Some scientific evidence to back up my opinion on free will.
Quote:
I wish, next, to describe two experiments (described in Harth 1982) that have been performed on human subjects, and which appear to have rather remarkable implications for our considerations here. These have to do with the time that consciousness takes to act and to be enacted. The first of these is concerned with the active role of consciousness, and the second, its passive role. Taken together, the implications are even more striking.
The first was performed by H. H. Kornhuber and associates in Germany in 1976. (Deeke, Grötzinger, and Kornhuber 1976.) A number of human subjects volunteered to have electrical signals recorded at a point on their heads (electroencephalograms, i.e. EEGS), and they were asked to flex the index finger of their right hands suddenly at various times entirely of their own choosing. The idea is that the EEG recordings would indicate something of the mental activity that is taking place within the skull, and which is involved in the actual conscious decision to flex the finger.
What is found is remarkable, namely that there is a gradual build-up of recorded electric potential for a full second, or perhaps even up to a second and a half, before the finger is actually flexed. This seems to indicate that the conscious decision process takes over a second in order to act! This may be contrasted with the much shorter time. that it takes to respond to an external signal if the mode of response has been laid down beforehand. For example, instead of it being 'freely willed', the finger flexing might be in response to the flash of a light signal. In that case a reaction time of about one-fifth of a second is normal, which is about five times faster than the 'willed' action that is tested in Kornhuber's data.
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-Roger Penrose
The second experiment, despite being fascinating, is not really of huge relevance to our discussion here.
What is interesting about this experiment is that there appears to be a discrepancy about what we 'perceive' and what 'is'. We perceive ourselves only to have decided, a split second ago to flex our mussel. But according to the EEG, our brain has decided to flex the finger up to second and a half before then! It seems that our perception is lying to us!
Also bear in mind that the EEG is not simply registering the person thinking about flexing their finger. As in: "I'm going to flex my finger in 5...4...3...2...1...NOW". The subjects perceived themselves as making sudden split-second decisions.
This raises some very serious concerns about the concept of Free Will. Since our perception of our free will is our only evidence that we have free will, when that perception is shown to be deceptive, you cannot help but wonder. What if I am nothing but a passive 'observer'? I might perceive making a choice, but how do I know that perception is truthful?
One thing that was not mentioned above was, what happens when we mix both internal 'Free Will' with external responses?
Consider the same set up above, with the person receiving an EEG, and being asked to flex his finger suddenly, at random times. But there is an added constraint. He is told not to flex his finger while a little light indicator is switched on.
We now connect the light to the EEG, in such a way that it will occasionally light up when it detects that the subject is about to flex his finger. What will we observe? More importantly what will the subject perceive?
What we will observe is this:
We will start to observe the tell-tale signs that the subject is about to flex his finger.
The light will switch on.
A fifth of a second later, the tell-tale signs will begin to fade away.
The light will switch off.
It appears that an external stimulus can "over-ride" our internal free will.
What does the subject perceive? Well nothing actually, he sees a bulb light up, and go off again. As far as he is concerned, he had no intention of flexing his finger (after all, he would only become aware of this decision a second later!)