Halifax

I usually refrain from arguing philosophy and politics on internet forums, especially anything which touches on religion, but as a philosophy student, and a Christian, and a person tired of hearing the same old historical, psychological, and anthropological analyses of religious belief, I figure I should add my two cents, or rather my understanding of Alvin Plantinga's two cents. I find his reformulation of the ontological argument for God's existence rather compelling.

For those unfamiliar with it, the ontological argument traces back to St. Anselm of Canterbury, the 11th century Archbishop of Canterbury. Simply put, his argument claims that since I can conceive of God, and God, by definition, is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, he must exist; for to exist in reality is greater and more perfect than to exist merely in the mind, and since I can conceive of a maximally great and perfectly perfect being, such a being must embody the quality—namely existence)—to fulfill and effect this conception. If there was not such optimal perfection, I would be unable to conceive of it. There must be a prototype for the type of thought in my mind.

In summary, (taken shamelessly from Wikipedia):
1. God is, by definition, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (imagined).
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind.
3. God must exist in reality, if God did not then God would not be that which nothing greater can be conceived (imagined).

Now, I know that the original ontological argument has its flaws as evidenced by the numerous detractors it has acquired in the 900-something years since its introduction. For my own part, I do accept Kant's objection to the treatment of existence as a property. What Plantinga offers in his revived version, however, is something which accounts for even this.

His version of the argument is somewhat more complex, but here is my amateur rendition, as I understand it:
1. In our minds, we can entertain the possibility that God exists.
2. That which we can conceive of as possible in our minds is possible in reality, (for the same reason as mentioned above—the need of a prototype).
3. There is, therefore, a possibility that God exists.
4. God, however, if he were to exist, would exist necessarily, (that is, God, by definition, is not dependent or in any way contingent).
5. The possibility of God's existence, then, is the possibility of a necessity, (that is, it is possible that there is a necessity of God's existence.).
6. By axiom S5 of modal logic, if there is a possibility of a necessity, then that possibility is necessarily true.
7. Therefore, God necessarily exists.

The most controversial premise, that which invokes axiom S5, simply states that if there is a possibility of something so necessary, so transcendent, so absolute, it must necessarily be. If you allow the possibility, it must be.

I know I might be opening a pretty large can of worms here, and I know that there's already a wealth of debate and publication on the subject, but I just though I'd throw it out here and see what the TFP community can make of it.

__________________
Philosopher-in-Training

“The present writer…writes because for him it is a luxury which becomes the more agreeable and more evident, the fewer there are who buy and read what he writes.”
—Søren Kierkegaard

asaris

I tried this here a while back, and didn't manage to convince anyone. But it's always worth a shot, right? For what it's worth, I think that 4-6 are better parsed as follows (at least, for those who understand what philosophers mean when they talk about possible worlds).

4. God exists in some possible world. (Since it is possible God exists)
4a. If God exists, he exists necessarily (via the original Ontological Argument)
5. Therefore, in the possible world in which God exists, he exists necessarily. (4, 4a)
6. Therefore, God exists in all possible worlds (via S5)
7. Therefore, God exists in the actual world. (Since the actual world is a possible world)

The only obvious flaw is that it requires you to believe in S5. Now, I found S5 to be intuitively the best of all of the modal systems, but maybe that's just me.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

Oh no, here comes Willravel!

Just a few thoughts.

Ontological Argument 1 (pre-Plantinga): While I enjoy the way this looks on paper, god isn't necessarily the greatest being imaginable. 'Great' is subjective and vague, thus I can imagine things that might be greater than god by my standards.

Ontological Argument 2 (Plantinga): Interesting, but when I apply it to something else, it becomes deliciously incorrect. Let's say that I have P, a potato chip that has infinite surface, height, and perfect taste. This is the greatest potato chip ever, ever. P is the greatest potato chip that can exist - existing is greater than not existing, therefore P must have existed (before I ate it).

