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What makes a choice free really has nothing to do with knowledge of its consequence. What I think has you confused is the connection between a choice's blameworthiness, it's freedom, and the foreseeable consequences. We typically think that the blameworthiness of an act is related to its consequences, and if someone reasonably failed to consider a potential bad consequence which then occurs, we're likely to hold that person less blameworthy. Similarly, if we think that someone was less free in making their choice, we're likely to hold that person less blameworthy. So it's easy to think that the two are related.
But I don't really see any reason to think that they are. An act's freedom arises from whether that act is up to me or not, and this doesn't have much to do with whether we know all the consequences of the act. I might agree that if we are radically mistaken about the consequences, an act might be less free, especially if the mistake arises as a result of an external agency (as in cases of fraud). But most of the time, we have a pretty good idea of the likely consequences, and I don't see why this isn't enough.
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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