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Greg700,
I was hoping you would post here because you know much better than I, what is or isn't appropriate to share publicly. The sense I get is that the increased bureaucracy, the length of the chain of command, and the differences in goals and execution of policy, recently, vs. before the buildup of conventional US and NATO forces, has had unintended consequences as far as casualty rates of conventional forces, compared to how aggressive their posture has been, and that the way you were able to operate prior to this buildup, accompanied on missions with the native forces you've trained (force multiplication). In other words, before this buildup, smaller US units, working alongside native forces trained by and well acquainted with their US trainers, operated with more autonomy and projected a much different impression on the locals, and were much less provocative, as far as the enemy's impression of these units as they operated in both their "hearts and minds winning" role, in intelligence gathering, and in patrol and combat missions, than currently in border areas with larger numbers of conventional forces and command....
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the sense I get, if the way I described the changes is correct, is that the introduction of a much larger force is setting back (or at least confusing) the winning of hearts and minds and force multiplication, encouraging a larger and more aggressive response from the enemy, and producing US and NATO casualties that might not have to happen,
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