Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post - Anti-Ballistic Missile defense is unfeasible.

Superbelt · 01-13-2004, 09:27 AM

Fiscal Year '04 looks to approve 9.1 billion dollars for this endeavor.

Link to letter

Quote:

President William Jefferson Clinton

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20502

Dear Mr. President:

We urge you not to make the decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system during the remaining months of your administration. The system would offer little protection and would do grave harm to this nation's core security interests.

We and other independent scientists have long argued that anti-ballistic missile systems, particularly those attempting to intercept reentry vehicles in space, will inevitably lose in an arms race of improvements to offensive missiles.

North Korea has taken dramatic steps toward reconciliation with South Korea. Other dangerous states will arise. But what would such a state gain by attacking the United States except its own destruction?

While the benefits of the proposed anti-ballistic missile system are dubious, the dangers created by a decision to deploy are clear. It would be difficult to persuade Russia or China that the United States is wasting tens of billions of dollars on an ineffective missile system against small states that are unlikely to launch a missile attack on the U.S. The Russians and Chinese must therefore conclude that the presently planned system is a stage in developing a bigger system directed against them. They may respond by restarting an arms race in ballistic missiles and having missiles in a dangerous "launch-on-warning" mode.

Even if the next planned test of the proposed anti-ballistic missile system works as planned, any movement toward deployment would be premature, wasteful and dangerous.

Respectfully,

Sidney Altman
YALE UNIVERSITY
1989 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Philip W. Anderson
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
1977 Nobel Prize in physics

Kenneth J. Arrow
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1972 Nobel Prize in economics

Julius Axelrod
NIH
1970 Nobel Prize in medicine

Baruj Benacerraf
DANA FARBER CANCER INST.
1980 Nobel Prize in medicine

Hans A. Bethe
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
1967 Nobel Prize in physics

J. Michael Bishop
UNIVERSITY OF CALIF., SAN FRANCISCO
1989 Nobel Prize in medicine

Nicolaas Bloembergen
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1981 Nobel Prize in physics

Paul D. Boyer
UCLA
1997 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Steven Chu
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1997 Nobel Prize in physics

Stanley Cohen
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
1986 Nobel Prize in medicine

Leon N. Cooper
BROWN UNIVERSITY
1972 Nobel Prize in physics

E. J. Corey
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1990 Nobel Prize in chemistry

James W. Cronin
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
1980 Nobel Prize in physics

Renato Dulbecco
THE SALK INSTITUTE
1975 Nobel Prize in medicine

Edmond H. Fischer
UNIV. OF WASHINGTON
1992 Nobel Prize in medicine

Val L. Fitch
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
1980 Nobel Prize in physics

Robert F. Furchgott
SUNY HEALTH SCIENCE CTR.
1998 Nobel Prize in medicine

Murray Gell-Mann
SANTA FE INSTITUTE
1969 Nobel Prize in physics

Ivar Giaever
RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
1973 Nobel Prize in physics

Walter Gilbert
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
1980 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Sheldon L. Glashow
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
1979 Nobel Prize in physics

Roger C. L. Guillemin
THE SALK INSTITUTE
1977 Nobel Prize in medicine

Herbert A. Hauptman
THE MEDICAL FOUNDATION OF BUFFALO
1985 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Dudley R. Herschbach
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1986 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Roald Hoffmann
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
1981 Nobel Prize in chemistry

David H. Hubel
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1981 Nobel Prize in medicine

Jerome Karle
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
1985 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Arthur Kornberg
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1959 Nobel Prize in medicine

Edwin G. Krebs
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
1992 Nobel Prize in medicine

Leon M. Lederman
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
1988 Nobel Prize in physics

Edward B. Lewis
CALTECH
1995 Nobel Prize in medicine

Rudolph A. Marcus
CALTECH
1992 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Franco Modigliani
MIT, SLOAN SCHOOL
1985 Nobel Prize in economics

Mario Molina
MIT
1995 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Marshall Nirenberg
NIH
1968 Nobel Prize in medicine

Douglas D. Osheroff
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1996 Nobel Prize in physics

Arno A. Penzias
BELL LABS
1978 Nobel Prize in physics

Martin L. Perl
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1995 Nobel Prize in physics

Norman F. Ramsey
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1989 Nobel Prize in physics

Burton Richter
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1976 Nobel Prize in physics

Richard J. Roberts
NEW ENGLAND BIOLABS
1993 Nobel Prize in medicine

Herbert A. Simon
CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV.
1978 Nobel Prize in economics

Richard E. Smalley
RICE UNIVERSITY
1996 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Jack Steinberger
CERN
1988 Nobel Prize in physics

James Tobin
YALE UNIVERSITY
1981 Nobel Prize in economics

Daniel C. Tsui
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
1998 Nobel Prize in physics

Steven Weinberg
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, AUSTIN
1979 Nobel Prize in physics

Robert W. Wilson
HARVARD-SMITHSONIAN, CTR. FOR ASTROPHYSICS
1978 Nobel Prize in physics

Chen Ning Yang
SUNY, STONY BROOK
1957 Nobel Prize in physics

Owen Chamberlain*
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
1959 Nobel Prize in physics

Johann Diesenhofer*
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER
1988 Nobel Prize in chemistry

Willis E. Lamb, Jr.*
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
1955 Nobel Prize in physics

Missile Defense Strategy Not Feasible Warns American Physical Society

Quote:

Intercepting missiles while their rockets are still burning would not be an effective approach for defending the U.S. against attacks by an important type of enemy missile. This conclusion comes from an independent study by the American Physical Society into the scientific and technical feasibility of boost-phase defense, focusing on potential missile threats from North Korea and Iran.
Boost-phase defense (disabling ballistic missiles while they are still under power) has recently received much attention as one possible element of a National Missile Defense system.

