I haven't watched the video yet, I will get around it, but based on your description, a few points:
When I left about a year ago Kabul had (relatively) steady and reliable power.
If the electricity is only available for 4 hours a day, it is likely because people can afford AC for the first time in their lives and are out-pacing gains in electricity production. There were several hydroelectric projects in progress where I operated...I would assume they were elsewhere as well.
That, or things have deteriorated far more quickly than I would have anticipated.
Quote:
Originally Posted by roachboy
after the initial invasion of afghanistan, the coalition went into what amounts to a 3 year holding pattern. everything just kinda stopped. can you say iraq?
it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see in the wreckage that is now unfolding a consequence of the iraq debacle.
the relationship with musharraf undertaken by the bush people was such that despite the fact that pk offered sanctuary along its borders to al qeada, to the taliban(s) etc., and allowed it from the highest levels of government, and despite the fact that everyone--and i mean everyone--knew this was the case, what musharraf said went and so these sanctuaries were allowed to operate, dig in, expand.
he outlines the relations between pashtoons across the afghan/pk border--the extent to which this was a very old kind of relation, one that shaped much about afghanistan as a largely fictional western-style nation-state, how it rendered the notion of foxed borders absurd because it's a similar pattern that you see everywhere.
he outlines the dynamic in which the afghanistan taliban was able to fashion a pk correlate of itself, which is what you see now moving into swat, which is just outside the national capital.
i still dont see any obvious move that can be made here, but maybe i'm thinking about it too much through the process of trying to make sense of how this happened.
what's clear is that while charlatans point is excellent in principle, in fact, at the moment, the shit may be about to hit the fan and while it nonetheless makes sense for the strategy he outlines to be adopted in other contexts, in this one the time may be passed.
i don't know.
how do you parse this?
i hope i'm missing something....
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Hope you don't mind, I pared down your quote for readability.
The 'holding pattern' is not particularly accurate. We did not push large numbers of troops into Afghanistan, but we did focus on getting at least the framework of a workable government/military in place and we trained up the Afghan Army/Police enough to be useful in a fight. We wasted time for sure by not putting all our assets on the problem, but so it goes.
Despite the two-faced-nature of the PK government, it appears they have at the very least tolerated our attacks on targets in PK (they hem and haw but dont' actually do anything about it). Truth be told they never really controlled the NWFP or SWAT in the first place. They have used the Frontier Corps as a means to maintain some government influence, but they are ultimately loyal to their local tribes rather than to a central government (which is of a different ethnic group).
The idea of the border being an artificial construct is spot on. That area is often referred to as "Pashtunistan" and is more or less Pashtu with little loyalty to any state whatsoever. The people are loyal to their families, tribes and villages. If you ask one of them to tell you where he is from he will tell you what tribe he is from, and what village he is from but will likely make no reference to what country, regardless of whether you are interviewing him in Afghanistan and he just crossed the border. It isn't deception (well, sometimes it is) but rather a very different sense of identity. Though, the PK Pashtuns have integrated somewhat successfully into the PK government (as evidenced by the continued support of high ranking gov members of the Taliban).
However, Pashtunistan is too volatile to make a successful state. If it were to happen (and PK volunteered to give up half it's territory and most of it's natural resources) fighting would likely break out almost immediately between those on the AF side and those on the PK side as they are (while still Pashto) very different and Afghans tend to be xenophobes in the extreme.
The solution?
It has to be a long term one, because you can't change how people live their entire lives overnight. It also have to be cheap or it won't be sustained. Your guess is as good as mine on exactly how that should be structured.
Edit: With regard to nuclear weapons. If the PK government fell and the extremists acquired or were about to acquire nuclear weapons, India would be on them immediately. Most Pakistani's are far more concerned with India than the US (and rightly so).