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Banned
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Rep. Waxman's letter today to white house counsel:
Quote:
http://www.speaker.gov/blog/?p=517
June 26th, 2007 by Jesse Lee
Chairman Henry Waxman of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, who produced the initial report on Vice President Cheney’s disregard for rules governing the handling of classified information, has written has a letter to White House Counsel Fred Fielding indicating that contrary to the recent claims of White House spokesperson Dana Perino, there is evidence that the White House has repeatedly failed to investigate security violations, take corrective action following breaches, and appropriately protect classified information.
The full letter (pdf):
June 26, 2007
The Honorable Fred Fielding
Counsel to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. Fielding:
Last week, I wrote the Vice President about evidence that he violated Executive Order 12958 by blocking the National Archives from conducting security inspections in his office. In response, White House spokesperson Dana Perino said: “The president and the vice president are complying with all the rules and regulations regarding the handling of classified material and making sure that it is safeguarded and protected.” She asserted that the only part of Executive Order 12958 that was not being followed by the White House and the Vice President’s office was the “small portion” giving oversight responsibilities to the Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives.
I have received information that casts doubt on these assertions. There is evidence that both the White House and the Office of the Vice President have flaunted multiple requirements for protecting classified information, not just the section related to the responsibilities of the Information Security Oversight Office. According to current and former White House security personnel who have contacted my staff, White House practices have been dangerously inadequate with respect to investigating security violations, taking corrective action following breaches, and physically securing classified information.
I have received information that:
• White House security officials have been blocked from inspecting West Wing offices for compliance with procedures for handling classified information. The White House has its own security office that functions independently of the Information Security Oversight Office in the National Archives. According to several security officials who have worked in this White House office, the Bush White House blocked the White House security officers from conducting unannounced inspections of the West Wing. This is a departure from the practices of the prior administration, which allowed these inspections.
• The White House regularly ignored security breaches. The security officers described repeated instances in which security breaches were reported to the White House Security Office by Secret Service or CIA agents, but were never investigated. In one case, the White House Security Office took no action after receiving a report that a White House official left classified materials unattended in a hotel room. In numerous instances, reports that White House officials left classified information on their desks went uninvestigated.
• The President’s top political advisor received a renewal of his security clearance despite presidential directives calling for the denial of security clearances for officials who misrepresent their involvement in security leaks. Under guidelines issued by President Bush, security clearances should not be renewed for individuals who deny their role in the release of classified information, regardless of whether the disclosure was intentional or negligent. Contrary to this guidance, the White House Security Office renewed the security clearance for Karl Rove in late 2006.
• The White House has condoned widespread mismanagement at the White House Security Office. According to the White House security officers, the White House allowed the White House Security Office to be run by managers who ignored basic security procedures and allowed other White House officials to do so also.
The Oversight Committee has been seeking to interview or take the deposition of White House officials with knowledge of these security matters since I wrote to former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about them in April. While I do not question your good faith in seeking to negotiate the terms of these interviews, further delay would not be in the interests of the nation. I am therefore writing to advise you that unless we are able to schedule these interviews promptly, I will bring before the Committee on Thursday, June 28, a motion to subpoena the relevant officials for depositions.
Background
I wrote to Vice President Cheney last week regarding his decision to exempt himself from the President’s executive order that establishes a uniform, government-wide system for safeguarding classified information. In response to my letter, White House spokesperson Dana Perino explained that the Vice President is complying with most sections of the executive order, stating: “There’s no question that he is in compliance, in terms of the meat of the issue, which is … the handling of classified documents. It’s just simply a matter of a small portion of an executive order regarding reporting requirements, of which he is not subject to, and the interpretation of the EO.”
Ms. Perino repeatedly reiterated this point, stating: “The President and the Vice President are complying with all the rules and regulations regarding the handling of classified material and are making sure that it is safeguarded and protected,” “the Vice President’s Office says that they are in compliance, and I can tell you on behalf of the President that we are in compliance, with all matters regarding classified information,” and “I don’t think there’s a question of the handling of the documents. There’s a question of the reporting. In the handling of the documents, we are confident that we are in full compliance.”
These statements do not appear to be accurate. After the Committee’s hearing in March into the disclosure of the identity of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson, several former and current employees of the White House Security Office informed my staff of multiple White House violations of the rules for safeguarding classified information. If their statements are true, the White House has repeatedly disregarded basic requirements for protecting our national security secrets.
