I haven't had any experience with the M16A2 versions of the M16, so I can't really comment here. Here's something i googled out...
http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/2002/02Dailey.html
The M4 Carbine: Is It for Everyone?
by GySgt John A. Dailey
How does the M4 measure up?
Much has been written recently concerning the M4A1 carbine and its possible application as a replacement for the M16A2 service rifle. I believe serious consideration should be given to this and will explain why by discussing the history, components, advantages, and drawbacks of the M4A1 carbine.
A shortened or carbine version has been around almost as long as the M16 itself. The XM177 was developed and fielded to special operations forces (SOF) in the mid-1960s and, with minor modifications, has remained in use with SOF units ever since. In 1994 Operational Requirements Document 1.14 was approved, and the search began for a weapon to replace the MP5 that force reconnaissance Marines and others used during close quarters battle (CQB) operations. The M4A1 carbine was developed by Colt for the government of Abu Dhabi in the mid-1980s and used as the basis for the CQB weapon (CQBW) that was developed jointly by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The CQBW was initially fielded to the Marine Corps force reconnaissance, fleet antiterrorism security teams, and military police special response teams in 1999. The weapon was issued as a replacement for the MP5 and other nonstandard submachineguns.1
The CQBW consists of the 5.56mm M4A1 carbine with a flat top upper receiver configured with the military standard 1913 (MilStd 1913) accessory mounting rail. The handguards were replaced with the M4 rail adapter system (RAS) that provided four additional MilStd 1913 rails for the weapon.2 The M4A1 is equipped with a collapsible four-position stock and is capable of both semiautomatic and automatic fire. In addition to the weapon itself, receiving units were issued all or part (mission dependent) of the special operations peculiar modification (SOPMod) kit. This kit contains accessories designed to enhance the capabilities of the M4A1 carbine in regard to target acquisition, engagement, and ease of use. The SOPMod kit components are listed below with a brief description of their function.
Backup iron sight (BIS).3 This sight attaches to the rear of the upper receiver MilStd rail and flips up for use in the event that the mounted optics should fail. Due to lack of agreement between the Services this item was not included in the SOPMod kit. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company purchased Knight’s Armament Company BISs from the manufacturer.
Detachable carry handle. Identical to the M16 carry handle, the accessory attaches to the upper receiver MilStd rail and provides the Marine with the standard rear sights. This piece of gear should be removed from the kit. We do not use the carry handle for carrying the weapon, and far superior sights are included for use (more on this later).
Vertical foregrip.4 The foregrip attaches to the lower RAS rail providing the shooter with more precise control during firing.
M203 quick detach mounting bracket.5 The quick mount bracket can be attached to both the standard 15.5-inch tube and the M4A1-specific 9-inch tube. This allows the M203 to be quickly mounted to the M4A1 after removing the lower M1913 MilStd rail. One item of note, the modified leaf sight for the M203 was not included in the SOPMod kit.
Rail grabber accessory kit AN/PAQ–4C6 (infrared aiming light) and AN/PEQ–27 (infrared aiming light/illuminator). This attachment provides a screwon rail grabber that allows both the AN/PVS–4 and the AN/PEQ–2 to be attached to the rail assembly.
Quick detachable (QD) sound suppresser with compensator.8 After installment of the compensator the sound suppresser is easily attached/ detached reducing muzzle flash and decreasing sound by a minimum of 28 decibels.
Visible light illuminator.9 Six AA cell (or 3 DL123) battery-powered, rail-mounted, waterproof flashlight capable of producing 90 to 100 lumens. Used for CQB operations.
Trijicon close quarters battle reflex sight.10 A lightweight nonmagnifying optical sight that provides a parallax free aiming dot useful from close quarters out to 300m. The sight is waterproof to 66 feet for 8 hours and requires no batteries. While this sight is not dependent on batteries, the dot is also very difficult to pick up rapidly. This is especially true during BMNT/EENT (begin morning nautical twilight/end evening nautical twilight). (According to MAJ Robert Rogers, founder of the Rangers, this is when the “Indians” attack.) A far superior sight, not included in the SOPMod kit is the M–68 Aimpoint™ M-XD. This sight operates on one lithium 2L76/DL 1/3N or two silver oxide 357 batteries. These sights possess the waterproof characteristics of the Reflex sight but provide a variable intensity red aiming dot that can be used with or without night vision devices (NVDs) in any lighting or weather conditions. In the newest version, the Aimpoint™ Comp M2 battery life is reported to be 10,000 hours.
