

In fact, Senator McCain may have transmitted the North & South strategy-punch at the end of his visit in mid-March when he said, “Today America and its allies, stand on the precipice of winning a major victory against radical Islamic extremism.”

Petraeus is Operating Under Orders

I have no doubt that the warfighters such as General Petraeus and his former deputy General Ray Odierno are doing everything they can to fight the war. That is their job and they like it. They will be the last to acknowledge publicly or privately that they cannot make additional headway in the face of a changing administration or a dysfunctional Iraqi government. They will soldier on and fight whoever comes in their way until ordered otherwise so civilian criticism of them is pointless. Far be it for General Petraeus to kick the can down the road. He wants to deal with the problem at hand, which is to stabilize a fire breathing insurgency long enough to get adequate numbers of trained Iraqi forces online for any decision to withdraw and to get Iraqi reconciliation back on track. That will be winning to him.

Unfortunately, the Basrah Operation may have also been an attempt at a Hail Mary pass for both General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in the heart of the election season. To show dramatic tangible gains all across Iraq would bolster the President’s case for continuing the war. This is most likely due to pressure, if not direct orders from the White House through the Vice President’s visit last month. Considering their stunning record of incompetence when making even the smallest decisions about Iraq, the over reliance on the Iraqi army to complete even the simplest independent task by all parties may only increase US casualties and public intransigence about the entire adventure.

Unfortunately, scheduling General Petraeus to testify back to Washington in early April while the fighting occurs may herald the end of American “last chances” in Iraq. That depends on the election. The results of November 4th may force both Petraeus and Crocker face up to the possibility that they had better have withdrawal plans drafted by November 5th and standby to execute them on January 21st 2009. No matter who is in charge or how it is sliced, the longer it takes the Iraqis to fight even small pockets of militias means more American soldiers will die in their place.

No one doubts US Supremacy on the battlefield, but this is the Iraqi Army engaged now in Basrah and by all accounts performing poorly. Any attempt to extract them will be a victory for the JAM. On the other hand the JAM can easily make it clear that hardball is a two way game, as they have done in the past. They could suddenly disappear from the battlefield, secretly open up those hidden away crates of Iranian made EFP-IEDs and make Basrah a living hell for whoever comes in with armor. JAM’s “brave, but stupid” street tactics have a low survivability rate against US soldiers but they are more than a match for the Iraqi army and police of 2008. The Iraqi army of 2009 may be a different matter, but there is no doubt that the JAM may use on any more ceasefires to train their cadres so they can continue to fight the Iraqi and US army like Hezbollah fought Israel in Lebanon.

UPDATE #1: As predicted, in a replay of the 2004 and 2005 Mahdi militia uprisings, Muqtada al-Sadr ordered the JAM to conduct the cease-fire-and-vanish act that typified his conflicts with Prime Minister Maliki. This is not a victory for Maliki, as the Iraqi army will only symbolically enter Basrah and none of the JAM controlled districts. This is a strategy that worked very well for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and will work again as the JAM gains strength and once again convinces members of the Iraqi police to mutiny and either refuse to fight or abandon their posts to join the JAM.

Seaver · 04-02-2008, 05:21 PM

Basra in a nutshell

Al-Sadr: You aren't giving me enough respect! To arms!
Maliki: Shut up and sit down
*Fighting*
*Sadr's army loses 358 KIA, 531 Wounded, 343 Captured, 30 Surrendered over only 3 days*
Al-Sadr: Put down your arms! Maliki isn't so bad!
US War Supporters: *smile patiently*
US War Opposers: WE'RE LOSING! PULL OUT NOW!

dc_dux · 04-02-2008, 05:23 PM

Sadr's milita was losing......in what world do you live?

Quote:

Iraqi crackdown backfires and strengthens Sadrists

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's crackdown on militias in the southern oil port of Basra appears to have backfired, exposing the weakness of his army and strengthening his political foes ahead of elections.

(snip)

It has also exposed a deep rift within Iraq's Shi'ite majority -- between the political parties in Maliki's government and followers of populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

Analysts say Iraqis may be about to witness a new phase in the cycle of violence that has gripped the country since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 -- intra-Shi'ite bloodletting that could tear Iraq apart and more deeply embroil U.S. forces.

(snip)

The operation was lauded by U.S. and British officials as evidence of the growing strength of the Iraqi army, but by the weekend it had largely stalled, with Iraqi troops having failed to dislodge the gunmen from their strongholds.

