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Lebell · 06-19-2003, 11:22 PM

The following is a paper I wrote for a morality class on the subject of abortion.

It is broken into three parts. First I argrue the pro-life side, second I agrue the pro-choice side and third, I argue my own conclusions and viewpoint.

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The Morality of Abortion:
A Discussion

Introduction

Historically, abortion has been a subject that has received little attention in mainstream thinking. Various cultures have addressed when it was permissible, such as after “quickening” or after so many days of conception, but as a reality it was left to women and midwives. It has only been since the late 19th century with the advent of women’s rights movements in areas such as birth control do we see abortion begin to be addressed. This debate has significantly escalated in intensity and volume since 1973 with the Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion in the landmark case, Roe vs. Wade.

A comment should be made regarding the use of the terms pro-life and pro-choice in this paper. It has been my experience that in this highly emotional debate, each side has chosen the terminology that it feels best describes itself. These terms are used here out of respect and not out of favor for a particular political or moral view on the rightness or wrongness of abortion and abortion laws.

Pro-life

The difficulty in the pro-choice side of the abortion debate lies in the fact that wherever the line is drawn in allowing or not allowing abortion, it is an arbitrary line. Fortunately, there are two principles which can guide us in deciding whether or not abortion is moral and permissible. First, is that is always wrong to take an innocent life, and second, that the fetus is human by the only non-arbitrary line, that being conception and the creation of a unique human genetic code.

Typically, arguments for the morality of abortion during any or all of pregnancy fall into three areas: 1) viability of the fetus; 2) experience, and; 3) what Noonan calls, “the sentiments of adults” . None of these are reliable however in determining the morality of abortion. The age of viability of the fetus has changed dramatically with the advent of 20th century medicine and it is reasonable to think that something akin to an artificial womb is possible. At the other end of the spectrum, a full term baby is just as dependant upon others for survival as the fetus, so viability is a non-issue.

Experience is also unreliable, as this not only depends on age but on the individual. The fetus at a very early age can experience pain, while adults who have suffered nerve damage may not. Psychologically, we do not distinguish individuals who have cerebral palsy as less “human” than others because of their defect and deficit of experience. Our view of children or our “sentimentality” is just as unreliable. The pro-choice side would argue that the fetus does not even “look” like a baby until several months after conception. Yet such distinctions have been used throughout history to deprive whole classes of individuals of rights, such as blacks in America, and in the extreme case, eugenics movements during Nazi Germany. So too, the pro-choice side would deprive the fetus.

Pro-choice

The mistake of Noonan and the pro-life side is to confuse genetic humanity with person-hood and to attempt to ascribe the rights of the later to the former. This separation is central to the pro-choice position. Person-hood is and must always be separate from genetic humanity. While a fetus is undeniably genetically distinct from the parents, it is not sufficient for us to grant it the status of person-hood and the rights and moral status implied. In developing this argument, one must first define the characteristics or qualities that we can, in general, ascribe to people. Mary Ann Warren defined them thus:

1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and /or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;
2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);
3) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control);
4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely man possible topics;
5) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.

An adult human certainly demonstrates all of these characteristics, and a baby of only a few weeks demonstrates most of them, but a fetus demonstrates none of them at the start and very few of them even at later stages of development. It is not denied that the fetus will become a person, but rather that the fetus is not yet a person and therefore cannot be ascribed all the rights and moral status that we would to an adult human or even an infant.

Using this concept of person-hood vs. genetically human, we may further say that not all genetically human beings are people, nor is genetic humanity necessary for person-hood and the rights we ascribe it. For the former case, we can consider the case of anencephaly, that is, incomplete development or even the absence of the brain in a newborn. Genetic humanity is undeniable yet the child will never meet the criteria of person-hood. In the second case we can consider hypothetical alien cultures or artificial intelligence. We can imagine meeting such creatures and where they meet our criteria they deserve the rights of person-hood.

Therefore, while it is due respect of it potential, a fetus is not a person and abortion is morally permissible at any and all stages of pregnancy.