Plantinga is brilliant, probably a genius, but he is notorious for question begging. He displays a lack of understanding of basic science (stating that earthquakes, weather, and radioactive decay are not subject to natural laws).
http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od181/methnat181.htm
http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od182/methnat182.htm

At the end of the day, he's just trying to cover for the use of supernatural explanations of scientific phenomena.

roachboy

the proof turns on problematic axioms/assumptions.

1.
the requirement of a prototype, which itself leans on the notion that language is best understood via nouns, which are names.
if you remove that assumption and run the proof, it functions as a demonstration of semantic effect: because there is the word god, it follows that god could exist...but in this form, what you are demonstrating is the effect of the category god on (say) practical understanding (a way of designating interactions with language, say, for purposes of doing this in shorthand)...and nothing at all about any real or potential referent.

another way: without the notion of template or form, the proof cannot and does not do what it is supposed to do.

2.
obviously the issue that arises at s4 has to do with definitions of this character god that are in no way demonstrated by the proof.

if you want a nice example of the extent to which theological and philosophical questions in "modern" philo remain tangled (and this but one example)--this proof turns up verbatim in descartes's meditations.
so to tie this and (1) together:

descartes version runs through the opposition imperfection/perfection. the claims are---once the actual ontological proof has been completed--ontology here being routed through determinism and thus through certainty or knowability--so what can be known absolutely is the center of the proof. known absolutely means what can be apprehended as clear and distinct. so having finished that part off, descartes can be understood as standing up, brushing off his pants and saying "now what?"--the next move is to say something on the order of (a) and i see that i am an imperfect being but (b) i can imagine a perfect being--(c) but i could not do this on my own--therefore the notion of perfection must have been put there (there being in language or in descartes mind as something of a mental form) (d) therefore god and (e) therefore everything else (so begins the deduction of the world...

but it is also possible that the notion of perfection is posited along with that of imperfection as its inverse...and so creates a semantic environment if you like----so perfection is simply a way of grouping properties or phenomena (a category) that are hypothetical or transcendent----that one can fill in practically (i.e. make meaningful or operational via praxis in the context, say, of particular belief communities)--and which neither supposes nor requires (a) a form "perfection" or (b) anything like apprehension of contents associated with the category in any direct manner.

in other words, you could easily claim that the notion of perfection is a simple semantic inversion of imperfection. as an inversion it (the category) comes to be given content--it does not HAVE content----it does not come with it from the word factory.

which is not the part of the meditations that folk who want to see the text as the origin of modern philosophy generall sned a whole lot of time on)

now these are not the only problems with descartes (you mght wonder about the infinite regress that gets going once he tries to import the criteria for judgment just after the reduction is completed---process it via set theory and voila, a seamonkey-like infinite regress of your very own. you can play with it. it makes a lovely hat, i have found.)

what is more, if you juxtapose the above with the other proofs outlined so far in this thread, you can set up a quick and easy formal explanation for the recurring differends that are the principle charateristic of the gazillion atheism/nonatheism threads. believers are not going to be inclined to follow you when you reduce god or perfection to a simple name.

the way out from within the christian tradition is nominalism. everything about the name god outlined above could be true---this because human understanding is finite and has no access to the infinite--so it follows that the name god is but a name, a convenience, a signifier given content in various control-contexts--which may or may not have anything to do with the (putative) referent, or that which the category "god" points to but does not and cannot signify--any relation between the two would be accidental.
and this claim does not require that one posit some outside observer postion from which one can evaluate the fit between what folk think this god dude is and what this god fellow "really is"---instead it follows from definitions concerning human understanding that are every bit as deeply embedded in xtian theology as are the rather sad desires to know perfection or to "prove"
god's existence.

so the critiques of the ontological proof do not require that one therefore abandon one's christianity--but they do push you toward nominalism, which i would think would be the basis for a better christianity in any event. but that's just my opinion, man.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

asaris

Well, I skimmed through the articles, and the closest I could find was the suggestion, based on the work of the prominent philosopher of science Bas VanFraassen, that so-called scientific laws are not, properly speaking, laws, but rather mere descriptions of regularities. This might be wrong, but to describe it as "a lack of understanding of basic science" is rather too severe. Am I missing the quotes you're referring to?

