1. One reason why invading Iraq is (somewhat) ok:
The president has a moral obligation to take action when the United States is threatened. All the intelligence he got, combined with his own prejudices and convictions, told him that Iraq would one day threaten America. There are a finite number of sources of WMD (for now, NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical). Iraq is not only a source, but is also ruled by a belligerent dictator with a grudge against America. 9/11 not only made the threat Iraq posed more clear, but it also made war with Iraq politically possible. Iraq wasn't a threat now, but there was a window of opportunity open to engage the threat aggressively. In the future, war might not be feasible, and the threat might be greater. In short, this is the situation we feared, and the main reason we went to war.
That's all fine and good, but it doesn't describe the entire thought process that went on, and it negects the fact that the CIA wouldn't classify Iraq as enough of a threat to justify invasion.
2. The Neoconservative foreign policy mindset in a nutshell:
The world is a dangerous place. Contrary to the prevailing ideas about foreign policy, American power is a force for good. Moreover, American power can (and should!) be used to shape world affairs for the better. If we invade Iraq, a few things will happen. One, we will be welcomed as liberators. Two, we will ultimately establish a friendly democratic government in the country. Three, democratic change in Iraq might ultimately spread throughout the middle east.
Neoconservatism, in contrast to the world-weary conservative mindset in America, is idealistic. It says we're the good guys, and we should go try to make the world a better place.
=====
If you read all of that, you'll understand why I think they went to war. I don't agree with what the neoconservatives say by and large (although on lots of nuts and bolts security issues they agree with what the Democrats are saying).
=====
Now, even if you reject the premise that our plans in Iraq have already gone horribly wrong, you have to concede that some aspects of our plans in Iraq (to date), have in fact gone horribly wrong. In this case, the disagreement is going to be on were these bad outcomes preventable. Sadly, I don't have much evidence to show that they were (not that it doesn't exist; I'm just too lazy to find it), but I do have a few more points to make.
1. Postwar planning was inadequate, or plans we had weren't followed.
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/w...rplanning.html
Well, turns out I did find some evidence. Thanks google.
A key paragraph:
Quote:
|
The officials didn't develop any real postwar plans because they believed that Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops with open arms and Washington could install a favored Iraqi exile leader as the country's leader. The Pentagon civilians ignored CIA and State Department experts who disputed them, resisted White House pressure to back off from their favored exile leader and when their scenario collapsed amid increasing violence and disorder, they had no backup plan. [Knight Ridder, 7/11/03]
|
Moreover, the defense department produced plans that were not followed:
http://www.freep.com/news/nw/iraq12_20030712.htm
Quote:
|
Referring to the Chalabi scenario,(Richard) Perle said: "The Department of Defense proposed a plan that would have resulted in a substantial number of Iraqis available to assist in the immediate postwar period," Perle said. Had it been accepted, "we'd be in much better shape today," he said.
|
Now, if we blew all that stuff, how likely do you think it is that we'll play the poltical situation with equal agility?
Iraq is a divided country, and the only power on the ground that seems to have the power to get people mobilized for governmental reform are the clerics. When we called for caucuses, al-Sistani called for open elections, and
we backed down. Now who's running the country again?