Blocking Inspections by White House Security Officials
Last week, White House spokesperson Dana Perino asserted that the Information Security Oversight Office in the National Archives “is not the only agency that can check” whether White House offices are in compliance with the security procedures established by the President’s executive order. On this issue, Ms. Perino is right. Within the Executive Office of the President, there is a White House Security Office that is supposed to ensure that all White House officials comply with the requirements for protecting classified information.
What Ms. Perino did not mention is that former and current employees of the White House Security Office have informed my staff that they have been blocked from conducting inspections in the West Wing of the White House, where most of the President’s most senior advisors work.
Under Executive Order 12958, every entity in the executive branch that handles classified information is supposed to have a security office that administers the classified information program. The White House Security Office fills this role in the White House, overseeing White House compliance with the order. Its responsibilities under the executive order and implementing regulations and guidance include issuing security clearances, conducting security education and training programs, and maintaining an ongoing self-inspection program.
During the previous administration, security specialists working for the White House Security Office were given access to all White House offices, including those in the West Wing. According to the security officers, this access was revoked by the Bush Administration. As a result, only the senior management of the White House Security Office (such as the Director and Deputy Director) retained the authority to enter the West Wing without advance notice to and assistance from West Wing personnel. The security officers objected to the loss of access, but Security Office management denied their requests to restore access to the West Wing.
The denial of access to the West Wing has serious adverse effects, according to the security officers. The officers report that they and other security officers working in the White House Security Office do not have the ability to perform basic security functions, such as conducting unannounced inspections of West Wing offices. The result is that security violations are disclosed only when the incidents are self-reported by the violators or happen to be noticed and reported by Secret Service or other officials with access to the West Wing.
Ignoring Security Violations
The security officers also described a systemic breakdown in procedures for responding to reports of security violations in the West Wing. The officers identified multiple instances of security breaches that were reported to the White House Security Office by concerned officials, such as Secret Service agents, but ignored by the White House Security Office. According to the security officers, the practice within the White House Security Office was not to document or investigate violations occurring in the West Wing or to take corrective action.
This failure to respond to reports of security breaches would appear to be a direct violation of Executive Order 12958. Under the executive order, one of the fundamental responsibilities of security offices is to investigate reported security breaches and “take appropriate and prompt corrective action.”
The security officers provided several examples of White House security breaches that were never investigated by the White House Security Office. One high-profile example cited by the officials was the failure of the White House to initiate its own investigation into the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s covert identity. It took months before a criminal investigation into this breach was initiated by the Justice Department. Yet according to the security officers, no White House investigation into the breach was initiated during this critical period.
In another example described to my staff, a junior White House aide reported that a senior assistant to the President improperly disclosed “Sensitive Compartmented Information” to the junior aide, even though the aide had no security clearance. Although SCI is the highest level of security classification, the White House Security Office took no steps to investigate or take corrective action.
In a third example, a security officer reported that a White House official left classified material behind in a hotel room during a foreign trip with the President. Although the CIA recovered the material and reported the incident, the White House Security Office did not investigate, seek remedial action, or discipline the responsible official.
The security officers also described numerous examples of White House officials failing to physically secure classified information within the White House in accordance with applicable security requirements. The officers related that they had received numerous reports of White House officials leaving classified information out on their desks, rather than in secure locations. Yet according to the officers, the White House Security Office made no effort to investigate these violations or implement any remedial actions.
Renewal of Karl Rove’s Security Clearance
On March 16, 2007, I wrote to White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to ask about the renewal of Karl Rove’s security clearance. You wrote back on April 16, 2007, to say that Mr. Rove did undergo a review for the renewal of his security clearance last year. According to your letter:
My office has confirmed that these processes and security clearance renewals continued uninterrupted for all White House officials, including for Karl Rove. Although Mr. Knodell testified he had no “first-hand knowledge” of whether a reinvestigation of Mr. Rove’s security clearance was initiated, my office has confirmed that it was initiated. Upon conclusion of the reinvestigation process in late 2006, Mr. Rove’s security clearance was continued by the Office of Security and not altered in any respect.
This renewal of Mr. Rove’s security clearance would appear to be another example of a questionable White House security practice. Under guidelines approved by President Bush in 2005, the “deliberate or negligent disclosure” of classified information can be a “disqualifying” condition. Moreover, these guidelines provide that an individual’s response to a potential security breach may be just as important as the breach itself. Under the guidelines, a lack of candor, even about unintentional breaches, can be grounds for terminating access to classified information.
Under these standards, it is hard to see how Mr. Rove would qualify for a renewal of his security clearance. At a minimum, his disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s status as a CIA officer would appear to be a disqualifying “negligent” disclosure under the executive order. In addition, he told White House spokesman Scott McClellan in September 2003 that there was “no truth” to the allegations that he was involved in the disclosure of Ms. Plame’s identity. This misrepresentation would appear to be an independent ground under the President’s guidelines for denying his clearance renewal.