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od182/methnat182.htm

Plantinga's trying to apply the theories of Bas van Fraassen to 'real life' in faulty examples of earthquakes, weather, and radioactive decay being inexplicable by science.

roachboy

what's the difference between a regularity and a law?

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Willravel

Regularity is the passing of well formed stools at regular, and healthy intervals.

This should answer your question:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo...kel_set_theory
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_regularity

roachboy

why are we doing set theory?

when i looked at the op, i saw nothing particularly problematic with it, so didn't look into plantinga, who seems to offer very little in the way of modifications to the problems that have accompanied these proofs from the outset.
besides, if you try to revisit old philosophical questions using set theory, things end up getting tangled up in more or less the same way as they do without set theory--problems of self-referentiality, of ground, bothersome elements like the incompleteness theorem, etc. there is a group of french mathematicians and philosophers who tried this project, publishing things under the pseudonym of bourbaki....the value of the bourbaki project is that you can see the problems (even as they tried to wave them away)--so i didnt see any particular need to revert to set theory--it wouldnt make the logical problems with this version of the ontological proof go away.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

Willravel

I haven't the faintest. The stuff gives me a headache, anyway.

roachboy

damn that was quick will.
i decided to explain what i meant and in the meantime, there we are.
editing: the bane of roachboy's deployment. if the other guy could just get his shit together, roachboy wouldnt have to put up with this.

anyway, back to regularly scheduled programming.

__________________
a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear

it make you sick.

-kamau brathwaite

asaris

Is this the part you mean? If it is, I don't really see how he's saying what you think he's saying.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Halifax

This objection has also been made to the original ontological argument. Sounds very much like Gaunilo's island—that is, the idea that one could conceive of a perfect island, or any given x such that it "must necessarily exist." However, the concept of a truly perfect anything other than God misunderstands the nature of perfection. With the notion of Divine Simplicity, there can be no variation in true perfection. Thus, the truly perfect island, (or chip, or table, or "Double Stuf" Oreo cookie, ), ultimately reduces to God. The more and more you maximize its perfection, the closer you bring that conception to God.


Although...if by my thought I could conjure up the Platonic form of the potato chip, I could really have some fun...

__________________
Philosopher-in-Training

“The present writer…writes because for him it is a luxury which becomes the more agreeable and more evident, the fewer there are who buy and read what he writes.”
—Søren Kierkegaard

Willravel

But, as I said before, 'perfection' is subjective and relative no matter what because we are imperfect ourselves and because we have different perceptions of the manifestation of perfection. God is not by definition perfect to everyone. In my opinion, for example, the Judeo-Christian god was wrong to test Job the way he did. Because of that and other similar tales of immorality in the Torah, I find that god is imperfect. As such, the idea that as a concept becomes more perfect it approaches god would be flawed in my perception. As a matter of fact, as the potato chip is not immoral, as god becomes more like the chip he becomes more perfect, by my perception. Ultimately, one has to conclude that since perfection is subjective, as a universal term in axiom it is flawed.
On that we can wholeheartedly agree.

asaris

That argument doesn't exactly work, Will. There are three possibilities for allegedly immoral actions on the part of God.

1. You're wrong -- that is, the action isn't actually immoral
2. The Bible's wrong -- either the action did not take place or it is attributed to the wrong being.
3. 'God' is wrong -- in which case, the being described as performing these actions is not actually God, but merely some powerful being.

(Note that this doesn't actually require an objective morality, just that morality not be up to you.)

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

Yes, in your opinion god is perfect, but that doesn't make it so in my opinion. Just as the term perfection, morality is relative to the subject. In my opinion, what god did in the Bible was often immoral. Of the Bible is wrong, then the entire concept of god is probably wrong and Christianity is meaningless. If god is wrong, then god isn't perfect...So I'm right no matter what.