However, the report shows that issues of timing severely limit the feasibility of this approach. The short time window available for disabling an enemy missile means that interceptor rockets would have to be based close to enemy territory to have a chance of intercepting the missile in time, if it is possible at all.

The study found that defending the United States against solid-propellant ICBMs would be impractical in many cases, because of their short burn times. According to the U.S. intelligence community, countries of concern could deploy such ICBMs within 10 to 15 years, about the same time the study judged would be required for the United States to field a boost-phase defense against ICBMs.

Even against the longer burning liquid-propellant ICBMs that North Korea or Iran might initially deploy, a boost-phase defense would have limited use due to the requirement that interceptors be based close to potential missile flight paths.

"Only two to three minutes would be available to achieve a boost-phase intercept, even assuming substantial improvements in systems for detecting and tracking missiles," said Study Group co-chair Frederick Lamb.

"Consequently, even fast interceptors could have difficulty catching liquid-propellant ICBMs and would be unable to catch solid-propellant ICBMs in time. In the most optimistic scenarios, the defense would have only seconds to decide whether to fire interceptors and could be required to make this decision before knowing whether a rocket launch were a space mission or a missile attack."

However, boost-phase defense against short- or medium-range missiles launched from ships off U.S. coasts appears technically possible, provided ships carrying interceptors could stay within about 40 kilometers of the threatening ships.

"This study was conducted for the American Physical Society by a group that included recognized experts on missile defense. The group assessed the feasibility of boost-phase intercept in terms of fundamental science and engineering requirements," said APS President Myriam Sarachik.

"It is crucial that decisions about large-scale investments in weapons systems take into account their technical feasibility. The APS hopes this report will help in evaluating whether to build boost-phase defense systems."

The APS Study Group looked at boost-phase defense systems utilizing land-, sea, or air-based interceptors, space-based interceptors, or the Airborne Laser.

The effectiveness of interceptor rockets would be limited by the short time window for intercept, which requires interceptors to be based within 400 to 1,000 kilometers of the possible boost-phase flight paths of attacking missiles.

In some cases this is closer than political geography allows. Even interceptors that were very large and fast and that pushed the state of the art would in most cases be unable to intercept solid-propellant ICBMs before they released their warheads.

A system of space-based interceptors, also constrained by the short time window for intercept, would require a fleet of a thousand or more orbiting satellites just to intercept a single missile. Deploying such a fleet would require a five- to tenfold increase in the United States' annual space-launch capabilities.

The Airborne Laser currently in development has the potential to intercept liquid-propellant ICBMs, but its range would be limited and it would therefore be vulnerable to counterattack. The Airborne Laser would not be able to disable solid-propellant ICBMs at ranges useful for defending the United States.

"Few of the components exist for deploying an effective boost-phase defense against liquid-propellant ICBMs and some essential components would take at least 10 years to develop," said Study Group co-chair Daniel Kleppner.

"According to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea and Iran could develop or acquire solid-propellant ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years. Consequently, a boost-phase defense effective only against liquid-propellant ICBMs would risk being obsolete when deployed."

Although a successful intercept would prevent munitions from reaching their target, live nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads could strike populated areas short of the target in the United States or in other countries, shows the study. This "shortfall problem" is inherent in any boost-phase defense and difficult to avoid.

The American Physical Society (APS) is the professional society for physicists in the United States, with more than 40,000 members. The principal functions of the APS are the publication of professional journals and arrangement of scientific meetings. On occasion, the APS produces reports on matters of public interest that require technical understanding, and for which an impartial and authoritative analysis would be of particular use to the public and to policy makers. The last such study was on the use of directed energy weapons for missile defense. This report is another study in that tradition.

Missile defense system projected, by economists, to cost 1 trillion dollars.

Test failure

Quote:

On Tuesday, June 17, 2003, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) conducted FM-5, the fourth intercept test of its AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (AEGIS BMD) system. AEGIS BMD is a ship-based technology intended to intercept missiles in the midcourse phase of flight. FM-5 was planned as an evaluation of the kill vehicle's new terminal guidance and maneuvering system. According to initial reports, the interceptor's kill vehicle failed to maneuver into a successful intercept.

This is them knowing everything about the target, they know where it will be every second of its path and they still can't hit it.

Google search for Missile Defense Failures

I think when this many Nobel Luareates, some of the smartest men in the world in the fields that really count here, tell us this. That it will not work and instead will place the United States in a more dangerous situation with hostile ICBM's waiting in "launch-on-warning" mode, we should listen to them.
Technology will advance along with us. Hostile nations will develop the technology to get around any missile defense shield we can come up with. For lack of a better word "stealth missiles". All abm will do is ensure that more warheads are pointed at us.

Other nations can just go with the easy solution, which is that as long as they start off a few hundred kilometers from our defense systems, we can't hit it. They could overwhelm out system easily by firing a couple dozen at once, or use mobile deployment sources like subs and trailers to keep their launch far enough away from our only effective means of a defense. And all for a price of 1 trillion dollars. A little coordination by a hostile force and all that money spent is worthless.

Finally, missile defense is not needed. MAD takes care of any nation what wants to try to tangle with us. The real threat is small, mobile bombs smuggled across our borders. This ABM money needs to be spent on personell and technology at our ports to detect these things. But our national 'leaders' don't want to do that.