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Banned
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Not to post shameless, self serving hype in this thread....but I sincerely wish more folks would read the "PTB" OP that I posted in this forum last night, and comment on it....sometimes, I feel like I might be losing my mind, because of my disappointment about the general level of distraction, disinterest, and superficiality exhibited in the posts and in the interests I perceive of so many of my fellow "TFPers", because the apathy and disinterest is EXACTLY WHAT ENABLES SHIT LIKE THE FOLLOWING, and what I detailed in the "PTB" thread, to happen to the US, and by extension, to the rest of the world, over and over, all the way back to the turn of the last century, and probably long before.....
People!!!! This is your country, your lives, and the lives of your children we are talking about, here. Can we poke our collective heads up from the distractions of everyday living, even just once and a while, to examine and consider who is running "the show", and what they are doing, and why they are doing it?
The "colleagues" of this Mr. Bush and of his father's and grandfather's generation, either are themselves, or serve at the pleasure and on the approval of some of the wealthiest and most powerful people in the country (and thus, in the world....). These are people, as I documented in the "Robert A. Lovett" segment in the PTB thread, who were so zealous in their prosecution of war, that they built and studied a top secret weapons "proving ground" in Utah during WWII, models of German and Japanese "villages"...duplicated clusters of civilian residential buildings in order to bomb them with chemical, biological, explosive, and incendiary aerial bombs, for the purpose of learning which weapons would be most effective in killing civilian populations in residential districts.....
I further documented how, beginning in the 1930's these "people", purchased residences next to each other on a small, private Florida island, an island purchased with weapons sales profits, from sales to all sides, during WWI.
In contrast, the most recent US foray into "ginned up" rationale for unnecessary war, seems almost routine, for this group of ruling class Americans:
The "16 words"....they came on the background of events and decisions documented below:
Leaving uranium in Iraq is our standard practice....it's what our leadership does:
Quote:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...-2004Jul7.html
U.S. Faulted for Leaving Tons of Uranium in Iraq
By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 8, 2004; Page A12
Nuclear experts yesterday questioned a decision by the Energy Department to leave in Iraq nearly 400 tons of natural uranium that could be enriched for a nuclear weapon or used to build a radioactive "dirty bomb."
On Tuesday, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced that about two tons of low-enriched uranium and about 1,000 radioactive sources had recently been removed from an old Iraqi nuclear facility and brought to the United States for safety reasons.
Although low-enriched uranium can be made usable for a bomb much faster, the "natural uranium is still dangerous and could be used in a nuclear weapons program or sold to somebody that would misuse it," said David Albright, a nuclear analyst and former weapons inspector in Iraq.....
...... The decision to remove the more dangerous materials was made by the National Security Council nearly one year after the invasion. The operation was completed on June 23, several days before the United States transferred political authority to the Iraqis.
"They lost a real opportunity to move the natural uranium, and that's disappointing since they had well over a year to do it when the country was exclusively under American control," Albright said. "We have no idea what Iraq will look like in a year."
The International Atomic Energy Agency kept Iraq's uranium under seal in storage facilities for more than a decade before the U.S. invasion in March 2003, but the storerooms were looted when Baghdad fell several weeks later.
The IAEA was allowed back into Iraq to help clean up the facility, and it urged U.S. officials to protect Iraq's former weapons sites from further looting.
But in recent months, radioactive equipment and Iraqi weapons components have been showing up in scrap yards and ports in Europe and the Middle East.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, has unsuccessfully lobbied the White House to let international inspectors return to Iraq. He is now discussing the matter with Iraqi authorities. Before the war, ElBaradei reported that Iraq had no nuclear weapons program, despite assertions to the contrary by the Bush administration, which went to war to remove weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons have not been found.
In a letter to the U.N. Security Council yesterday, ElBaradei said the IAEA had been told about the operation to remove the low-grade uranium and radiological sources, but he made it clear that the international nuclear agency -- which has a mandate to oversee Iraq's nuclear materials -- was not consulted or asked to participate.
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Quote:
http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2005/10/24/182733/96
Niger/Uranium: FACTS everyone NEEDS to know
by Todd Johnston
Mon Oct 24, 2005 at 03:27:33 PM PDT
....some historical persepctive is in order:
* In 1991, Iraq was discovered to have about 500 metric tons (~1 million lbs.) of yellowcake they'd 'forgotten' to mention. George Herbert Walker Bush, his coalition pals, and the International Atomic Energy Agency were so alarmed that Iraq had yellowcake, they decided to leave it in Iraq. The "prudent" course of action as they saw it: put it drums, seal it up, and check the seals once a year. They knew an entire year was not long enough for Hussein to make anything dangerous out of yellowcake. [3, .pdf]
* That yellowcake was inspected and remained untouched until Hussein barred the U.N. inspectors in late 1998. [see 3 above]
* On Oct. 6, 2002, the CIA sent a fax to the White House that stated "the procurement [of yellowcake] is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide [yellowcake] in their inventory. [4, para. 7, emphasis added]
* During Dec. 9-11, 2002, before Bush's SOTU claim that Iraq was trying to buy yellowcake from Africa, U.N. Inspectors verified that the yellowcake from 1991 was in Iraq, undisturbed, and still sealed. [see 3 above]
I hope you've made it this far. This background is crucial to truly understanding what happened, and what may yet happen, i.e. Iran (with an "n") who is processing uranium, not enriching it yet. Here's the payoff:
Repeated claims that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger, initiated and bolstered solely by the CIA's Directorate of Operations were irrelevant. The idea was never credible, never implied Iraq was re-starting their nuclear programs, and never taken seriously. Iraq had all the yellowcake it needed and 4 years to use it ('99-'02) -- they had no facilities to enrich uranium.