Advanced combat optical gunsight (ACOG) day optical scope (DOS). This is a four-power scope designed to enhance target identification and increase hit probability out to 600M. The reticle pattern aids in range estimation.
Tactical sling. The purpose of the tactical sling is to provide a comfortable, safe, and ready method of carrying the rifle when required. The tactical sling is not a shooting aid. As a former weapons instructor CWO3 Patrick Rogers, USMC(Ret) says, “The tactical sling is to the carbine as the holster is to the pistol.” The sling allows the Marine to release his weapon while transitioning to a secondary weapon or when both hands are required in order to climb, deal with a prisoner, or other situation. I am not a fan of any of the issued three-point slings. A more effective sling produced by The Wilderness Tactical Products consists of a single attachment point routed through a sling keeper mounted at the base of the stock/receiver. The loop is placed over the head and weak side arm. A fast-tec buckle provides the ability to cut away the weapon if required. This single point sling prevents the alleged problem that left-handed shooters have had with ejected casing bouncing back into the ejection port. The tactical sling was designed for CQB/military operations on urbanized terrain operations and should not be considered a patrolling sling. In my opinion there is no such thing. On patrol a sling creates unnecessary noise and should be left at home.
Carry case. A soft gun bag produced by Eagle Industries provides a means of transporting the M4A1 weapons system and its components.
In order to make the M4A1 even more user-friendly an extended charging handle is available that allows Marines to easily cycle the bolt with the nonfiring hand while remaining up on target. This becomes even more crucial with the addition of many optics in which the attaching screws extend from the left-hand side of the weapon. Additionally, an ambidextrous safety and magazine release is available to make the weapon more ergonomic for left-handed shooters.
It became quickly apparent to the Marines of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company that in addition to CQB operations, the versatility and modular nature of the M4A1 carbine suited it well as the patrolling weapon of choice. The obvious logic being that with only one weapon to master, proficiency would be greatly improved, and equipment could be streamlined with magazine and equipment placement standardized between patrolling and CQB operations. Most important however was the increase in capabilities of force reconnaissance platoon during infiltration to and extraction from a CQB objective. The limited range and inadequate terminal ballistics of the 9 x 19mm round left the maritime special purpose force assault element poorly prepared for contact outside of the objective site.
I have read reports of dissatisfaction with the M4A1 during testing conducted by infantry units. The weapon was called the M4A1 modular weapons system (MWS) during this test.11 I believe that while several points are valid, the bulk of the complaints are based on misunderstanding, misuse, inadequate training, lack of trust in the capabilities of the individual rifleman and, perhaps most importantly, a fear of change. I would like to address the most common complaints point by point and attempt to clarify why I feel that the M4A1 is indeed a more capable infantry weapon.
Difficulty mastering the weapon. I was among the first to receive the M4A1 and have had the opportunity to teach the weapon and its components to four force reconnaissance platoons, military police special response teams, and others. I do not claim to have mastered it or any other weapon. I consider myself to be proficient, but that proficiency has come at the price of years of training, excellent instruction, and tens of thousands of rounds. We will not allow our Marines the opportunity to come close to mastering any weapon until we increase ammunition allotments and provide them with realistic combat shooting instruction and training. Multiple award experts or distinguished shooting badges do not combat shooters make. At 1st Force Reconnaissance Company all Marines are required to attend a 3-week weapons and tactics transition course that includes instruction and practical application on the use and employment of all optics and weapons components, as well as emphasizing the capabilities and limitations of the weapon.