The fact of the matter is that fiction can be anything you want it to be by it's nature, including perfect, but that perfection does not make it anything other than fiction. God has been written about in works of fiction for hundreds of years, and many representations of god are different than one another. If there is on true god, then your theory is negated. If there are many gods, each created by man, then Christianity is wrong.

asaris

I think you're misunderstanding me, Will. I'm saying God, by definition, is perfect. Now, one of the possibilities I mentioned above is that the being described in scripture is not perfect -- but that doesn't mean that God isn't perfect, that means that that being is not God.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

You want to argue semantics in order to prove an axiom? Yeesh.

There are two types of perfection: dualistic perfection is a theoretical state of existence which is beyond all possible improvability. No one can prove god, therefore he isn't perfect. Non-dualistic perfection is relative perfection (the screwdriver is perfect for this job). God doesn't fit into either of those (god cannot be proven, and the second doesn't seem to fit your description of perfection).

As perfect has many meanings to many people, saying that god is, by definition, perfect is like saying everyone has their own god. I might be willing to settle on that point, but that's not Christianity.

asaris

Ah, I think I see the disagreement. See, I think perfection means just one thing. People might disagree about what perfection is, but some of those people are wrong and some of those people are right. That is, perfection is an objective property. You happen to disagree. Is that right?

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Halifax

Exactly. In response to willravel, perfection in this sense is not merely an "excellence," but the ultimate state of ontological self-sufficiency. A perfect being is one which wants for nothing, needs nothing, is contingent upon nothing.

You say God is not proven, and therefore he is not perfect, but I don't follow your reasoning. We do have an existent concept of perfect perfection. How then can I even conceive of such a concept without a prototype for my thoughts? The world we inhabit and perceive in our daily experience is utterly contingent—governed, (or rather described), as it is by the laws of scientific materialism.

As for God becoming like the potato chip, the chip has innumerable accidental properties and is reducible to more fundamental parts. I can imagine the potato paste, the potatoes, the plants, the oils, etc. used to create the chip. God, however, is fundamentally simple. His simplicity goes hand in hand with his non-contingency.

__________________
Philosopher-in-Training

“The present writer…writes because for him it is a luxury which becomes the more agreeable and more evident, the fewer there are who buy and read what he writes.”
—Søren Kierkegaard

Willravel

Why would a creature that needs nothing ask for worship?
I was following the idea that there are two types of perfection, dualistic and non-dualistic. If you're aware of a third, I'd like to learn.
God is made of father, son and holy spirit; 3 ingredients in one god. A potato chip is made of potatoes, oil, and salt; 3 ingredients in one delicious snack.

Halifax

Does He ask for our worship? Or is it due Him in accord with the existent order of things? I don't think God created us to merely to worship Him—not in the "slavish" sense of worship which some people have. He created us as a gratuitous expression of His love and glory. Only the superabundance of Goodness found in God could spur Him to a true creative act. We were created free because properly one may only enter into a loving relationship with a free creature.

The non-dualistic perfection you describe sounds essentially like the concept of "excellence" in the classical, Platonic/Aristotelian sense. It is relative and therefore contingent, as you say. Perhaps you can expand more on the meaning and sense of the first. I don't think the perfection I'm describing and which the argument concerns is a "third" option, but rather an ontological perfection—a perfection and self-sufficiency in being. This does not vary from person to person. Unles we're going to lapse into solipsism, being must be taken as common. That is, my experience of existing—not my personal or life experience, but merely my awareness of the fact of my existence, my being, my substance—is something which I share with all existent things and therefore the basis on which I can relate to any existent thing.

Yum.

Seriously, though, I'm hesitant to even touch upon the Trinity in this discussion because, well...it's a whole other (long) complex discussion. Christianity is a monotheistic religion. There is one God, and God is one. ("Hear o' Israel..." etc.) Furthermore, and more importantly, perhaps, it is philosophically imperative that God be one. To introduce division into a fundamental, (or in this case the Fundamental), is to violate and deny its status as a fundamental.