Embarrassingly, Iraq's defence minister had to admit that despite much preparation, his forces were not ready for such fierce resistance. U.S. and British forces have intervened, launching air and artillery strikes to support Iraqi troops.

What has happened has weakened the government and shown the weakness of the state. Now the capability of the state to control Iraq is open to question," said Izzat al-Shahbander, a moderate Shi'ite politician from the Iraqi National List party.

Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Exeter in England, said Maliki had staked his political credibility on the show of force in Basra and lost.

"Maliki's credibility is shot at this point. He really thought his security forces could really do this. But he's failed," he said.

full article: http://uk.news.yahoo.com/rtrs/200803...s-43a8d4f.html

The only ones who think this latest outbreak of violence is a sign of the success of the surge and the weakening of Sadr are Bush and McCain.

We are now more embroiled than even in the crossfire of multiple battles involving different political and religious interests...and we cant tell them apart.

Seaver · 04-02-2008, 06:17 PM

Oh yes, it's the man who cries stop fighting is the one winning the battle.

God I haven't seen that much spinning since my 21st birthday.

roachboy · 04-02-2008, 06:54 PM

there are non press-pool analyses of basra that indicate that the central government has never had any control over it, that it has been chaos for quite some time, split amongst a variety of militia groups and that maliki fucked up in trying to precipitate a military action against these groups, found out that it was more than the iraqi/american forces counted on or could deal with, got bogged down almost immediately and are having their asses bailed out by the offer of a cease fire for al-sadr.

or you can watch the press pool releases and believe all kinds of arbitrary stuff about an imaginary conflict in which things are going swimmingly.

it's really just a matter of information streams.

fact is that iraq is as it has been--a fiasco of proportions that make you wonder about some divine agency that forces leaders who wage wars on illegitmate grounds to pay and pay and pay for that--not with their own blood of course--that'd be too easy.

i wonder if george w bush sleeps well.

Mojo_PeiPei · 04-02-2008, 08:43 PM

Yeah I'm kind of bothered by this, even if it wasn't an actual military defeat, the bottom line is this equates to peace without victory, something I am certain is not a good thing.

I get the reality of the shit storm that would follow here, but I still cannot help but wonder why Al-Sadr is still alive.

Tully Mars · 04-02-2008, 10:44 PM

The Iraq situation is almost like getting an STD. The fucking you get for the fucking you got, only we never got laid. We just pay and pay. More lives, more money, more world standing. I'm sure we're going to turn the corner real soon. I know this because Bush and Co. keeps telling me this is the turning point. From purple fingers to the surge. The promised land is just ahead boys. Just around the next bend. Just a little farther. Just a few more lives. Just a few 100 billion more. You'll see, it'll have been worth it.

silent_jay · 04-03-2008, 05:59 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Seaver

Oh yes, it's the man who cries stop fighting is the one winning the battle.

So all the talk of a US pullout must mean they're losing, thanks for clearing that up for us Seaver, much appreciated.

roachboy · 04-03-2008, 07:04 AM

from this morning's ny times...

Quote:

April 3, 2008
U.S. Cites Gaps in Planning of Iraqi Assault on Basra
By MICHAEL R. GORDON, ERIC SCHMITT and STEPHEN FARRELL

This article was reported by Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt and Stephen Farrell and written by Mr. Gordon.

BAGHDAD — Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

“The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged.”

“Nothing was in place from our side,” he added. “It all had to be put together.”

The Bush administration has portrayed the Iraqi offensive in Basra as a “defining moment” — a compelling demonstration that an Iraqi government that has long been criticized for inaction has both the will and means to take on renegade militias.

The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

“He went in with a stick and he poked a hornet’s nest, and the resistance he got was a little bit more than he bargained for,” said one official in the multinational force in Baghdad who requested anonymity. “They went in with 70 percent of a plan. Sometimes that’s enough. This time it wasn’t.”

As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops.

In Baghdad, Mr. Crocker lobbied senior officials in the Iraqi government, who complained that they had been excluded from Mr. Maliki’s decision-making on Basra, to back the prime minister’s effort there.

“I stressed the point that this was a moment of national crisis, and they had to think nationally,” Mr. Crocker said. “Because nobody should think that failure in Basra is going to benefit any element of the Iraqi community. The response was good. I have not found any element of the Iraqi government that will admit to being consulted.”

Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city, lies atop vast oil reserves and is a strategically situated port on the Shatt al-Arab waterway controlling Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf. Predominantly Shiite, it has suffered from fighting among numerous Shiite militias, tribal forces and criminal gangs struggling for control of its lucrative smuggling and oil revenues. Even some of the Iraqi police are believed to be under the influence of militia groups.

British troops, who provided the main allied military presence in the province after the 2003 invasion, withdrew from the city center last September and formally handed Basra over to Iraqi control on Dec. 16, moving to an “overwatch” position at the airport outside the city center.

There has been growing concern with the Iraqi government about the disorder in the city. In recent weeks, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Fireji, a senior Iraqi commander in Basra, proposed that additional forces be sent.

Prompted by this suggestion, a detailed plan was being developed by American and Iraqi officials, which involved the establishment of combat outposts in the city and the deployment of Iraqi SWAT teams, Iraqi Special Forces and Interior Ministry units, as well as Iraqi brigades.

That plan was the subject of a March 21 evening meeting that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American commander in Iraq, convened with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Mr. Maliki’s national security adviser. At the end of that session, General Petraeus was asked to meet with Mr. Maliki the next morning. The prime minister, it seemed, had his own ideas on how to deal with Basra and planned to travel to the city to oversee the implementation of his plan.

“Effectively, much of the city was under militia control and had been for some time,” Mr. Crocker said. “Maliki kept hearing this along with some pretty graphic descriptions of militia excesses and just decided, ‘I am going to go down there and take care of this.’ I think for him it was a Karbala moment.” Last August, Mr. Maliki rushed to Karbala after an outbreak of Shiite-on-Shiite violence, fired the police commander and oversaw the successful effort to restore order to the city.

One American intelligence officer in Washington, however, had a somewhat different interpretation of the prime minister’s motivations. While restoring order was his stated goal, he asserted, the Iraqi leader was also eager to weaken the Mahdi Army and the affiliated political party of the renegade cleric Moktada al-Sadr before provincial elections in the south that are expected to be to be held this year. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite political party and militia that are rivals to Mr. Sadr, his party and his militia, form a crucial part of Mr. Maliki’s political coalition.

When Mr. Maliki met with General Petraeus on the morning of March 22, he indicated that his goal was to take on the “criminals and gang leaders” in Basra, according to an account of the meeting by an American official. Mr. Maliki explained that the operation would be an Iraqi affair but that he might need air support from the Americans.

He said that he was going to meet with sheiks, religious figures and other local leaders, taking advantage of the additional leverage he hoped to gain by sending in troops, fostering economic development programs and sending teams of judges to try to punish corrupt and violent behavior.

“It was a unilateral decision by Maliki,” said an American official familiar with the session. “It was a fait accompli.”

For the Americans, the timing was not good. The American military had little interest in seeing a hastily conceived operation that might open a new front and tempt Mr. Sadr to annul his cease-fire, which had contributed to the striking reduction in attacks over the past several months. Mr. Crocker and General Petraeus were also scheduled to testify to Congress the next month on the fragile political and security gains achieved in Iraq.

According to one American official, General Petraeus conveyed the message that while the decision was in the hands of the Iraqi government, “we made a lot of gains in the past six to nine months that you’ll be putting at risk.”

But if Mr. Maliki was determined to act, General Petraeus advised him not to rush into a fight without carefully sizing up the situation and making adequate preparations, the official said. Sending a couple of brigades of the Iraqi Army, Special Forces and Interior Ministry forces was a complicated undertaking that under the best of circumstances would test the Iraqi logistical and command and control system.

The Iraqi forces started to arrive March 24. The attack into Basra began just a day later. Reports from Basra indicated that the militias were deeply entrenched. Adding to the problems, the Iraqis did not trust the British and were not including them in their planning, according to a senior American officer.

Faced with a fight that had escalated far beyond what the United States had anticipated, American commanders took several steps to support the Iraqis. Rear Adm. Edward G. Winters, a member of the Seals with experience in special operations, was sent March 25 to lead a lower-ranking American liaison team that had gone to Basra with Mr. Maliki.

Lt. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, the day-to-day commander of American and allied forces in Iraq, went to Basra on March 27 to survey the situation. The next day, his senior deputy, Maj. Gen. George J. Flynn, was sent to the Basra Operations Center, a command center that was supposed to oversee the military operations. General Flynn, a Marine officer, commanded a team of American planners and other personnel.

The United States also sent air controllers to call in airstrikes on behalf of Iraqi units and moved additional helicopters and drones down to Basra and nearby Tallil.