Zeroing weapon and optics/Loss of zero. Through experience we have determined that it is preferable to establish an initial battlesight zero (BZO) on all sights at 25 yards with a desired point of impact 1 inch below the point of aim. This provides us with the ability to accurately engage targets from CQB distances out to 300 yards. This zero, of course, must be confirmed at range. The chart below depicts a typical ballistic trajectory when firing the 5.56mm ball round from a 14.5-inch barrel.12
We can see that at no point between 3 and 300 yards will the trajectory of the round rise or fall more than 3.6 inches from the point of aim. I consider this to be acceptable accuracy. I have yet to speak to a veteran infantryman of any war who has made a sight adjustment while in a firefight. Numerous studies confirm that the possibility of engagements occurring at distances greater than 300 yards is minimal at best, with the average infantry engagement taking place within 125 yards. There are very few locations on the planet Earth not covered by water (except for our known distance ranges) in which a Marine in a prone position can even observe an enemy at distances greater than 300 yards due to terrain and vegetation. Exceptions may occur in the desert or when observing up- or downhill; however, we do not teach angle shooting during our week of annual range time. With proper elevation applied, at a range of 500m firing up or down a 30 percent slope, the point of impact of the M855 ball will be almost 1 foot above the point of aim.13 The ballistic trajectory of the 5.56mm round drops off sharply after 300m when fired through either the M6A2 or the M4A1 carbine. If engaging targets with the weapons at BZO, a Marine will almost certainly not hit anything beyond 300m. Zeroing should first be conducted with the backup iron sight. Once this sight is zeroed it can be used to establish an approximate zero on the dot-type sights by properly mounting and tightening the sight. Then the windage and elevation adjustments are used to move the aiming dot until it is centered in the rear sight aperture and sitting on the tip of the front sight post. This expedient zero must be confirmed; however, it will put the optics in the ballpark and reduce the time required to achieve a BZO. All RAS rail notches are marked with a numerical system. It is imperative that if removed after zero the optic is returned to the same location—“address”—and tightened to the same degree (hand tight plus 1/4th turn). If removed after zero has been established the RAS assembly and laser devices should return to within 1 minute of angle (MOA). Optics should return to 1/2 MOA. An MOA is defined as 1 inch per 100 yards. Keeping rail surfaces covered when not in use can enhance return to zero.
Weapon length, muzzle velocity, and terminal ballistics. Figure 2 lists the relevant data concerning the differences between the M4A1 carbine and the M16A2 service rifle.14
Both weapons are rifled in a 1-inch, seven right-hand twist meaning that a projectile fired from the M16A2 completes almost one more full revolution prior to reaching the end of the barrel. It is true that the greater the number of revolutions the projectile completes within the barrel the greater the accuracy and that higher muzzle velocity usually equates to superior terminal ballistics. On the surface it would seem that the M16A2 is a superior rifle; however, several other factors must be taken into consideration. If we want to discuss retained velocity, terminal ballistics, and the effect of a projectile upon the human body we must first ensure that we can accurately place our round into the human body. Our ability to easily manipulate our weapon greatly contributes to this ability. While the M16A2 is a relatively ergonomic weapon in regard to manipulation, it does have several problems. The length of both stock and barrel are well-suited for known distance target shooting (the Marine Corps rifle team’s influence is seen here) but is not what we are looking for in a combat rifle. The M16A2’s 13.5-inch length of pull is generally too long for the average Marine in an aggressive Weaver type (basic warrior) fighting stance when wearing a flack jacket and load-bearing equipment. The M4A1 has a variable length of pull from 10.5 to 13 inches. This allows the Marine to rapidly shoulder the weapon from a proper fighting stance (or any other position) with combat gear. The reduced barrel length allows the weapon to be more easily maneuvered in restrictive terrain, urban areas, vehicles, and aircraft. Again, we must understand (as numerous studies have shown) that it is unlikely that we will often be required to engage targets beyond 200 yards. At this range the retained velocity of the 5.56mm round fired from a 14.5-inch barrel provides adequate terminal ballistics.
Fully automatic capability. One of the changes in design between the M16A1 and the M16A2 was the removal of the fully automatic capability and the replacement with the three- round burst. This was due no doubt to the alarmingly high rate of rounds expended per kill during the Vietnam conflict. I do not often advocate the use of fully automatic fire, but it is nice to know that it is there if you need it.
Sight radius. The sight radius is the distance between the front and rear sight. Obviously, if all other factors remained unchanged the longer the sight radius the more accuracy the shooter would be capable of. This is a simple matter of physics. The drawback to a longer sight radius is that the amount of time required to acquire a proper sight picture is also lengthened. The dilemma becomes one of speed versus accuracy. While we cannot miss fast enough to win, we must also realize that in gunfighting, second place is last place. Speed and accuracy are inversely related to distance. In a close range engagement scenario, speed is more important than pinpoint accuracy. At distance, more time is required (and generally available) to achieve acceptable accuracy. This entire point will become moot, however, when discussing the next topic.
