Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post - A little reminder for those who were "lied to"

Scipio · 02-03-2004, 09:51 PM

The question we get to now is this: what is worse?

Despite the fact that the CIA urged caution and patience in dealing with Iraq, they got it wrong.

Or, a rogue intelligence outfit in the White House bypasses the CIA experts in order to produce an overly pessimistic view of Iraq.

I don't know. Sure, the CIA failed to put enough people on the ground, and failed to correctly assay Iraq's unconventional weapons capability. However, the policy that would have resulted from their recommendations was one of caution, and hindsight vindicates that. Although their resources on the ground might have been lacking, their analysis was sound.

One fundamental problem with the task the intelligence agencies were given is the difficulty of proving a negative. This is doubly true when we knew for a fact that he possessed, at a minimum, some chemical weapons in the past. Why would he get rid of them? We don't know. Figuring out if he ever did get rid of them (which seems to have happened) is even harder.

So it makes sense that we thought he had some weapons, but the CIA was absolutely right to conclude that the threat they posed was questionable at best.

On the other hand, when critics of the CIA got their hands on the raw intel, they made it fit into their own view of the world. This approach turned out not only to misinterpret the intelligence, but also to produce terrible policy.

What gets lost in all of this is that what weapons Saddam had might have been stolen by or transferred to terrorists as we invaded. Mabye that's why there are no weapons to find.

02-03-2004, 09:51 PM	#13 (permalink)
Scipio Mencken Location: College	The question we get to now is this: what is worse? Despite the fact that the CIA urged caution and patience in dealing with Iraq, they got it wrong. Or, a rogue intelligence outfit in the White House bypasses the CIA experts in order to produce an overly pessimistic view of Iraq. I don't know. Sure, the CIA failed to put enough people on the ground, and failed to correctly assay Iraq's unconventional weapons capability. However, the policy that would have resulted from their recommendations was one of caution, and hindsight vindicates that. Although their resources on the ground might have been lacking, their analysis was sound. One fundamental problem with the task the intelligence agencies were given is the difficulty of proving a negative. This is doubly true when we knew for a fact that he possessed, at a minimum, some chemical weapons in the past. Why would he get rid of them? We don't know. Figuring out if he ever did get rid of them (which seems to have happened) is even harder. So it makes sense that we thought he had some weapons, but the CIA was absolutely right to conclude that the threat they posed was questionable at best. On the other hand, when critics of the CIA got their hands on the raw intel, they made it fit into their own view of the world. This approach turned out not only to misinterpret the intelligence, but also to produce terrible policy. What gets lost in all of this is that what weapons Saddam had might have been stolen by or transferred to terrorists as we invaded. Mabye that's why there are no weapons to find. __________________ "Erections lasting more than 4 hours, though rare, require immediate medical attention."