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Peetster · 09-20-2003, 02:43 AM

Sometimes purporting to be a Microsoft Security Update, this worm is intended to propagate via various mechanisms:

mailing itself to recipients extracted from the victim machine
copying itself over network shares (mapped drives)
sharing itself over the KaZaa P2P network
sending itself via IRC
The worm is written in MSVC. Though in a different HLL, it bears similarities to W32/Gibe.b@MM (original Gibe variants were written in VB).

The worm terminates processes relevant to various security and anti-virus products (see below).

Proactive Detection : This worm is detected as "virus or variant New Worm" with the 4120 DATs or greater (with program heuristics enabled).

Mail Propagation

The virus contains its own SMTP engine to construct outgoing messages.

Various outgoing messages are created. Some make use of an IE exploit to ensure the worm attachment is run upon viewing the email. See Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS01-020) . One such message bears the following characteristics:

Subject : Returned Response
From : Email Delivery Service (kmailengine@yahoo.com)
Body : Undeliverable mail to (email address )

Messages constructed to take advantage of this vulnerability will be detected as Exploit-MIME.gen.exe with the 4215 DATs or greater (and earlier as Exploit-MIME.gen).

Multiple subject lines and attachment names are constructed from pools of strings within the worm to be used in outgoing messages. Target email addresses are extracted from files on the victim machine.

At least one message masquerades as a Microsoft update:

Share Propagation

The worm copies itself to the startup folder on mapped network drives. A random filename is used.

The following network locations are targetted:

windows\all users\start menu\programs\startup
windows\start menu\programs\startup
winme\all users\start menu\programs\startup
winme\start menu\programs\startup
win95\all users\start menu\programs\startup
win95\start menu\programs\startup
win98\all users\start menu\programs\startup
win98\start menu\programs\startup
document and settings\all users\start menu\programs\startup
document and settings\default user\start menu\programs\startup
document and settings\administrator\start menu\programs\startup
winnt\profiles\all users\start menu\programs\startup
winnt\profiles\default user\start menu\programs\startup
winnt\profiles\administrator\start menu\programs\startup
IRC Propagation

The worm drops a SCRIPT.INI file (123 bytes) into the mIRC program folder in an attempt to propagate via IRC (using dcc send). This file is proactively detected as MIRC/Generic with the 4149 DATs or greater.

P2P Propagation

The worm makes copies of itself in a directory (random name) within the system temp directory. Enticing filenames are used, for example:

SIRCAM CLEANER.EXE
YAHOO HACKER.EXE
HALLUCINOGENIC SCREENSAVER.EXE
etc etc
The following Registry key is modified to share these copies via the KaZaa P2P network:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Kazaa\LocalContent
"Dir99" = 012345:C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\(random directory name)

Propagation via Newsgroups

Within the list of servers carried in the worm are multiple NNTP servers. Analysis is currently ongoing to determine exactly how these are used (email address harvesting and/or replication).

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Symptoms
Display of the above dialog boxes
Unexpected termination of AV/security product
Inability to run RegEdit on the victim machine

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Method Of Infection
Installation

When run on the victim machine, a sequence of fake message boxes are displayed:

The worm installs itself (using a random filename) into %WinDir%, for example:

C:\WINDOWS\ZNFUL.EXE

A Registry key is added to hook system startup, for example (random string and filename will obviously change):

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run "(random string)" = ZNFUL.EXE autorun

Various Registry keys are modified to hook the execution of the following file types:

BAT
COM
EXE
PIF
REG
SCR
For this, the following Registry keys are set:

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\batfile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %*

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\comfile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %*

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\exefile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %*

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\piffile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %*

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\regfile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% showerror

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\scrfile\shell\config\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1"

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\scrfile\shell\open\command
"(Default)" = %filename% "%1" /S

(Where %filename% is the random filename which the worms installs into %WinDir% as.)

The following files are also dropped:

%WinDir%\GERMS0.DBV - email addresses harvested from the victim machine are written to this file (: delimitted)
%WinDir%\SWEN1.DAT - list of remote servers
Other randomly named files may also be dropped in %WinDir% - a batch script (approx 50 bytes) for launching the dropped copy of the worm, and a config file (approx 100-150 bytes) containing path/filename data.

The following Registry key is set in order to prevent RegEdit being used on the victim machine:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Policies\System "DisableRegistryTools" = 01 00 00 00

Other data is written to the Registry stored under the following key:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\explorer\%random string%

Where %random string% is a random text string.

The following values are stored here:

"Install Item" = (random string used for installed copy of worm in %WinDir%)
"Installed" = ... by Begbie
"Kazaa Infect" = yes
"Mirc Install Folder" = C:\Program Files\mirc
"Unfile" = buzf.qtq
"ZipName" = wqrqgd
The worm also displays a fake dialog window concerning a MAPI32 Exception. The user is prompted to submit:

email From name
login name/password
email address
SMTP server
POP3 server
Process Termination

The worm terminates various processes on the victim machine (see below). Interesting, the list includes "gibe"!