God is not made of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God is one, and each is in turn God. They are not modes, nor expressions, though the word "expression" comes closer than anything else I can think of to capturing the nature of the persons of the Trinity, (though no words may completely express their nature). Each person is fully God and represents a particular expression or mode of the Godhead, (but not, of course, in the sense of Modalism, the early heresy). The Father is the creator, the memory, the generating mind; the Son is the intellect or "word;" the Holy Spirit is the will. Yet in the proper operation of each of the persons, their actions are undertaken through modes proper to each of the other persons, (including its own person); i.e. the Father, in encompassing the whole of existence and Being, can be considered in terms of metaphysics, (the principles), which is proper to the Father, or in mathematics, (the image), which is proper to the Son, or in physics, (the instantiation, particular, or gift), which is proper to the Spirit.

Anyways...

__________________
Philosopher-in-Training

“The present writer…writes because for him it is a luxury which becomes the more agreeable and more evident, the fewer there are who buy and read what he writes.”
—Søren Kierkegaard

Willravel

This only works if the arguer works from the center: subjective agnosticism. In all of your arguments, you make claims that god is great and god is good and god is perfect. That's all well and good for you and I hope that your faith gives you peace and happiness for the rest of your life, but that's not my perception of reality.

I see faults lining both arguments because I perceive reality differently.
1. In our minds, we can entertain the possibility that God exists. I agree completely, and you are living proof. Many people consider god daily and not only entertain, but believe certainly that god exists. It's the foundation of theism.
2. That which we can conceive of as possible in our minds is possible in reality, (for the same reason as mentioned above—the need of a prototype). This is absolutely incorrect. With knowledge of the rules, one can conceive ways to break those rules. I can imagine hot snow falling up. The existence of paradox disproves #2 conclusively.
3. There is, therefore, a possibility that God exists. There is a possibility that god exists, but it's as far from #2 as anything can be. God existing depends on our limited understanding of the universe. As I've tried to touch on before,
science is ever growing. What we know today could seem almost godlike in comparison to what we knew thousands of years ago. As such, it's possible that an intelligence developed through evolution over millions of years that is absolutely beyond our current understanding. The thing is, god is supposed to have predated existence, so either that idea is incorrect or god isn't real.
Being must be taken as common? That can't happen without collective experience of said being. For the same reason there are dozens of denominations of Christianity based on one book, there are going to be many interpretations and perceptions of the god concept...thus god is a subjective phenomenon.
You're telling me. This thread gets me more hungry than Tilted Cooking....and I have only myself and Plantinga to blame.
You said god was more simple than a potato chip. I begged to dipper (I can't help myself, don't take it as blasphemy...it's more like diet blasphemy).
The perfect potato chip mentioned above is not made of potatoes, oil and salt. The chip is one, and each is in turn the chip. I think you get where I'm going with this. Anything someone can say about god I can twist to say about my fictitious chip. I'm not by any means saying that this disproves god. I'm just saying I think there is a flaw to the reason.

I had a thought. Your argument is based on the idea that god is fundamentally simple. Can you really call the last paragraph simple? Honestly? I'm a fairly bright person, and I had to read it twice to make sure we were on the same page.

asaris

The doctrine of divine simplicity depends on a certain sense of simple. To use a simplistic (hah!) example, when Christians say God is simple, they don't mean he's stupid. What they mean is that God is identical to himself and completely indivisible to the point of also being identical to his properties. For example, a potato chip may instantiate the property of being good. But God is goodness itself. Also, your chip analogy falls apart because the potato is not, in itself, fully chip, but Jesus is fully God.

I don't get why you say God must be a subjective phenomenon just because people disagree about the best way to worship him (among other things). I'm sure that my friends and family, even those who know me best, disagree about how to worship --- erm, strike that --- make me happy. My sister has a different idea about what to get me for my birthday from my best friend. That doesn't mean I'm a subjective phenomenon (assuming I understand what you mean by that term.

I understand your objection to #2, but think it's insufficient. If I can form some conception of something in my head, not merely thinking the words 'round square' but actually conceiving of something like a 'unicorn', that's a good prima facie case that that thing is possible. That puts the burden of proof on the person who wants to say that it is, in fact, impossible. It's not that difficult -- just derive a contradiction of the form "p & ~p" from the concept you're trying to show is impossible.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

pig

i've been following this for a bit; i think that before i post too much, i'd need to see roach's post #4 responded to in a substantial manner. in addition the points that he raises, i furthermore see no reason to pre-suppose that a concept of perfect unity requires any of the various details attached to God or gods, starting with personification and building up.

__________________
You don't love me, you just love my piggy style

Willravel

You're trying to describe details about something in my imagination. This special chip is goodness incarnate. This chip is perfect in every way. But it's still a potato chip. Simple.

I don't think that anyone is saying god is stupid, but it was demonstrated that he/she/it is not simple by any means when Halifax briefly described the concept of a triune god. That's only one example. That's just one of god's supposed properties out of many which is complex.
What about different religions? Are you suggesting that god and Shiva are the same perfect being? If so, then there are two very distinct descriptions of the god creature that would seem to be at odds. If not, then are there multiple gods?
I can conceive going back in time and killing my grandfather. Tolkien imagined the Lord of the Rings. Actually, I think that's the perfect fantasy series, so it must exist.

asaris

I wasn't trying to say that you think God is stupid -- I'm sure you would agree that, if God existed, he would be fairly intelligent. (Actually, I'm not sure, but whatever.) All I meant to say is that the word 'simple' means several different things, and just because 'simplicity' is ascribed to God doesn't entail that descriptions of God are therefore simple. The doctrine of divine simplicity is fairly technical.

There can't be multiple gods -- that's a direct consequence of the ontological argument. (If it was possible for there to be multiple gods, it would be possible for me to conceive of one of them being more powerful than the others. But God is the being than which none greater is possible. Ergo, ...) I'm saying that, despite their differences, all Christian denominations worship the same God. I'm willing to say that, in some sense, Judaism and Islam also worship the same God. But at some point, the properties ascribed to the supreme being become different enough that you don't want to say you're talking about the same being.

Two examples of this. Take the quest for the historical Arthur. Most people admit that the historical Arthur isn't going to share alot of properties with the mythical Arthur. But certainly the historical being has to share a certain amount of properties with the mythical being, otherwise it doesn't make sense to speak of them as both being the same Arthur. Or, take the example of someone who posts here named Asaris. You guys probably have differing ideas of what my properties are -- you also probably agree to some extent about what my properties are. But if someone said that Asaris was a tennis coach at Holland Christian H.S. in the mid-70s, while they wouldn't be wrong, they'd be talking about a different Asaris. (Yes, someone with my name was a tennis coach in the mid-70s). But just because two of you disagree about what properties I have doesn't mean you're talking about two different Asaris's.

No, bad inference. I strongly suspect you going back in time and killing your grandfather is possible. I'm almost positive the Lord of the Rings is. Not a good counter-argument.

__________________
"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Astrocloud

All this demand for proof seems to undermine faith.

Willravel

That's contradictory. You are labeling something complicated 'simple'. You can't have it both ways. You are saying, in so many words, that 'The simplicity of god is complicated." The heat of god is cold, the up of god is down.
That's why I used Shiva, who I'm sure very few claim is the same deity as the Judeo-Christian god. So you're either going to tell me that Shiva is real, or that Shiva isn't perfect. The problem is, that you'll be falling into my devious trap. Anything you can say to suggest that Shiva isn't perfect, I can claim to be subjective and then you'd be agreeing that the 'perfection' of a deity is subjective.
So Shiva isn't the same as the Judeo-Christian god? Or they are the same? I'm afraid you've lost me in your postulated scenario.
You suspect that going back in time and killing my grandfather is possible? Looking past the obvious difficulties of time travel, are you sure that time stream theory is correct? The only way around the grandfather paradox is time stream, and time stream has no proof. If time stream isn't right, then I've just imagined, in my mind, a true paradox. A paradox negates the second postulation.

asaris

No, I'm pointing out that the term is equivocal. "Divine Simplicity" means "identical with his properties." Not "easy to understand".

