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When I first read the article, I thought Brooks was giving judgment short shrift; see the sixth paragraph. It seems to describe the human as being merely a product of evolution/the environment. Our emotional moral judgments come from somewhere we know not where, and we're largely helpless in the face of them. I didn't notice the third from last paragraph, in which he notes the possibility of judgment overcoming our emotional reactions. The difficulty is that the source of our judgment is also external -- our reasons for overcoming our intuitions come from society, largely in the form of our friends. But for moral action to be moral, it has to in some sense come from us, and I'm not sure that this sort of account leaves room for that.
I think one problem might be this dichotomy between embeddedness and reflection. Our reflection is itself always already embedded, but that does not mean it is determined by that embeddedness. It is a false dichotomy. I also have no idea why he would think that any of this would mean the end of philosophy. Perhaps he's right (though I think he's not; cf. Blackburn, for example), and philosophy has historically given too short a shrift to moral emotions. But that just mean Philosophy needs to change its course, right?
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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