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As far as the US goes, there are two main policy objectives: the first and most important one is to keep the Islamic Bomb out of Islamist hands. This is followed closely by maintaining Pakistani support in the GWOT, which is indispensable both in Afghanistan (where we are now losing) and as leverage against Iran (dear god, let's hope we don't start down that road).
Democracy in Pakistan no longer seems to me a policy objective, if it ever was. To the extent that it factors into our calculus, it is no longer about underlying realities and is more about maintaining a coherent stance that bridges the explicit goals of 'democracy promotion' and the 'war on terror'.
Ramonet implies that the US has some sort of plan for Pakistan. Unfortunately, he ignores the possibility that our policy is simply confused. It's not entirely our fault - we have strikingly contradictory interests in the country, and to balance them is not easy. It's quite likely that policymakers are looking to Kiani as a saving grace. He will not diverge significantly from Musharraf's policies, but he has a fresh face that is not tarnished by years of semi-competent rule and postponed electoral promises. But I think the American hope was that if Musharraf and the civilians could not learn to play nice, Musharraf could quietly step out of the picture, leaving the civilians in nominal control of a state that would still be run with the consent of a strong army. This is actually a pretty good characterization of what previous periods of civilian rule looked like, including in the 90's when Sharif and Bhutto took turns as PM.
By the by, I think Ramonet is a little unfair to Musharraf, or at least incomplete. For example, Musharraf opened up avenues for privately-held and free media that were completely unknown in Pakistan before him. That he became so frustrated with the opposition that he clamped down on the media and the judiciary is deeply regrettable and a major mistake. The tide has not turned back in his favor since the declaration of emergency.
The deepest problem with Musharraf's rule hasn't been bad intentions - unlike many de facto despots, I think his intentions were actually good, for the most part, and his ideas about eventual democracy sincere. It is that he failed to devolve any power to real Pakistani institutions. When institutions that grew powerful under his watch (the courts) threatened to oppose him, he lashed out and shut them down rather than trust them to shepherd Pakistan safely into the future. I think it is transparent to all by now that the emergency was expressly and solely declared because Musharraf was afraid to death that the courts would rule his election to the Presidency invalid (the technical cause being that, according to the SCoP, a presidential candidate cannot run while in uniform; Musharraf only doffed the uniform after safely elected). Musharraf sees himself as the savior of Pakistan, the only one who can keep the country's various interests (bearded religious fools, venal politicians, self-interested capitalists) from tearing the country apart. But the result of his autocratic rule has been that now that the very top of the establishment is threatened, no one is quite sure what can take its place if it falls. No strong institutions exist, only powerful individuals and powerful and conflicting interests.
The only real institution is the army, and that is not likely to change. That is why I do not worry that Pakistan will crumble. I do worry about what Faustian compromise might be struck with those responsible for Bhutto's death, and I worry still more about what kind of reactions that festering Islamism might eventually provoke from an outside power.
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