I'd argue that, given the description of Shiva in (what book would it be? I don't know much about Hinduism), Shiva's not perfect. For one thing, Shiva lacks omnipotence, and since it's better to have power than not to have power, that must mean Shiva's not perfect.

I can see how that would be confusing -- I think I confused myself. I don't know whether there's a sense in which I would want to say that Shiva is the Judeo-Christian God. From what I know of Shiva, there's not a lot of resemblance there, so I'd be somewhat disinclined.

I don't follow. Note that it's possible that the laws of nature are different from what they are. That is, there is some possible world in which there are different laws of nature. I'm not familiar with all the theories, but the 'fact' that time stream has no proof isn't going to be sufficient -- if it's possible, then killing your grandfather is possible.

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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

I figured this would all eventually boil down to semantics. 'Simple' means easy to understand and/or not complex. Maybe you learned from a different dictionary.
Shiva is said to be omnipotent, omnipresent, and all knowing. Sounds a lot like god. Also, how is omnipotence perfect? I see that as a massive flaw because, in theory, someone who is omnipotent cannot be checked and balanced.
If that's possible, then you're applying what I whimsically call the 'every thing's possible' doctrine. That means that anything and everything is possible. If that's the case we may need to call this game on rain, because we're not on the same page at all. In my opinion, not everything is possible, and I base my understanding of the universe on that. I can keep an open mind, but if my daughter has chocolate on her face and the cookies are gone, I won't blame Saddam Hussein. Not everything is possible.

pig

will/asaris: switch out brahman for shiva, in my opinion and then you're talking a closer approximation to what it sounds like asaris is trying to express in the christian tradition : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahman

i believe, interestingly enough, the brahman is broken down into vishnu, brahma, and siva: creator, protector and destroyer or something of that nature. another trinity!

still think roach killed this thing back at #4.

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You don't love me, you just love my piggy style

asaris

Actually, I think Roachboy's post was very good. I disagree with him a little bit on some of the details (for example, I'm not sure his critique of Descartes version, which is spot on, applies equally well to Plantinga's), and I wish he'd use capital letters. But there's nothing I really wanted to argue about in that post. Contrary to willravel, Roachboy actually knows a bit about philosophy, and so understands that words sometimes have technical definitions that are different from their common sense meaning.

Will, first, I'm unclear why the ability to be checked and balanced makes one more perfect. Perhaps you could explain that? It seems like, all other things being equal, it's better to have power. It's better to be able to move than to be moved.

You also obviously don't understand the philosophical meaning of 'possible'. Clearly, not everything is possible. Consider the following statement: X is both square and a circle. I can prove (or, at least, someone can prove) that this leads to the claim that X is p and ~p. Which means that X is impossible. That's just what it means for something to be impossible, speaking philosopically. (And part of why, in law, we speak of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' rather than 'beyond all possible doubt'). Impossibility is, therefore, a very strong claim.

Finally, interesting note about Brahman. If you read scripture seriously, it can be a bit interesting to think about what to do with other gods. There are, as far as I can tell, three possibilities. One, they didn't exist in any form. Two, they're demons masquerading as something else. Three, they're confused recollections of the true God. I don't know that I'm committed to any one explanation in the case of any particular god, except, of course, the Jewish and Islamic Gods, who bear a special relation to the Christian God. (They were in the same frat )

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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

pig

asaris,

quick point because i'm being a jackass: i'd pick a different metaphor than square/circle. i believe that a complex variable transformation will allow you to map a square onto a circle, and vice versa. sort of like the (fuck can't remember the name) maps that "accurately" depict the spherical earth on a 2-D map. planar projection, perhaps?

quick questions: can i understand that "god exists in all possible worlds" points to all worlds of perception, in a subjective sense, and not to all possible worlds in a physics-based multi-verse sense?

do you believe, and/or are you defending the concept of god/God as a signifier of that which is beyond comprehension - an abstract quantity of mystical proportions that explains events counter to any "scientific" inquiry; or "God" who did all things in the Bible...or perhaps something in-between.