Optics versus iron sights. As stated previously, the SOPMod kit contains several optical sights—the Reflex nonmagnified day/night optic, the Trijicon four-power scope, and the AN/PVS–17 magnified nightscope. Additionally, some testing units were issued various other optical sights that included Hensoldt, Leopould, U.S. Optics, and C-More sights. I won’t go into the pros and cons of each sight, but I will place them into three categories—magnified optics, nonmagnified optics, and NVDs. The one thing that these three categories of optics have in common is that a single aiming device is used—either a dot or reticle pattern. This eliminates the previous discussion concerning sight radius and relieves us of the necessity to align a front sight tip vertically and horizontally within a rear sight aperture. It also begs the question, why was a carrying handle issued with the M4 carbine? Perhaps we are so afraid of change that it is easier to stick with the same technology that has been in use since the advent of the firearm. As Marines we operate under the assumption that if it can be broken, it will break. Certainly, while rugged, most optics require batteries that can fail or lenses that can break. There are several remedies to this problem. All of the optics, with the exception of the NVDs, consists of a circular lens opening that can be looked through without battery power or if one or more of the lenses break. If these problems are encountered and the optic is properly mounted on the upper receiver rail where it should be, and not the top of the carry handle, the front sight post can be centered in the circular aperture, and the sight can be used as a large rear sight aperture. This is not as difficult as it sounds. Regardless of the size of a circle, the human eye is instinctively drawn to its center. Accuracy will be degraded somewhat; however, we are operating under the assumption that the tactical situation is such that the Marine is in a position that requires him to engage a threat immediately. If there is time the Marine simply flips up the backup iron sight. This can be achieved without removal of the optical sight except in the case of the ACOG DOS and AN/PVS–17, which due to eye relief must be removed in order to flip up the iron sight.
Magnified optics. This family of optics for the M4 generally offers between three- to five-power magnification and provides some form of reticle pattern, often with the ability to assist in range estimation. Some training in the use of a scoped weapon is required because while we now have only one aiming point, eye relief is fixed and parallax (the apparent movement of the reticle across the target as the head is moved) can become an issue. Failure to align the reticle posts horizontally and vertically and eliminate scope shadow will cause a round to impact off of the point of aim. Magnified optics give us the ability to observe, identify, and engage targets at greater ranges than iron sights. They do, however, have the disadvantage of reducing the field of view and increasing target acquisition time at close ranges.
Nonmagnified optics. This family of optics consists of an aiming dot imposed inside the ocular lens of the sight. Unlike laser sights made popular in the movies, no beam is projected from the weapon. The dot is parallax free, meaning that the relative position of the dot within the optic is unimportant except at long ranges when precision accuracy is required. These sights are designed to be used with both eyes open greatly increasing the field of view and enhancing the Marines situational awareness. Within this group of optics there is the nonbattery powered Reflex sight issued with the SOPMod kit that, as discussed under the SOPMod component portion, I consider difficult to use. A far superior sight in my opinion is the M68 Aimpoint™ M-XD. This sight is battery powered; however, the dot brightness is adjustable and can be seen immediately in all lighting and weather conditions.
Night vision sights. While any NVD equipped with a rail grabber assembly can be mounted on the M4A1, I will concentrate on the AN/PVS–1415 night vision monocular and the AN/PVS–1717 mini night vision sight (MNVS). Both are third-generation night optics that provide superior clarity and definition. The AN/PVS–14 is a nonmagnified, hand-held, head-, helmet-, or weapon-mounted night optic. This optic contains no aim point but can be used in conjunction with the AN/PEQ–4 or AN/PEQ–2, and can be equipped with a screw-on three- or five-power magnifier. The AN/PVS–17 (MNVS) is a 2.25 magnified (a 4.25-power version is available) head- or weapon-mounted night sight with a variable intensity red aiming dot. This sight has proven effective to beyond 300m. As it is a magnified optic, which is fix-focused at infinity, it does not provide a clear image within 25m.
While I am on the subject of night vision, I must relate what I feel to be an incredibly troubling point. It was recommended that during testing each Marine be equipped with night vision capability. Sufficient numbers of NVDs were not available due to the battalion table of equipment. Requests were made to ignore the recommendation based not on the availability of night optics or quality of training that would be received but on the burden that would be placed on the support and maintenance shops. Further rationalizations included the argument that as Marines we fight as teams; therefore, not every Marine needs the ability to see at night. We need to pull our heads out of the trenches and realize that the battlefields of tomorrow will be more decentralized than ever before. The days of the squad set of NVDs are in the past. Optics allow for engagement at greater ranges and increase first-round hit probability dramatically especially during darkness/low-light conditions. He who owns the night wins. We are grossly negligent if we do not ensure that every Marine rifleman is equipped with some form of optic, NVD, and a compass and knows how to use them. As for the support and maintenance overburdening, well fellas, things are tough all over.