_avp
ackwin32
amserv
anti-troj
aplica32
apvxdwin
autodown
avconsol
ave32
avgcc32
avgctrl
avgw
avkserv
avnt
avp
avsched32
avwin95
avwupd32
blackd
blackice
bootwarn
ccapp
ccshtdwn
cfiadmi
cfiaudit
cfind
cfinet
claw95
dv95
ecengine
efinet32
esafe
espwatch
f-agnt95
f-prot
f-prot95
f-stopw
findviru
fp-win
fprot
fprot95
frw
gibe
iamapp
ibmasn
ibmavsp
icload95
icloadnt
icmon
icmoon
icssuppnt
icsupp
iface
iomon98
jedi
kpfw32
lockdown2000
lookout
lu32
luall
moolive
mpftray
msconfig
nai_vs_stat
nav
navapw32
navnt
navsched
navw
nisum
nmain
normist
nupdate
nupgrade
nvc95
outpost
padmin
pavcl
pavsched
pavw
pcciomon
pccmain
pccwin98
pcfwallicon
persfw
pop3trap
rav
regedit
rescue
safeweb
serv95
sphinx
sweep
tca
tds2
vcleaner
vcontrol
vet32
vet95
vet98
vettray
view
vscan
vsecomr
vshwin32
vsstat
webtrap
wfindv32
zapro
zonealarm
If one of these processes is started when the worm is running, a fake error message is displayed "Memory access violation in module kernel32 at (number)".

Infection Counter

Once running on the victim machine, the worm issues a HTTP request for a remote page which serves as an infection counter.

-- Update September 19th --

The original animated counter has been replaced by a warning message indicating the potential infection. In the text, the virus is referred to as W32/Swan@MM:

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Removal Instructions
All Users :

Detection is already included in the Daily DAT files (beta) .

The following EXTRA.DAT packages are being made available prior to the regularly scheduled weekly DAT release ( working with EXTRA.DAT files ).

EXTRA.DAT
SUPER EXTRA.DAT
As stated above W32/Swen@MM disables the execution of REGEDIT.EXE.

This UNDO.REG tool will reverse the changes made by the virus and allow the user to execute REGEDIT.EXE as normal.

The changes made to the Registry to hook BAT, COM, EXE, PIF and SCR file execution (as detailed above) will be removed when cleaning with the specified Engine and DATs. For manual removal, these hooks are also addressed in the UNDO.REG file.

Additional Windows ME/XP removal considerations

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Variants
Name Type Sub Type Differences

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Aliases
Name
I-Worm.Swen (AVP)
W32/Gibe.e@MM
W32/Swan
Win32.HLLM.Gibe.2 (DialogueScience)

