people are referencing kosovo as a kind of precedent---i think i linked to a juan cole piece from last week that made the case pretty well. the strongest parallel seems to be the fact that the political opposition grew out of the intervention, was galvanized as a function of it and structured itself in that context.
let's look at what ace actually wrote:
Quote:
|
One of my very first posts in this thread, and the points have been repeated several times, was about the tragedy in outsiders prolonging civil wars. In addition, I talked about the tragedy of providing rebels false hope. The Libyan rebels can not defeat Kadfi, and if he is not removed they will be killed one way or another. A no fly zone is a joke in the context of saving lives. More is going to be needed. If you have read my posts you would know this. I think you have read them but insist on trying to take these discussion in the gutter for some reason.
|
1. the assumption that "outsiders prolong civil wars" comes from where exactly? it's presented as a matter of fact, but really...i don't think so. in machiavelli, though, there is advice given to the prince to the effect "do not invade a revolution" because you cannot win. the reasons for this are obvious.
but outsiders prolong civil wars...interesting. so it would follow that without "outsiders" there's some kind of natural course that civil wars take....
2. and apparently ace thinks that the natural course of this civil war is the extermination of the rebels, who are being"given false hope" and who "cannot defeat kadhafi".....
now where does the assumption come from that the rebels are "being given false hope"? the best i can figure it, it operates in a circular relation to the potted assessment of the rebels military capabilities---which are obviously problematic---but the fact is that the nato strikes have pretty decisively tipped the balance away from where it was last saturday. at the same time, as i've pointed out via actual information about real people in this thread, the rebels haven't been able to capitalise on that because they simply aren't organized yet. this as a function of the speed of events. obviously.
but the reality on the ground belies this "false hope" business. it's not true.
and the claim that "the rebels cannot defeat gadhafi" presupposes that the nato strikes would do nothing to alter the situation. this is also false.
fact is that what's happening in libya on the ground appears to be quite open-ended. nobody who knows what they're talking about is making terribly confident assertions about the future.
at the same time, the factoid from reuters this morning that i linked above and which was ignored by our pal ace indicates that gadhafi might be looking for a way out. it's not clear, however. and the moves on the part of the organization for african unity are interesting---trying to get negociations under way.
so it's not true that the "rebels are being given false hope"---the dynamic has been changed. but it's not over yet.
3. "if gadhafi is removed, the rebels will be killed one way or another."
what is this based on? anything at all?
if you look at what's happening in egypt and tunisia, it's clear that ridding oneself collectively of a repressive security apparatus isn't an overnight affair, it's true. but at the same time, the repressive security apparatus cannot continue to function as it had in defense of an autocratic status quo absent that status quo. exposed for what they are and have been by the collapse of the context that partially hid them, these secret police agencies imploded.
so it's not at all clear that there's anything to this assumption that the "rebels will be killed one way or another" even on those grounds. but that assumes there were grounds for this statement. i don't think there are any.
4. "a n0-fly zone is a joke in terms of actually saving lives."
this is wrong. unless what's surfacing here is a sympathy for gadhafi's forces. their lives are certainly not being saved by the no-fly zone. but that was the point of it, yes?
at the same time, the no-fly zone is not solving all problems. but this is obvious from actual information about real people in libya in misrata and elsewhere. snipers in hospitals and all that.
5. "More is going to be needed"
this is quite possible. but it's also likely that if it turns out that this is the case, the obama administration has managed to navigate the situation such that the brunt of it will not be bourne by the united states.
whether this is a failure of "leadership" or not for a conservative i don't know.