Quote:
|
Originally Posted by aceventura3
I think our initial occupation strategy had a material flaw that was exploited. Although there was initial progress, thing took a turn for the worst pretty fast.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...201760_pf.html
We should have been better prepared for this type of an event. |
ace....thats a convenient excuse for the incompetence and failure to plan for an occupation, including the f
ailure to recognize the historic animosities between Sunni and Shiites and the l
ikelihood that our invasion would serve as both a recruitment tool for al Queda and a
justification for Iran to exert and strengthen its influence over Iraqi internal politics
There was no detailed (phase IV) post-Saddam occupation strategy before we got there...it was "unknown" other than a consensus among DoD and White Officials officials that it would require only a small US force and last a matter of months:
Quote:
The U.S. Central Command's war plan for invading Iraq postulated in August 2002 that the U.S. would have only 5,000 troops left in Iraq as of December 2006, according to the Command's PowerPoint briefing slides....
The PowerPoint slides, prepared by CentCom planners for Gen. Tommy Franks under code name POLO STEP, for briefings during 2002 for President Bush, the NSC, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the JCS, and Franks' commanders, refer to the "Phase IV" post-hostilities period as "UNKNOWN" and "months" in duration, but assume that U.S. forces would be almost completely "re-deployed" out of Iraq within 45 months of the invasion (i.e. December 2006).
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm
|