There were not enough military advisers for all the Iraqi reinforcements who were rushed south. So the United States took a company from the First Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. It was divided into platoons, which were augmented with Air Force controllers and assigned to help the Iraqi forces.

The United States helped the Iraqis ferry in supplies by C-130. The Iraqis, however, also began to fly in supplies and troops using their two C-130s. More than 500 Iraqi replacement soldiers were moved by air while an additional brigade was sent by ground. The Iraqis also flew Huey and Hip multimission helicopters.

Taking a page out of the American counterinsurgency doctrine, the United States encouraged the Iraqis to distribute aid and mount job programs to try to win over the Basra population.

To ease the distribution of supplies, American officials from the Agency for International Development flew with Iraqi officials to Basra to work with United Nations officials. The Americans also encouraged Mr. Maliki to proceed with his plan to seek an alliance with the Shiite tribes, as the Americans had done with Sunni tribes in the so-called Anbar Awakening.

“We strongly encouraged him to use his most substantial weapon, which is money, to announce major jobs programs, Basra cleanup, whatnot,” Mr. Crocker said. “And to do what he decided to do on his own: pay tribal figures to effectively finance an awakening for Basra.”

Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell reported from Baghdad, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/wo...hp&oref=slogin

host · 04-03-2008, 07:37 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by roachboy

from this morning's ny times...

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/wo...hp&oref=slogin
April 3, 2008
U.S. Cites Gaps in Planning of Iraqi Assault on Basra
By MICHAEL R. GORDON, ERIC SCHMITT and STEPHEN FARRELL

This article was reported by Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt and Stephen Farrell <h3>and written by Mr. Gordon.</h3>

roachboy, isn't it odd that the "oh sooooo liberal" NY Times, publishes the "work" of such a prolific Pentagon stenographer as Michael Gordon?

I'm not challenging anything specifically in your article, just sayimg that the NY Times seems to have learned nothing from it's experience employing Judith Miller, even though the "problem" of Michael Gordon has been repeatedly brought to the newspaper's attention....I guess they just like things the way they are:

Quote:

Michael Gordon trains his stenographer weapons on Iran - Glenn ...
Glenn Greenwald. Monday July 2, 2007 07:30 EDT ... As Gordon himself points out: "In effect, American officials are charging that Iran has been engaged in a ...
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwa.../07/02/gordon/ - Similar pages - Note this

The ongoing journalistic scandal at the New York Times - Glenn ...
Glenn Greenwald. Monday July 9, 2007 06:50 EST .... All one has to do is read Gordon's articles and it is immediately apparent that, time and again, ...
www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/09/hoyt/

...But Hoyt's column yesterday demonstrates that exactly the opposite is true. The Times is still doing exactly what it did before the invasion of Iraq -- the activities that supposedly brought it such "shame" -- and in many cases, it is exactly the same people who are doing it.

Just consider what Hoyt's criticisms yesterday mean. These criticisms apply not only to one article, but rather, to a whole series of articles. The criticisms concern not some obscure topic or isolated special report, but rather, the single most important political and journalistic issue of this decade -- the war in Iraq and the American media's coverage of government claims about that war.

And most significantly of all, Hoyt's criticisms are grounded not in a technical violation of some petty rule or failure to adhere to some debatable journalistic custom, but rather, involve the worst journalistic sin of all: namely, a failure to treat government claims with skepticism and a willingness mindlessly to recite such claims without scrutiny. If a newspaper simply prints government claims without skepticism, what remote value does it have other than as a propaganda amplifier? None. And yet, as Hoyt's column potently demonstrates, that is exactly what the NYT is doing in Iraq -- yet again.

In light of all of this, what rational argument can be mounted in response to the claim that the NYT is simply not interested in practicing real journalism when it comes to the Bush administration's actions in Iraq, or worse, that at least some editorial factions at the Times support the war and want to prop up the administration's political case? What other explanation is possible in light of the clear, lengthy record of the newspaper?

Just consider the record of Michael Gordon -- who, I want to stress, is not personally the problem but merely the most vivid manifestation of the ills of American political journalism. Based exclusively upon what has appeared in the Times itself -- thus excluding all external criticisms of his reporting -- this is Gordon's record of shame over the last four years:

* A May 26, 2004 NYT Editors' Note identifies several articles written or co-written by Gordon about the Bush administration's pro-war Iraq claims and says about that reporting "that it was not as rigorous as it should have been"; that the war-fueling case "was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged"; and the reporting was flawed because "Administration officials were allowed to hold forth at length" with virtually no challenge or dissent.