09-20-2003, 02:43 AM	#21 (permalink)
Peetster Right Now Location: Home	Sometimes purporting to be a Microsoft Security Update, this worm is intended to propagate via various mechanisms: mailing itself to recipients extracted from the victim machine copying itself over network shares (mapped drives) sharing itself over the KaZaa P2P network sending itself via IRC The worm is written in MSVC. Though in a different HLL, it bears similarities to W32/Gibe.b@MM (original Gibe variants were written in VB). The worm terminates processes relevant to various security and anti-virus products (see below). Proactive Detection : This worm is detected as "virus or variant New Worm" with the 4120 DATs or greater (with program heuristics enabled). Mail Propagation The virus contains its own SMTP engine to construct outgoing messages. Various outgoing messages are created. Some make use of an IE exploit to ensure the worm attachment is run upon viewing the email. See Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS01-020) . One such message bears the following characteristics: Subject : Returned Response From : Email Delivery Service (kmailengine@yahoo.com) Body : Undeliverable mail to (email address ) Messages constructed to take advantage of this vulnerability will be detected as Exploit-MIME.gen.exe with the 4215 DATs or greater (and earlier as Exploit-MIME.gen). Multiple subject lines and attachment names are constructed from pools of strings within the worm to be used in outgoing messages. Target email addresses are extracted from files on the victim machine. At least one message masquerades as a Microsoft update: Share Propagation The worm copies itself to the startup folder on mapped network drives. A random filename is used. The following network locations are targetted: windows\all users\start menu\programs\startup windows\start menu\programs\startup winme\all users\start menu\programs\startup winme\start menu\programs\startup win95\all users\start menu\programs\startup win95\start menu\programs\startup win98\all users\start menu\programs\startup win98\start menu\programs\startup document and settings\all users\start menu\programs\startup document and settings\default user\start menu\programs\startup document and settings\administrator\start menu\programs\startup winnt\profiles\all users\start menu\programs\startup winnt\profiles\default user\start menu\programs\startup winnt\profiles\administrator\start menu\programs\startup IRC Propagation The worm drops a SCRIPT.INI file (123 bytes) into the mIRC program folder in an attempt to propagate via IRC (using dcc send). This file is proactively detected as MIRC/Generic with the 4149 DATs or greater. P2P Propagation The worm makes copies of itself in a directory (random name) within the system temp directory. Enticing filenames are used, for example: SIRCAM CLEANER.EXE YAHOO HACKER.EXE HALLUCINOGENIC SCREENSAVER.EXE etc etc The following Registry key is modified to share these copies via the KaZaa P2P network: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Kazaa\LocalContent "Dir99" = 012345:C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\(random directory name) Propagation via Newsgroups Within the list of servers carried in the worm are multiple NNTP servers. Analysis is currently ongoing to determine exactly how these are used (email address harvesting and/or replication). Top of Page Symptoms Display of the above dialog boxes Unexpected termination of AV/security product Inability to run RegEdit on the victim machine Top of Page Method Of Infection Installation When run on the victim machine, a sequence of fake message boxes are displayed: The worm installs itself (using a random filename) into %WinDir%, for example: C:\WINDOWS\ZNFUL.EXE A Registry key is added to hook system startup, for example (random string and filename will obviously change): HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Run "(random string)" = ZNFUL.EXE autorun Various Registry keys are modified to hook the execution of the following file types: BAT COM EXE PIF REG SCR For this, the following Registry keys are set: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\batfile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\comfile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\exefile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\piffile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" %* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\regfile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% showerror HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\scrfile\shell\config\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\scrfile\shell\open\command "(Default)" = %filename% "%1" /S (Where %filename% is the random filename which the worms installs into %WinDir% as.) The following files are also dropped: %WinDir%\GERMS0.DBV - email addresses harvested from the victim machine are written to this file (: delimitted) %WinDir%\SWEN1.DAT - list of remote servers Other randomly named files may also be dropped in %WinDir% - a batch script (approx 50 bytes) for launching the dropped copy of the worm, and a config file (approx 100-150 bytes) containing path/filename data. The following Registry key is set in order to prevent RegEdit being used on the victim machine: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Policies\System "DisableRegistryTools" = 01 00 00 00 Other data is written to the Registry stored under the following key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\explorer\%random string% Where %random string% is a random text string. The following values are stored here: "Install Item" = (random string used for installed copy of worm in %WinDir%) "Installed" = ... by Begbie "Kazaa Infect" = yes "Mirc Install Folder" = C:\Program Files\mirc "Unfile" = buzf.qtq "ZipName" = wqrqgd The worm also displays a fake dialog window concerning a MAPI32 Exception. The user is prompted to submit: email From name login name/password email address SMTP server POP3 server Process Termination The worm terminates various processes on the victim machine (see below). Interesting, the list includes "gibe"! _avp ackwin32 amserv anti-troj aplica32 apvxdwin autodown avconsol ave32 avgcc32 avgctrl avgw avkserv avnt avp avsched32 avwin95 avwupd32 blackd blackice bootwarn ccapp ccshtdwn cfiadmi cfiaudit cfind cfinet claw95 dv95 ecengine efinet32 esafe espwatch f-agnt95 f-prot f-prot95 f-stopw findviru fp-win fprot fprot95 frw gibe iamapp ibmasn ibmavsp icload95 icloadnt icmon icmoon icssuppnt icsupp iface iomon98 jedi kpfw32 lockdown2000 lookout lu32 luall moolive mpftray msconfig nai_vs_stat nav navapw32 navnt navsched navw nisum nmain normist nupdate nupgrade nvc95 outpost padmin pavcl pavsched pavw pcciomon pccmain pccwin98 pcfwallicon persfw pop3trap rav regedit rescue safeweb serv95 sphinx sweep tca tds2 vcleaner vcontrol vet32 vet95 vet98 vettray view vscan vsecomr vshwin32 vsstat webtrap wfindv32 zapro zonealarm If one of these processes is started when the worm is running, a fake error message is displayed "Memory access violation in module kernel32 at (number)". Infection Counter Once running on the victim machine, the worm issues a HTTP request for a remote page which serves as an infection counter. -- Update September 19th -- The original animated counter has been replaced by a warning message indicating the potential infection. In the text, the virus is referred to as W32/Swan@MM: Top of Page Removal Instructions All Users : Detection is already included in the Daily DAT files (beta) . The following EXTRA.DAT packages are being made available prior to the regularly scheduled weekly DAT release ( working with EXTRA.DAT files ). EXTRA.DAT SUPER EXTRA.DAT As stated above W32/Swen@MM disables the execution of REGEDIT.EXE. This UNDO.REG tool will reverse the changes made by the virus and allow the user to execute REGEDIT.EXE as normal. The changes made to the Registry to hook BAT, COM, EXE, PIF and SCR file execution (as detailed above) will be removed when cleaning with the specified Engine and DATs. For manual removal, these hooks are also addressed in the UNDO.REG file. Additional Windows ME/XP removal considerations Top of Page Variants Name Type Sub Type Differences Top of Page Aliases Name I-Worm.Swen (AVP) W32/Gibe.e@MM W32/Swan Win32.HLLM.Gibe.2 (DialogueScience)