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Originally Posted by willravel
His definition of malevolence is semantically correct.
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Yes, but it also means that we are all malevolent, since we aren't presently doing everything in our power to prevent evil. In which case, why even have the word?
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I'm saying that it's mentioned so often, that if I were to write out all the verses where it's mentioned, I'd crash TFP. Crack open the thing. Read it.
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I don't want to, and my argument doesn't require me to.
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Why don't we do this, I'll choose 4 verses mentioning evil and use them to derive an axiom:
So, evil is, according to 4 random verses: the opposite of righteousness, stubbornness and rebelliousness, giving people something dangerous instead of what they ask for, and the opposite of peace. Let's apply this to Epicurus's riddle:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is god willing to stop war (the opposite of peace)? Nope.
Is god willing to stop the process of having something dangerous be given to people? Nope.
Is god willing to stop stubbornness and rebelliousness? Nope.
Is god willing to stop that which is unjustified? Nope.
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Why would you expect a god to define evil for humans in the same way that that god defines evil for itself? As far as I can tell, the god you quote seems to think that evil is something people do to one another. No where does it say that god aims to prevent evil altogether. It seems to me that implicit in some christian belief systems is the idea that god doesn't want people to be evil, but then leaves it up to them.
The fact that bad things happen isn't proof that god is malevolent. It's proof that god lets bad things happen. Malevolence also speaks to intent, and the fact that a god lets bad things happen says nothing about intent.
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Unless god's "plan" supersedes logic, it doesn't negate the logic in the riddle.
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Nothing can negate the logic of the riddle. That doesn't mean the riddle says anything interesting. All it says is that defining a god, omnipotence, malevolence, etc. in a specific way leads to a logical contradiction. If you define a those things in a different way then the argument becomes irrelevant. If you add a new axiom concerning the motivations of a hypothetical god then you can change the conclusion entirely.
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How often in this thread have to asked me to essentially look something up for you? And how often have you been frustrated that the conversation turns to semantics?
www.dictionary.com
Go right ahead.
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If you'd use words correctly then we wouldn't have problems.