Personal Viewpoint

I have never been completely satisfied or comfortable with either position presented here. In developing my own position, I have considered two cases, 1) the one week old fetus, and 2) the 8 ½ month old fetus. In the first case, I am strongly persuaded by Warren’s arguments. There are genetic humans, and there are persons, and the fetus at this stage does not exhibit the characteristics of a person as outlined above. It has a high probability of becoming a person and should be valued as such, but to ascribe it the same moral status as a fully developed person is completely foreign to my understanding of what a person is. In the second case, the fetus has, for whatever reasons, been allowed to develop. At this point, its potentiality is much closer to realization and it is viable outside the womb. I would consider an abortion at this point to be immoral, except to save the life of the mother. In both cases, Jane English’ “self defense” argument, where even the taking of innocent life can at times be justified, is persuasive.

I have also noted that frequently the pro-life side of the debate ignores the woman and her rights in this debate, or as English put it, “But all such approaches look to characteristics of the developing human and ignore the relation between the fetus and the woman.” Here I choose to distinguish being pro-choice from being pro-abortion. The debate of abortion is much like the debate over capital punishment. We are forced as individuals and as a society to draw lines in the sand. In some cases we may justify capital punishment while in others we may decide that it is an inappropriate punishment, while some individuals will hold that it is never morally justifiable.

Yet, there are valid arguments for each position. So too, is the debate over abortion. Strangely, Noonan said it best, “To say a being was human was to say it had a destiny to decide for itself which could not be taken from it by another man’s decision.” While he was talking about the fetus’ rights as a human being, I believe this is central to being pro-choice: it is morally wrong to interfere with another person’s personal moral decisions and destiny, especially when such decisions can be supported by reasoned and logical arguments.

Therefore, I support the current position of the Supreme Court in making abortion legal without restrictions in the first trimester while allowing restrictions as the pregnancy progresses. In my view, this is a reasonable attempt to balance the rights of the woman to self-determination with that of the fetus’s right to life especially in the middle of the pregnancy where it is difficult to draw a line, yet a line must be drawn.

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1 John T. Noonan Jr., The Moral Life, page 760
2 Mary Anne Warren, ibid, page 769
3 Jane English, ibid, p 782
4 John T. Noonan Jr., ibid, pp 763-764