* On January 28, 2007, NYT Public Editor Byron Calame reports that "Times editors have carefully made clear their disapproval of the expression of a personal opinion about Iraq on national television by the paper's chief military correspondent, Michael Gordon," in which Gordon expressed clear support for President Bush's "surge" plan. The Times Washington Bureau Chief, Philip Taubman, said that Gordon "stepped over the line" by admitting that he supported escalation in Iraq.

* On February 27, 2007, Calame gently though clearly criticized an article by Gordon written about the Bush administration's "saber-rattling about Iranian intervention in Iraq" (and other articles on the same topic) on the ground that (a) Gordon's article violated the paper's rules on the use of anonymous government sources; (b) the reported government claims about Iran "needed some qualification" about whether they were based on evidence or inference; (c) readers "deserved a clearer sense" of whether such a belief about the Iranian leadership's involvement in Iraqi insurgent attacks is shared by a consensus of intelligence officials (which, as even the President subsequently admitted, it was not); and, most incriminatingly (given its obvious similarity to Gordon's pre-war failures), (d) "editors didn't make sure all conflicting views were always clearly reported" and the "story also should have noted . . . that the president's view on this point differed from the intelligence assessment given readers of [Gordon's] Feb. 10 article."

* Hoyt's column yesterday identifies a series of articles about Iraq, many written or co-written by Gordon, which "slipped into a routine of quoting the president and the military uncritically about Al Qaeda's role in Iraq," and further criticized the articles because "in using the language of the administration," these articles presented a misleading picture of Iraq.

Does anyone at the NYT really need help seeing the clear pattern here? What more does Gordon need to do in order to show how journalistically irresponsible he is, how either incapable or unwilling he is to treat Bush administration claims about the war with skepticism and do anything other than serve as an obedient vessel for pro-war government claims?......

Michael R. Gordon - SourceWatch
Glenn Greenwald, The NY Times returns to pre-Iraq-war "journalism", Salon, ... Gordon trains his stenographer weapons on Iran, Salon.com, July 2, 2007. ...
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php...hael_R._Gordon

Gordon Selling "Surge"

In late 2006, the consistent theme in Gordon's reports was the desirability of an escalation ("troop surge") in Iraq. Alexander Cockburn wrote that:

"On September 11, 2006, the Times ran a Gordon story under the headline, "Grim Outlook Seen in West Iraq Without More Troops and Aid". Gordon cited a senior officer in Iraq saying more American troops were necessary to stabilize Anbar. [3] A story on October 22 emphasized that "the sectarian violence [in Baghdad] would be far worse if not for the American efforts." [4] There were of course plenty of Iraqis and some Americans Gordon could also have found, eager to say the exact opposite." [5]

On two successive days in November, the New York Times gave Gordon its front page for selling the "surge". November 14: "Get Out Now? Not So Fast, Some Experts Say". [6] November 15: "General Warns of Risks in Iraq if GIs Are Cut".On December 4, he tried to preempt the the Iraq Study Group report with another story: "Blurring Political Lines in the Military Debate". [7] On December 7, he wrote another attack on the repot: "Will it Work on the Battlefield?"

On January 2, he co-authored with John Burns and David Sanger a piece attacking Gen. George Casey, the commander of US forces in Iraq, for espousing a defeatist plan of orderly withdrawal. [8]

Appearing on TV, he fully supported the escalation, saying "I think it's worth one last effort for sure to try to get this right, because my personal view is we've never really tried to win." [9]

The Bush admin. doesn't want to directly antagonize Maliki by having someone from the administration say what Michael Gordon wrote, so they pass it on to Gordon, and he publishes their communication for them, word for word!

silent_jay · 04-03-2008, 09:20 PM

Once again from the NY Times, seems 1000 Iraqi's didn't want to partake in the festivities and refused to fight or deserted their posts.

Quote:

More than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen either refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts during the inconclusive assault against Shiite militias in Basra last week, a senior Iraqi government official said Thursday. Iraqi military officials said the group included dozens of officers, including at least two senior field commanders in the battle.

The desertions in the heat of a major battle cast fresh doubt on the effectiveness of the American-trained Iraqi security forces. The White House has conditioned further withdrawals of American troops on the readiness of the Iraqi military and police.

The crisis created by the desertions and other problems with the Basra operation was serious enough that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki hastily began funneling some 10,000 recruits from local Shiite tribes into his armed forces. That move has already generated anger among Sunni tribesmen whom Mr. Maliki has been much less eager to recruit despite their cooperation with the government in its fight against Sunni insurgents and criminal gangs.