Bolt/gas/extraction problems. Representatives from Colt have identified that due to the shorter gas and recoil system, cracks may develop in the second and seventh bolt lugs after 10,000 rounds. These lugs could break off at around 20,000 rounds. Colt claims that this should have no impact on the function of the weapon. While this could obviously affect the Marine carrying the rifle, at the rate infantry units fire, it will be many years before this number is reached. I have trained or trained with over 100 Marines firing the M4 carbine and have observed only one broken bolt face. Many of our weapons have fired well in excess of 10,000 rounds. We must also stop thinking of our infantry weapon as a one-time investment. Scheduled maintenance will detect these flaws and ensure that our weapons will be ready when we need them. Another problem reported was weak extractor springs that supposedly induced type 3 malfunctions (double feeds). I have not noticed this to be true in a functionally clean weapon.
Overheating. Claims have been made that the RAS handguards heat up more quickly than standard handguards. I have not found this to be true. A deficiency noted upon delivery of the first M4A1s was a tendency for the lower heat shield to detach. This has since been corrected. A requirement with the use of the RAS is to ensure that the unused portions of the 1913 MilStd rails are covered with the handguard sections. These not only protect the shooter from heat and cuts caused by the rail surfaces, but also protect the rails from damage and ensure zero retention.
Bayonet techniques and close combat. It may appear that due to its reduced length and collapsible buttstock, the M4A1 is poorly designed for close combat. An available SOPMod enhanced stock will provide more rigidity in the rear of the weapon while executing a smash, horizontal, or vertical butt stroke. While a collapsible stock will never possess the rigidity of a fixed stock, we must keep in mind that these are softening techniques and distraction used in order to set the enemy up for a killing thrust. Utilizing the linear fighting techniques incorporated in the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, length of weapon does not equate to advantage in combat.
Rifle racks. The current rifle racks were not designed to hold the M4A1 carbine. Obviously, replacing the Marine Corps’ inventory of rifle racks will be costly; however, a rack must be modified or designed that will securely hold the weapon with components attached. This will greatly enhance zero retention and limit premission preparation time by allowing Marines to store weapons with their mounted components attached. This may cause problems with accountability; however, we are enhancing the readiness of our Marines.
Loss of components. One of the most inane criticisms of the M4 has been the fear of Marines losing the modular components. I would recommend that all mounted optics be checked daily for tightness. Most of the components can be easily dummy-corded to further ensure retention.
If we still do not feel that we can entrust our Marines with equipment that will increase their ability to accomplish their mission, then we must first take a hard look at ourselves as leaders. Perhaps we should issue a hip pocket class on the leadership trait of responsibility, or we could require our Marines to use only weapons of opportunity found on the battlefield.
Another related complaint is that the modular nature of the weapon provides too many options that may overwhelm the individual rifleman and increase mission preparation time. There are several base configurations that will serve well during most operations. The modular nature allows weapons capabilities “mix” to the small unit leader. While a point man may require a dot-type sight for close range chance contacts, it would also be beneficial to have several Marines equipped with a magnified optic capable of detecting and engaging at greater ranges. A complaint of testing units was that it became difficult to change weapons components during cold weather. Modular does not mean that we have to switch optics, components, or buttstock length in midpatrol. In most cases, once established, components will not frequently change unless there is a change in mission. The only change that may be required during a patrol is the attachment/removal of the night vision. I have found this to be easily accomplished at night and with heavy gloves. As with anything else, proficiency comes with practice—and we need more of it.
It is my opinion that the M4A1 carbine is indeed a superior infantry rifle. It is based on a proven design with which all Marines are familiar and is equally well-suited for operations in all types of terrain, to include use in urban environments. It provides our infantry unit leaders with the ability to rapidly prepare for combat under varying situations while allowing them to employ the latest in target acquisition technology. Its modular nature allows us to upgrade components as improvements become available. We must stop using our known distance range as a basis for the evaluation of our combat weapons. We must equip our Marines with every possible advantage. Most importantly, we must get our weapons out of the armory and into the hands of our Marines. We must give our infantry Marines the opportunity and ammunition required to become proficient with their individual weapons. Perhaps in addition to a new weapon we need a new attitude concerning our opinions of the capabilities of our combat elements.