06-19-2003, 11:22 PM	#67 (permalink)
Lebell Cracking the Whip Location: Sexymama's arms...	The following is a paper I wrote for a morality class on the subject of abortion. It is broken into three parts. First I argrue the pro-life side, second I agrue the pro-choice side and third, I argue my own conclusions and viewpoint. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Morality of Abortion: A Discussion Introduction Historically, abortion has been a subject that has received little attention in mainstream thinking. Various cultures have addressed when it was permissible, such as after “quickening” or after so many days of conception, but as a reality it was left to women and midwives. It has only been since the late 19th century with the advent of women’s rights movements in areas such as birth control do we see abortion begin to be addressed. This debate has significantly escalated in intensity and volume since 1973 with the Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion in the landmark case, Roe vs. Wade. A comment should be made regarding the use of the terms pro-life and pro-choice in this paper. It has been my experience that in this highly emotional debate, each side has chosen the terminology that it feels best describes itself. These terms are used here out of respect and not out of favor for a particular political or moral view on the rightness or wrongness of abortion and abortion laws. Pro-life The difficulty in the pro-choice side of the abortion debate lies in the fact that wherever the line is drawn in allowing or not allowing abortion, it is an arbitrary line. Fortunately, there are two principles which can guide us in deciding whether or not abortion is moral and permissible. First, is that is always wrong to take an innocent life, and second, that the fetus is human by the only non-arbitrary line, that being conception and the creation of a unique human genetic code. Typically, arguments for the morality of abortion during any or all of pregnancy fall into three areas: 1) viability of the fetus; 2) experience, and; 3) what Noonan calls, “the sentiments of adults” . None of these are reliable however in determining the morality of abortion. The age of viability of the fetus has changed dramatically with the advent of 20th century medicine and it is reasonable to think that something akin to an artificial womb is possible. At the other end of the spectrum, a full term baby is just as dependant upon others for survival as the fetus, so viability is a non-issue. Experience is also unreliable, as this not only depends on age but on the individual. The fetus at a very early age can experience pain, while adults who have suffered nerve damage may not. Psychologically, we do not distinguish individuals who have cerebral palsy as less “human” than others because of their defect and deficit of experience. Our view of children or our “sentimentality” is just as unreliable. The pro-choice side would argue that the fetus does not even “look” like a baby until several months after conception. Yet such distinctions have been used throughout history to deprive whole classes of individuals of rights, such as blacks in America, and in the extreme case, eugenics movements during Nazi Germany. So too, the pro-choice side would deprive the fetus. Pro-choice The mistake of Noonan and the pro-life side is to confuse genetic humanity with person-hood and to attempt to ascribe the rights of the later to the former. This separation is central to the pro-choice position. Person-hood is and must always be separate from genetic humanity. While a fetus is undeniably genetically distinct from the parents, it is not sufficient for us to grant it the status of person-hood and the rights and moral status implied. In developing this argument, one must first define the characteristics or qualities that we can, in general, ascribe to people. Mary Ann Warren defined them thus: 1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and /or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems); 3) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); 4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely man possible topics; 5) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both. An adult human certainly demonstrates all of these characteristics, and a baby of only a few weeks demonstrates most of them, but a fetus demonstrates none of them at the start and very few of them even at later stages of development. It is not denied that the fetus will become a person, but rather that the fetus is not yet a person and therefore cannot be ascribed all the rights and moral status that we would to an adult human or even an infant. Using this concept of person-hood vs. genetically human, we may further say that not all genetically human beings are people, nor is genetic humanity necessary for person-hood and the rights we ascribe it. For the former case, we can consider the case of anencephaly, that is, incomplete development or even the absence of the brain in a newborn. Genetic humanity is undeniable yet the child will never meet the criteria of person-hood. In the second case we can consider hypothetical alien cultures or artificial intelligence. We can imagine meeting such creatures and where they meet our criteria they deserve the rights of person-hood. Therefore, while it is due respect of it potential, a fetus is not a person and abortion is morally permissible at any and all stages of pregnancy. Personal Viewpoint I have never been completely satisfied or comfortable with either position presented here. In developing my own position, I have considered two cases, 1) the one week old fetus, and 2) the 8 ½ month old fetus. In the first case, I am strongly persuaded by Warren’s arguments. There are genetic humans, and there are persons, and the fetus at this stage does not exhibit the characteristics of a person as outlined above. It has a high probability of becoming a person and should be valued as such, but to ascribe it the same moral status as a fully developed person is completely foreign to my understanding of what a person is. In the second case, the fetus has, for whatever reasons, been allowed to develop. At this point, its potentiality is much closer to realization and it is viable outside the womb. I would consider an abortion at this point to be immoral, except to save the life of the mother. In both cases, Jane English’ “self defense” argument, where even the taking of innocent life can at times be justified, is persuasive. I have also noted that frequently the pro-life side of the debate ignores the woman and her rights in this debate, or as English put it, “But all such approaches look to characteristics of the developing human and ignore the relation between the fetus and the woman.” Here I choose to distinguish being pro-choice from being pro-abortion. The debate of abortion is much like the debate over capital punishment. We are forced as individuals and as a society to draw lines in the sand. In some cases we may justify capital punishment while in others we may decide that it is an inappropriate punishment, while some individuals will hold that it is never morally justifiable. Yet, there are valid arguments for each position. So too, is the debate over abortion. Strangely, Noonan said it best, “To say a being was human was to say it had a destiny to decide for itself which could not be taken from it by another man’s decision.” While he was talking about the fetus’ rights as a human being, I believe this is central to being pro-choice: it is morally wrong to interfere with another person’s personal moral decisions and destiny, especially when such decisions can be supported by reasoned and logical arguments. Therefore, I support the current position of the Supreme Court in making abortion legal without restrictions in the first trimester while allowing restrictions as the pregnancy progresses. In my view, this is a reasonable attempt to balance the rights of the woman to self-determination with that of the fetus’s right to life especially in the middle of the pregnancy where it is difficult to draw a line, yet a line must be drawn. -------- 1 John T. Noonan Jr., The Moral Life, page 760 2 Mary Anne Warren, ibid, page 769 3 Jane English, ibid, p 782 4 John T. Noonan Jr., ibid, pp 763-764 __________________ "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." – C. S. Lewis The ONLY sponsors we have are YOU! Please Donate!