The_Dunedan

Thanks for the correction on ULTRA vs MK-ULTRA, I had the two confused.

Now, as for FDR and Pearl Harbor...sorry, not BS. The contention that FDR, probably the Sec. of War, and almost certainly the Sec. State were at least aware of an impending attack on US Pacific assets is widely accepted as a valid (if unproven) hypothesis within professional historical circles. These was considerable disagreement on the location of the attack: Pearl Harbor was considered too far for the IJN to sail without being detected, but attacks on US interests/bases in the Phillipines, or perhaps on Wake Island, were considered at least equally likely. It's telling to note that neither the Phillipine garrisons -nor- Wake Island had their defenses strengthened or upgraded*, despite the fact that War Dept. "White Papers" were circulating as early as 1938 and as late as Dec. of 1940 suggesting that such an attack was in the works. Of course, one must remember that this is the same War Dept. which so vigorously overlooked both Lt. Col. Mitchell's groundbreaking experiments with anti-ship airpower and the Battle Of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, so a certain measure of institutional idiocy is also doubtless to blame.

Additionally, such does little to account for the fact that repeated radar warnings were ignored or "spiked" by command on the ground at Pearl**, that the Japanese attempt (very old-school of them) to give 3hrs warning before the attack was likewise ignored, or that warnings of midget submarines entering Pearl Harbor were not only ignored but discounted for years, even after the USS Ward accurately reported engaging and sinking one such vessel.

As regard the possession of Enigma codes; yes, most of the Japanese codes which were currently readable were Diplomatic. However, they were encoded and decoded using the same 3-rotor commercial Enigma machines used by the IJN and by much of the German military prior to 1940. This is the kind of intel you want to play -very- close to the vest. When the Abwehr added a fourth rotor in mid 1944, the intelligence loss it caused was so great that it allowed the planning and build-up for the Ardennes Offensive (Battle Of The Bulge) to take place in almost total secrecy. FDR and Churchill both knew, as to a lesser degree did De Gaulle and Stalin, that the preservation of this kind of intelligence was of absolutely paramount importance, and both men made horrible Solomonic decisions (as you acknowledge with Coventry) to protect it.

As for FDR's second motivation for ensuring US entry into the war, it was very simple. He (and everyone else) knew that once the UK was conquered and occupied, the Atlantic would be wide open and the eastern US left vulnerable to attacks by the Kreigsmarine. At this point the Atom Bomb was only a theory, but the possibility of atomic attack may very well have entered into the discussion. Most importantly, FDR and Churchill both knew that, once the UK fell and British colonial interests in Africa and the Far East fell in German/Japanese hands, Germany would have both the materiel and the manpower to challenge the industrial capacities of the US and USSR. This would have been -especially- true if Albert Speer or someone similarly capable was at the helm. With such capacity, the US would not only be vulnerable to significant assault itself, but the USSR (already on shaky ground thanks to the Yezhovschina Purges, and with Stalin playing the weather-vane to Hitler's wind) would probably have been taken out of the fight by either military or economic/diplomatic means. In order to prevent the conquest of the UK and the loss of the Soviet Union, it was important for the US to enter the war quickly. It was equally important that such entry not be initiated against Germany. An American analogue to the NAZI party, complete with swastikas and brown shirts, was already enjoying rapid growth, and Fascist-esque penetration of the US popular media was already well advanced. FDR risked the real possibility of both losing England and losing his job if America was seen to be initiating conflict with the Nazis, especially since many Americans at the time regarded the Nazis as a disagreeable but needed bulwark against Bolshevism. It was therefore important that the declarations of war follow as they did: Japan attacks, US declares war on Japan, Germany declares war on US.

As for Mr. Dewey retracting his statements, I have no doubt that he did. I also have no doubt that he had plenty of "help" from J. Edgar Hoover and his crowd of leg-breakers and blackmail specialists. We today have considerably more evidence that Dewey did, and much of it IMO points to at very least the passive compliance of the Rooseveldt administration for the above-outlined specific policy motives.


*The poor Marines on Wake were still using '03A3 Springfield rifles and Brewster Buffalo fighters at the time of the Battle Of Wake Island!
**And no, there is no way that hundreds of fighters approaching from the WEST were mistaken for five B-17 heavy bombers which were supposed to approach from the EAST.