asaris

Actually, I think this is demonstrably false. Free will means at base that our actions are up to us, right? If that's right, then for something to interfere with free will, it has to interfere with the extent to which the action is up to us. But knowing what an outcome will be does not influence the causes of that event.

Let's say, by hypothesis, that I know who will win the Yankees game tomorrow. This seems possible; at least logically possible, if not actually possible. But it seems odd to say the least that I, living in DC, have any effect on the outcome of that game. Why is this? Simply put, knowledge is not causation. Similarly, simply by knowing what I will do or what someone else will do tomorrow, I do not exert any causality over that decision, and so there is no interference with their free will.

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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche