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Post #7 on <a href="http://www.tfproject.org/tfp/showthread.php?t=103954">this thread:</a>
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Originally Posted by host
Isn't your thread just a "re-hash", of this one, over a year ago, here, titled:
<a href="http://www.tfproject.org/tfp/showthread.php?p=1695374&highlight=mcclellan+weapons+thought#post1695374">Are the Feb. 18 Harris Iraq Poll Results "The triumph of Opinion Over News"?</a>
How many times do we have to debunk the same, tired propaganda "Op"?
I thought that this thread exposed this BS for what it is:
<a href="http://www.tfproject.org/tfp/showpost.php?p=2051207&postcount=36">Are we going to let cheerleader Robert Joseph, lead us into another unnecessary war?</a>
It's a non-issue. Gold is above $650 oz...for the first time in 26 years....oil is headed back to $75 per bbl, and silver is pushing to $14 oz. (up from $3.75 oz, in 2003) Those are real issues...not the neocon propaganda intended to distract from the real impact of their failed, fiscally and morally corrosive agenda....here is where "they" have us heading:
In 2001, an ounce of gold was $257, by 2006, it was <a href="http://www.kitco.com/">$656.50</a>
Once again, we will attack a country, unilaterally, and then the POTUS reluctantly admit that <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050112-7.html#1">"the weapons that we all believed were there, based on the intelligence, were not there."</a>
...the last time we followed the rantings of these folks, we suffered an estimated $2 trillion obligation, when the final cost is fully measured, including lifetime care for most severely wounded troops. The loss of future accomplishments of our 2400 dead troops, cannot even be estimated.
Here's the "news":
and here is what our "Intelligence Czar", had to say, eight days ago. He should know....shouldn't he? He seems to be calm and unconcerned, and he knows a lot more than any of us do.....
Nope....Negroponte doesn't seem too worried about anything, to me....
I responded to the question that you are really asking:
Is there enough evidence of an Iran, nuclear "threat", to give our POTUS the excuse to launch pre-emptive attacks against Iran. The answer, just as it was in Iraq...is <h6>no!</h6>. |
<h3>The Bush administration have effing done it again....you can pick out the statements that Cheney insisted be included in this NIE, to temper the fact that Iran is not actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons, and has not been during this entire period of threats and bluster!</h3>
Quote:
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20...terstitialskip
Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities
November 2007
This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it
examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire
nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those
nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.
This Estimate does assume that the strategic goals and basic structure of Iran’s senior leadership
and government will remain similar to those that have endured since the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989. We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of
the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This
Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear
issue.
This Estimate incorporates intelligence reporting available as of 31 October 2007.
Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that
varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of
confidence to our assessments, as follows:
• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality
information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.
A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still
carry a risk of being wrong.
• Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible
but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of
confidence.
• Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is
questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid
analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.
<h3>Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1</h3>; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge
(CONTINUED AFTER FOOTNOTE)
1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” <h3>we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work;</h3> we
do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
Program and the May 2005 Assessment
Quote:
2005 IC Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran
currently is determined to develop nuclear
weapons despite its international
obligations and international pressure, but
we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
Iran could produce enough fissile material
for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
were to make more rapid and successful
progress than we have seen to date.
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Quote:
<h3>2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
confidence that the halt to those activities
represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
program.) Assess with moderate confidence
Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weapons.</h3> Judge with high confidence that the halt
was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
confidence Iran probably would be technically
capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
technical and programmatic problems.)
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely.
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Last edited by host; 12-03-2007 at 07:57 PM..
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