in essence, i see no point in arguing possibility. God is possible. no questions asked. God is possible.

when you turn to probability, i see no reason why God is necessary. Other than as a signifier for knowledge of a state of perfection we shall never ascertain, i can see no reason to postulate a personified deity.

i see all gods as (potentially) outdated sociological constructs, signifying man's search for deeper truth. i have no problem with this pursuit; in fact, in encourage it. i just don't see the need to fall back on these constructs. furthermore, when one adheres to these particular constructs, one would seemingly also be tied to other aspects of that God's teachings, which have clearly become outdated. so, the intelligent adherent must become metaphorical in his/her approach. fine. so why not go metaphorical all the way?

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You don't love me, you just love my piggy style

Willravel

Just because you're argument makes no sense when applied to reason doesn't mean that I don't know anything about philosophy. I'm not a professor, like rb, but I'm not an idiot. I also know when I've been insulted.

You've tried to stretch the words 'perfect' and 'simple' beyond their given meanings. People cannot have a philosophical debate when they aren't speaking the same language. Let me know when you're willing to use the dictionary definitions of the words, then I'll meet you back here.

DaveOrion

As I've said before, its not just me, many can get in heated discussion and insult one another.

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Syriana...have you ever tried liquid MDMA?....Liquid MDMA? No....Arash, when you wanna do this?.....After prayer...

pig

all i can say at this point is: goddamn i love me some willravel.

asaris, if you want to have a specialized conversation, then it would seem that roach's post makes a great point of departure. it gets to the heart of the axiomatic proofs posted by yourself and halifax, in as far as i can understand them. without doing extensive research on the positions referenced in the thread, the point of necessity which is raised seems to me to the pivotal issue. i think, without wanting to put words into will's mouth, that he would agree. God or gods does not seem to be necessary, if you do not start from a position which presupposes the existence of God.

as far as the slight to will, i would have to say that a formalized study of philosophy does not make one a good philosopher. please understand that i'm not applying this to you in particular. generally, that phraseology did seem a little rude. i'm only pointing out that will has some very well grounded points, even if he doesn't know the correct terminology. frankly, neither do i.

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You don't love me, you just love my piggy style

asaris

I defined the word for him the way I was using it, and the way philosophers use it when talking about God. I don't know what more he wants. Philosophy can be a technical discipline, and so sometimes they use words in technical ways that differ from the ways in which the dictionary defines them. When it's clear that someone doesn't understand the way in which I'm using a word, I try to define it. I do understand that most people here lack formal training, so I try to be patient. If the person insists on continuing to use a different definition, it's not a conversation I can have. If someone suggests the dictionary definition is better, I get to be a little bit insulting.

That being said, let me try and define the notion of possible world.
A, the actual world, is the set of all propositions that are true. A world, in general, is a set containing the maximal number of true propositions, so we can speak of propositions being true in possible world W. Take proposition p, and assume that it is false in A but possibly true in A. That means that there is some world W in which p is true. Statements which are necessarily true (like 2+2=4) are true in all possible worlds. Statements which are necessarily false (2+2=5) are true in no possible worlds. I'm not sure this is as clear as it could be -- I'll look up how Plantinga defines them when I get home from work.

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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Willravel

So you're speaking a different language, a language spoken by students of philosophy. The problem is that when philosophers are talking about the functions and meanings of god, they are presupposing his/her/it's existence. This thread is about an argument to prove that god necessarily exists. If the language and the meanings of the language already presuppose the existence of god, of course the argument will make it seem as it it's proving god. It's like making a theological argument for god.
This sounds a bit like theories surrounding alternate realities. Some scientists believe (going back to time stream) that every possible action and reaction are made. Every time there is a chance that a, b, c, or d will occur, then they all occur, and branch out into their own realities with each of their respective consequences. Under that theory, sure, god may exist in some form in some reality. But we're still at square one with that. God may exist. Probably doesn't, though. There's really no way to know.

pai mei

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