A British military official said that Mr. Maliki had brought 6,600 reinforcements to Basra to join the 30,000 security personnel already stationed there, and a senior American military official said that he understood that 1,000 to 1,500 Iraqi forces had deserted or underperformed. That would represent a little over 4 percent of the total.

A new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq cites significant security improvements but concludes that security remains fragile, several American government officials said.

Even as officials described problems with the planning and performance of the Iraqi forces during the Basra operation, signs emerged Wednesday that tensions with Moktada al-Sadr, the radical cleric who leads the Mahdi Army militia, could flare up again. Mr. Sadr, who asked his followers to stop fighting on Sunday, called Thursday for a million Iraqis to march to the Shiite holy city of Najaf next week to protest what he called the American occupation. He also issued a veiled threat against Mr. Maliki’s forces, whom he accused of violating the terms of an agreement with the Iraqi government to stand down.

Estimates by Iraqi military officials of the number of officers who refused to fight during the Basra operation varied from several dozen to more than 100. But three officials said that among those who had been relieved of duty for refusing to fight were Col. Rahim Jabbar and Lt. Col. Shakir Khalaf, the commander and deputy commander of an entire brigade affiliated with the Interior Ministry.

A senior military official in Basra asserted that some members of Colonel Khalaf’s unit fought even though he did not. Asked why he believed Colonel Khalaf did not fight, the official said that the colonel did not believe the Iraqi security forces would be able to protect him against threats to his life that he had received for his involvement in the assault.

“If he fights today, he might be killed later,” the official said.

The senior American military official said the number of officers was “less than a couple dozen at most,” but conceded that the figure could rise as the performance of senior officers was assessed.

But most of the deserters were not officers. The American military official said, “From what we understand, the bulk of these were from fairly fresh troops who had only just gotten out of basic training and were probably pushed into the fight too soon.”

“There were obviously others who elected to not fight their fellow Shia,” the official said, but added that the coalition did not see the failures as a “major issue,” especially if the Iraqi government dealt firmly with them.

Mr. Maliki, who personally directed the Basra operation, which both American and Iraqi officials have criticized as poorly planned and executed, acknowledged the desertions without giving a specific number in public statements on Thursday.

“Everyone who was not on the side of the security forces will go into the military courts,” Mr. Maliki said in a news briefing in the Green Zone. “Joining the army or police is not a trip or a picnic, there is something that they have to pay back to commit to the interests of the state and not the party or the sect.”

“They swore on the Koran that they would not support their sect or their party, but they were lying,” he said.

On Sunday, Mr. Sadr gave the prime minister a somewhat face-saving way out of the Basra fight by ordering the Mahdi fighters to lay down their weapons after days in which government forces had made no headway.

Mr. Sadr simultaneously made a series of demands, which senior Iraqi politicians involved in the talks said they believed that Mr. Maliki had agreed to in advance. But the prime minister has since denied any involvement in the talks, and government raids on Mahdi Army units — something Mr. Sadr had said must stop — have if anything become more frequent in Basra and Baghdad.

Accordingly, Mr. Sadr’s latest statement began by quoting a section of the Koran promising doom to those who make promises and then break them. He then complained bitterly that his followers were being unjustly suppressed and arrested, and warned that nothing would force them to completely withdraw. But he did not explicitly call for new fighting.

American support for Iraqi government forces has also continued, and on Thursday the American military said it had carried out two airstrikes on Wednesday in Basra, one “to destroy an enemy structure housing a sniper engaging Iraqi security forces in Basra” and another to destroy a machine gun nest.

The Iraqi police said one of the strikes leveled a two-story house in Basra’s Kibla neighborhood, killing three people and wounding three, all in the same family. The police made no mention of hostile activity.

Ryan C. Crocker, the United States ambassador to Iraq, said Mr. Maliki took the lead in talks with Shiite tribes and said that the turnout of thousands of security applicants in Basra was testament to his success.

“It is very clear that they have moved over toward the prime minister in a very significant way,” Mr. Crocker said during a briefing in the United States Embassy in Baghdad.

“The tribal element he managed himself, as far as I can see,” he said. “You may recall he had a series of meetings with different tribal leaders, three or four of them, maybe more. That was something he focused on almost from the beginning, and pressed it hard straight through and has seen it pay off. Did he have counsel to do it, I don’t know. But he is the one who did it.”