Current Developments
The events of 11 September 2001 shocked the world and drastically changed the deployment plans of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operation Capable) (MEU(SOC)). Along with all of the Marines and sailors of the 15th MEU and Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group, 2d Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company conducted a wide variety of operations. Missions ranged from securing the initial airfield in Pakistan to providing sniper support, observation posts (OPs), and personal security detachments in Jacobabad, Pakistan. After the 15th MEU(SOC) secured Forward Operating Base Rhino, force reconnaissance teams conducted numerous, mounted, long-range reconnaissance patrols. Additionally, the platoon was tasked with searching and securing detainees, conducting a direct action raid, and providing the assault element during interdiction operations on Highway 1, west of Kandahar.
During all operations, the primary weapon of the force reconnaissance Marine was the M4A1 carbine equipped with the SOPMod kit. The weapon performed flawlessly in the harsh terrain and weather conditions, and its size improved maneuverability in vehicles and in urban areas. The reliability, versatility, and the ability to change weapons configurations as the situation required (often at night and in extreme cold) allowed the Marines of 2d Platoon to select the optimum capabilities mix for each mission. All optics, when properly mounted, retained an acceptable zero even after numerous change outs and hundreds of kilometers of vehicle movement over the rough desert terrain of southern Afghanistan.
During daylight OPs most team members opted for the ACOG DOS, as this optic afforded a greater observation standoff. At night the AN/PVS–17, used in conjunction with the AN/PEQ–2, made it possible to illuminate and observe areas that would have otherwise been inaccessible. For operations in built-up areas, the Aimpoint™ Comp ML provided the rapid target acquisition required in close quarters. The QD suppressor gave the capability to silently remove dogs or sentries had it been required. When conducting nighttime highway interdiction operations, the visible light illuminator enabled rapid target identification. This provided a decisive advantage to the 2d Platoon Marines and served to temporarily stun the occupants of a vehicle during a short, but volatile close-range firefight that left at least seven enemy dead and destroyed a large fuel and ammunition cache.
In conclusion, our relatively short stay in Afghanistan provided a real-world test bed that verified my initial assessment of the M4A1 carbine.
The war on terror will continue. The very nature of this war calls for the employment of small units trained and equipped to take the fight to the enemy on the most uncertain of battlefields. The first step in winning this war is to further empower our small unit leaders. We must provide them with the ammunition and training opportunities required to develop the individual and unit skills needed for this type of war. The second step is to equip our Marines with the best weapons and technology available, teach them how to use it, and trust them to take care of it. The M4A1 carbine with the SOPMod kit answers the call as a combat rifle capable of combining a known and proven design with a versatile, modular group of components that will enhance the capabilities of our Marines.
Notes
1. Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command message: “Fielding Conference For The Close Quarters Battle Weapon (CQBW).”
2. Draft, User’s Logistics Support Summary for the Close Quarters Battle Weapon, ULSS 00993–15.
3. Backup Iron Sight Operator’s Manual, SW370–BT–OPI–010.
4. Forward Handgrip Operator’s and Armorer’s Manual, SW370–B8–OPI–010.
5. M203 Grenade Launcher Mount Operator’s and Armorer’s Manual, SW370–B9–OPI–010.
6. AN/PAQ–4C Infrared Aiming Light Operator’s Manual, TM 09596C–12/2.
7. Target Pointer Illuminator/Aiming Light Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual,
TM 10470A–12&P/1A.
8. Quick Attach/Detach Suppressor Operator’s Manual, SW370–BP–OPI–010.
9. Visible Bright Light Operator’s Manual, SW370–BS–OPI–010.
10. Reflex Sight Operator’s Manual SW370–BM–OPI–010.
11. M4 MWS new equipment training after-action report.
12. Rogers, Patrick A, “The Tactical Carbine Course Workbook,” p.13.
13. SOPMod accessory kit for the M4A1 Carbine, ST23–31–1.
14. Operator’s Manual component list rifle M16A2, M16A4, M4 carbine, M4A1,
TM 05538D/10012B–12/1.
15. Operator’s Manual monocular AN/PVS–14, TM 10271A–10/1.
16. AN/PVS–17 MNVS Operator’s Manual, SW215–B90OPI–010.
>GySgt Dailey is the platoon sergeant for 2d Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company currently deployed with the 15th MEU(SOC).
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