Ask yourself: why would Iraq try to buy 500-550 mT of yellowcake when they already had the same amount, during a period and no one was inspecting it?
Care to guess where Iraq originally bought it's yellowcake back in the late 80's? About 1/2 of it came from Niger, receipts they turned over in the early 90's. Receipts from the 80's for 500-550 mT of yellowcake.
And finally, yes finally, ask yourself who in the Bush administration during '02-'03 didn't understand the unspannable gap between yellowcake and a nuclear bomb:
* George W. Bush? Who's father left 500 mT of yellowcake in Hussein's possession?
* Dick Cheney? The Secretary of Defense in 1991? The energy mogul with interests in nuclear power?
* Condoleeza Rice? The head of NSC who got her undergraduate degree at age 19 and her master's at 20? Who served on the board of Chevron and had a tanker named after her?
* George Tenet? Whose agency said buying yellowcake "was not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions?"
Colin Powell knew. That's why he left out references to yellowcake in his speech to the U.N., focusing instead on the "aluminum tubes." Though still a lie, at least those tubes were supposedly part of a centrifuge, a device used to enrich uranium.
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See the sentences in expanded sized lettering, below, and the yellow highlighted sentences? Mr. Bush knew, and or certainly his staff and advisors knew....all of that "stuff" in those sentences, BEFORE he delivered the "16 words", in his January, 2003 SOTU address, accusing Iraq of attempting recent (irrelevant and unfounded....) purchases of uranium:
Quote:
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus...ort_110403.pdf
(.pdf page= 7)
Nuclear Material Availability
32. All known procured, indigenously produced and practically recoverable uranium compounds
which were not removed by 1994, in accordance with resolution 687 (1991), have remained in
the custody of the IAEA, and are presently stored under IAEA seal. This includes the depleted
uranium imported in 1979, natural uranium imported in 1979 and 1981–1982, low enriched
uranium imported in 1982, yellow cake produced at the Al Qaim facility, uranium dioxide and
uranium tetrachloride produced by the Al Jesira facilities, and uranium compounds produced at
Tuwaitha. After the resumption of inspections in November 2002, verification of the nuclear
material subject to IAEA safeguards which is stored in the nuclear material store of Tuwaitha
“Location C”, was performed from 9 to 11 December 2002. The inspection activities (i.e. item
counting, tag checks, gross defect tests, enrichment measurements and weighing) did not
uncover any discrepancies....
....Centrifuge Enrichment
35. During the four years preceding the resumption of inspections in Iraq, there was much
speculation about the possible revitalization of a gas centrifuge enrichment programme in Iraq.
Of main concern were the efforts of Iraq to procure high strength quality aluminium tubes,
declared for use in an unguided rocket programme, as possible cylinders in a gas centrifuge
programme. The IAEA conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq’s attempts to purchase large
quantities of such tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminium tubes
were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have
failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these tubes for any project other.....
....34. The IAEA investigated reports that centred on documents provided to it by a number of States
that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq on the sale of uranium to Iraq between
1999 and 2001. Based on its analysis, the IAEA concluded, with the concurrence of outside
experts, that these documents were in fact forged documents. The IAEA therefore concluded
that these specific allegations were unfounded. However, as the IAEA pointed out to the
Security Council, it could not automatically be extrapolated from this that Iraq had never sought
to import uranium, and the IAEA would continue to investigate the matter....
....Other Enrichment routes
38. The IAEA has not observed any indication related to other enrichment routes, such as the
electromagnetic isotopic separation process (EMIS) that was favoured by Iraq in the 1980s.
39. Nothing contained in the documents related to Iraq’s pre-1991 laser enrichment programme
which were found at the home of a former Iraqi scientist altered the conclusions previously
drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq’s laser enrichment programme. Nor did they
contain any evidence of efforts by Iraq to resume research in this field after 1991.
Weapons Development Related Activities
40. No indication of post-1991 weaponization activities was uncovered in Iraq. However, to draw a
definitive conclusion in that regard, the IAEA would have needed additional time. Assurances
that there are no weaponization capabilities in Iraq are essential not only for ensuring that any
possible undetected domestically produced weapons-grade material could be transformed into a
nuclear device, but also for ensuring that no illegally imported or smuggled weapons-grade
material can be so used....
.....CONCLUSION
43. In the nearly four months during which the IAEA was able to conduct inspections in Iraq,
significant progress was made in assessing the status of Iraq’s nuclear-related capabilities. On
17 March 2003, the IAEA, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and the
United Nations Secretary-General, had to withdraw its staff from Iraq, as part of the decision to
withdraw the staff of UNMOVIC and other UN staff, out of concern for their safety and
following an advisory of upcoming military action.
44. As of 17 March 2003, the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of
a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the IAEA had
completed its investigations on whether Iraq had attempted to revive its nuclear programme
between 1998 and 2002. Provided that Iraq’s co-operation had remained active, and barring
unforeseen circumstances, the IAEA would have been able to provide the Security Council with
credible assurance regarding the absence of such revival within two to three months of
continuing verification activities. However, any such assurance, as with any verification
process, would have had a degree of uncertainty. It is for that reason that the IAEA, as requested
by the Security Council, would have moved to the implementation of its reinforced OMV
system, which was designed to act as an effective deterrent to and insurance against resumption
by Iraq of its nuclear weapons programme, while permitting the IAEA to continue to look for
possible past activities, thus providing the international community with an ongoing and realtime
assessment of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations.
45. While the implementation of the IAEA mandate in Iraq has been interrupted because of the
ongoing military action, the IAEA’s mandate in Iraq, pursuant to Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement
to the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the relevant Security Council
resolutions, remains valid and thus not changed. The IAEA, as the sole legal authority to verify
Iraq’s nuclear activities, remains ready, subject to Security Council guidance, to resume its
verification activities as soon as conditions permit.
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Quote:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell...chapter2-f.htm
or... (report page=55 .pdf page=20):
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/c...8-301/sec2.pdf
or... (report page=55 .pdf page=67): http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-...id=f:sr301.pdf
F. The Cincinnati Speech
(U) On October 4, 2002, the NSC sent a draft of a speech they were preparing for the President to deliver in Cincinnati, Ohio. It was draft six of the speech and contained the line, "and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide from Africa - an essential ingredient in the enrichment process."
(U) The CIA's former Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence (ADDI) for Strategic Programs, told Committee staff he was tasked by the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) to handle coordination of the speech within the CIA. On October 5, 2002, the ADDI brought together representatives for each of the areas of Iraq that the speech covered and asked the analysts to bring forward any issues that they thought should be addressed with the NSC. The ADDI said an Iraq nuclear analyst - he could not remember who - raised concerns about the sourcing and some of the facts of the Niger reporting, specifically that the control of the mines in Niger would have made it very difficult to get yellowcake to Iraq.
( ) Both WINPAC Iraq nuclear analysts who had followed the Iraq-Niger uranium issue told Committee staff they were not involved in coordinating the Cincinnati speech and did not participate in the speech coordination session on October 5, 2002. The WINPAC Deputy Director for Analysis also told Committee staff he did not recall being involved in the Cincinnati speech, but later clarified his remarks to the Committee in writing saying that he remembered participating in the speech, but did not recall commenting on the section of the speech dealing with the Niger information. Committee staff asked the CIA to identify who might have attended the Cincinnati speech coordination meeting and raised concerns with the ADDI about the sourcing and facts of the Niger reporting. The CIA told Committee staff that the NESA Iraq analyst, ( ) believes he may have been the one who attended the meeting and raised concerns about the Niger reporting with the ADDI.
(U) Based on the analyst's comments, the ADDI drafted a memo for the NSC outlining the facts that the CIA believed needed to be changed, and faxed it to the Deputy National Security Advisor and the speech writers. Referring to the sentence on uranium from Africa the CIA said, "remove the sentence because the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it can be acquired from the source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue. Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory."
( ) Later that day, the NSC staff prepared draft seven of the Cincinnati speech which contained the line, "and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase substantial amounts of uranium oxide from sources in Africa." Draft seven was sent to CIA for coordination.
( ) The ADDI told Committee staff he received the new draft on October 6, 2002 and noticed that the uranium information had "not been addressed," so he alerted the DCI. The DCI called the Deputy National Security Advisor directly to outline the CIA's concerns. On July 16, 2003, the DCI testified before the SSCI that he told the Deputy National Security Advisor that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him the "reporting was weak." The NSC then removed the uranium reference from the draft of the speech.
( ) Although the NSC had already removed the uranium reference from the speech, later on October 6, 2002 the CIA sent a second fax to the White House which said, "more on why we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points (1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British."
(U) On October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered the speech in Cincinnati without the uranium reference. On the same day, the CIA prepared comments on a draft White House paper, A Grave and Gathering Danger. The comments suggested a change to the draft language saying "better to generalize the first bullet as follows: Sought uranium from Africa to feed the enrichment process" The original text from the White House had said "sought uranium oxide, an essential ingredient in the enrichment process, from Africa." The White House did not publish the paper.
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Last edited by host; 07-08-2008 at 10:13 AM..
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