Two southern tribal sheiks said that by providing recruits for the security forces, they were expressing support for the government. But the sheiks made clear that the promise of good-paying jobs for the largely unemployed young men in their tribes had also been a powerful inducement.

Sheik Kamal al-Helfi, head of the Basra branch of the Halaf tribe, said by phone that he was still bargaining to increase his tribe’s allotment of 25 jobs in the security forces. “Many people faced a bad situation since the time of Saddam, and they have no jobs,” he said.

Another southern tribal leader, Sheik Adel al-Subihawi, said larger and more powerful tribes had received quotas as high as 300 jobs.

Mr. Maliki also announced $100 million in economic assistance to Basra, to be administered by the central government in partnership with the provincial government, and said the government would create 25,000 jobs in the city over the coming year.

Citing that promise of assistance and the tribal discussions, Mr. Crocker said, “Were there deals? Like everything else, that is not an engagement you win purely by military means. The prime minister is employing the economic dimension of power right now, and good on him, I think. Money is in many respects his most important weapon and he is using it.”

Mr. Maliki said that the tribal recruits would be carefully vetted. But that was not enough to satisfy some Sunnis farther north who have been waiting for months to see comparable numbers of their tribesmen accepted into the government security forces. Tens of thousands of these Sunnis, including many former insurgents, are working alongside Iraqi and American troops in a so-called tribal awakening movement — clearly a model for the tribal outreach in Basra.

“Recruiting large number of young people in Basra to fight the JAM proves once again that the government of Nuri al-Maliki is a sectarian government, a double-standard one that favors one sect at the expense of other sects,” said Abu Othman, a senior member of Fadhil Awakening Council, referring to the Mahdi Army by its Arabic acronym.

Abu Othman said four months ago he had presented 100 Sunni names for enrollment in the Iraqi police and had received no reply.

“The Maliki government wants security forces that are controlled, manipulated and moved by them,” he said.

Reporting was contributed by Michael Gordon, Qais Mizher, Ahmad Fadam and Karim al-Hilmi from Baghdad, and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Basra.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/wo...ld&oref=slogin

dc_dux · 04-04-2008, 09:40 AM

An interesting article in the WSJ looks at the political implications of the "Basra Battle"

Quote:

The Iraqi government's inability to oust Moqtada al-Sadr's militia from Basra has boosted the fortunes of the Shiite cleric while damaging the ]standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

(snip)

U.S. officials said that Mr. Sadr was in a stronger political position, as well, because of the public perception that Mr. Maliki ordered the strikes to weaken the cleric and his followers ahead of provincial elections scheduled for October.

If the elections were held today, "there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Sadrists would win across the south," said a U.S. official at the America Embassy in Baghdad who monitors Iraqi politics.

(snip)

"President Bush was right that Basra marked a defining moment for Iraq, but not in the way that he intended," said Vali Nasr, a scholar of Shiite politics at Tufts University who has advised U.S. policy makers. "This is the birth of Sadrist power."

Mr. Nasr said that the biggest loser in the Basra fighting was Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, who has been battling Mr. Sadr for control of southern Iraq for several years.

Mr. Hakim is an American ally who leads Iraq's biggest Shiite political party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI. Mr. Hakim's forces have gradually taken control of several large Shiite regions, including the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, but they have been unable to extend their reach into Basra, a stronghold of Mr. Sadr and his followers.

The government's inability to oust Mr. Sadr means that the Shiite cleric is now in a better position than his rival Mr. Hakim, Mr. Nasr said.

"If the objective was to downsize Sadr, he emerges even more powerful politically and militarily," Mr. Nasr said. "The dreams of ISCI emerging as the sole power in southern Iraq are over."

http://online.wsj.com/public/article...f_main_tff_top

Could this be the first step in the worst possible scenario for the Bush strategy to bring "democracy" to Iraq....a democracy headed by religious fundamentalists?

If the Sadirsts win convincingly in the southern provincial elections in the Fall, strenghen their position for the next national elections in Spring 09 and possibly win a parliamentary majority, particularly with the sentiment of the Iraqi people opposed to the continued and unending US occupation, and ultimately choose the next PM...replacing a US puppet (Malaki)) with a Sadr puppet.

The big winner in this scenario.....IRAN.

Sadr has called for millions to march in Najaf next week to express opposition to the US occupation.

If anywhere near that number show up.....Malaki is in deep shit.

If the US interferes in any way with this march and creates a bloodbath....even deeper shit.

hiredgun · 04-04-2008, 10:11 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by dc_dux

If the Sadirsts win convincingly in the southern provincial elections in the Fall, strenghen their position for the next national elections in Spring 09 and possibly win a parliamentary majority, particularly with the sentiment of the Iraqi people opposed to the continued and unending US occupation, and ultimately choose the next PM...replacing a US puppet (Malaki)) with a Sadr puppet.

The big winner in this scenario.....IRAN.

As I pointed out before, Iran has as much or more influence with Maliki and Dawa as it has with Sadr. Iran being a big winner is not a potential; it has happened, that ship has sailed.

Gary Brecher, in his initimable style, also offers a pessimistic (but realistic) take on Basra here: http://exile.ru/articles/detail.php?...7&IBLOCK_ID=35

dc_dux · 04-04-2008, 10:18 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by hiredgun

As I pointed out before, Iran has as much or more influence with Maliki and Dawa as it has with Sadr. Iran being a big winner is not a potential; it has happened, that ship has sailed.

True....Iran has long ties to most of the Shia political parties....but I would suggest that the Sadirist block in the Iraqi parliament are the more fundamentalists.

Iran became the big winner in the region on the day we removed its greatest neutralizing force....Saddam, the secularist.

04-02-2008, 05:21 PM	#2 (permalink)
Seaver Junkie Location: Fort Worth, TX	Basra in a nutshell Al-Sadr: You aren't giving me enough respect! To arms! Maliki: Shut up and sit down Fighting Sadr's army loses 358 KIA, 531 Wounded, 343 Captured, 30 Surrendered over only 3 days Al-Sadr: Put down your arms! Maliki isn't so bad! US War Supporters: smile patiently US War Opposers: WE'RE LOSING! PULL OUT NOW! __________________ "Smite the rocks with the rod of knowledge, and fountains of unstinted wealth will gush forth." - Ashbel Smith as he laid the first cornerstone of the University of Texas

04-02-2008, 06:17 PM	#4 (permalink)
Seaver Junkie Location: Fort Worth, TX	Oh yes, it's the man who cries stop fighting is the one winning the battle. God I haven't seen that much spinning since my 21st birthday. __________________ "Smite the rocks with the rod of knowledge, and fountains of unstinted wealth will gush forth." - Ashbel Smith as he laid the first cornerstone of the University of Texas

04-02-2008, 06:54 PM	#5 (permalink)
roachboy Super Moderator Location: essex ma	there are non press-pool analyses of basra that indicate that the central government has never had any control over it, that it has been chaos for quite some time, split amongst a variety of militia groups and that maliki fucked up in trying to precipitate a military action against these groups, found out that it was more than the iraqi/american forces counted on or could deal with, got bogged down almost immediately and are having their asses bailed out by the offer of a cease fire for al-sadr. or you can watch the press pool releases and believe all kinds of arbitrary stuff about an imaginary conflict in which things are going swimmingly. it's really just a matter of information streams. fact is that iraq is as it has been--a fiasco of proportions that make you wonder about some divine agency that forces leaders who wage wars on illegitmate grounds to pay and pay and pay for that--not with their own blood of course--that'd be too easy. i wonder if george w bush sleeps well. __________________ a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear it make you sick. -kamau brathwaite

04-02-2008, 08:43 PM	#6 (permalink)
Mojo_PeiPei Kiss of Death Location: Perpetual wind and sorrow	Yeah I'm kind of bothered by this, even if it wasn't an actual military defeat, the bottom line is this equates to peace without victory, something I am certain is not a good thing. I get the reality of the shit storm that would follow here, but I still cannot help but wonder why Al-Sadr is still alive. __________________ To win a war you must serve no master but your ambition.

04-02-2008, 10:44 PM	#7 (permalink)
Tully Mars Living in a Warmer Insanity Super Moderator Location: Yucatan, Mexico	The Iraq situation is almost like getting an STD. The fucking you get for the fucking you got, only we never got laid. We just pay and pay. More lives, more money, more world standing. I'm sure we're going to turn the corner real soon. I know this because Bush and Co. keeps telling me this is the turning point. From purple fingers to the surge. The promised land is just ahead boys. Just around the next bend. Just a little farther. Just a few more lives. Just a few 100 billion more. You'll see, it'll have been worth it. __________________ I used to drink to drown my sorrows, but the damned things have learned how to swim- Frida Kahlo Vice President Starkizzer Fan Club