Mismanagement of the White House Security Office
Another area of concern involves the management of the White House Security Office itself. The current and former security officials reported that James Knodell, who until recently was the Director of the White House Security Office, and Ken Greeson, the Deputy Director, routinely violated basic security guidelines. They also said that these officials were poor managers who were loath to assert authority over White House security practices or to take actions that could embarrass White House officials.
One example cited by the officials involved security procedures in the White House sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF). The security officers said that Mr. Knodell and Mr. Greeson habitually brought their Blackberry devices and cell phones into the SCIF in the White House Security Office in violation of the rules. The officials said that Mr. Knodell and Mr. Greeson also allowed others, such as visiting White House personnel, to bring their Blackberries and cell phones into the SCIF. According to the officials, these improper practices were allowed to continue even after security officers repeatedly informed Mr. Knodell and Mr. Greeson that the practices violated security rules and set a poor example.
<b>According to the security officers, the poor management and bad examples set by Mr. Knodell and Mr. Greeson caused extreme frustration and plummeting morale among White House security officers, resulting in the departure of more than half of the White House security officers within the last year.
Request for Interviews
I wrote to former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about many of these issues on April 23, 2007, when I urged Mr. Card to appear voluntarily before the Committee to address inadequate White House security procedures. In your letter to me on April 24, 2007, and in subsequent meetings, you proposed that the Committee first interview lower-ranking White House officials. You expressed the hope that these interviews could “obviate the need to further consider your request for Mr. Card’s appearance.”
I do not doubt your good faith in proposing that the Committee consider interviews with other White House officials before seeking testimony from Mr. Card. But it has now been over two months and the Committee still has not been able to arrange an interview with Alan Swendiman, the Director of the Office of Administration; Mark Frownfelter, a former White House security officer; and Jeff Thompson, the former Director of the White House Security Office. This continued delay is impeding the Committee’s inquiry and is not in the nation’s interest.</b>
I respectfully request that the interviews that the Committee has been seeking be scheduled without further delay. If this cannot be accomplished, I will recommend to the Committee the issuance of subpoenas at our next business meeting, which is currently scheduled for June 28.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me or ask your staff to contact Michael Gordon or David Rapallo of the Committee staff at (202) XXX-XXXX.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
cc: Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
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We can't determine how the following "investigation" turned out.....but Chalabi himself was never interviewed by the FBI, and only a small number of people in the executive branch could be suspected of leaking the code breaking information to Chalabi:
Quote:
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:...lnk&cd=3&gl=us
Chalabi reportedly told Iran that U.S. broke its secret code
By James Risen and David Johnston
NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE
June 2, 2004
.........U.S. officials said that about six weeks ago, Chalabi told the Baghdad station chief of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security that the United States was reading the communications traffic of the Iranian spy service, one of the most sophisticated in the Middle East.
According to U.S. officials, the Iranian official in Baghdad, possibly not believing Chalabi's account, sent a cable to Tehran detailing his conversation with Chalabi, using the broken code.
That encrypted cable, intercepted and read by the United States, tipped off U.S. officials to the fact that Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the U.S. officials said.
The U.S. sources said that, in the cable to Tehran, the Iranian official recounted how Chalabi had said that one of "them" – a reference to an American – had revealed the code-breaking operation, the officials said. The Iranian reported that Chalabi said the American had been drunk.
The Iranians sent what U.S. intelligence regarded as a test message, which mentioned a cache of weapons inside Iraq, believing that if the code had been broken, U.S. military forces would be quickly dispatched to the specified site. But there was no such action.
The account of Chalabi's actions has been confirmed by several senior U.S. officials, who said the leak contributed to the White House decision to break with him.
The FBI has opened an espionage investigation seeking to determine exactly what information Chalabi turned over to the Iranians as well as who told Chalabi that the Iranian code had been broken, government officials said.
The inquiry, still in an early phase, is focused on a very small number of people who were close to Chalabi and also had access to the highly restricted information about the Iran code.
In a television interview May 23, Chalabi – a member of the Iraq Governing Council – attacked the CIA and the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, saying the agency was behind what Chalabi asserted was an effort to smear him.
One of those who has defended Chalabi is Richard N. Perle, the former chairman of the Defense Policy Board.
"The CIA has disliked him passionately for a long time, and has mounted a campaign against him, with some considerable success," Perle said yesterday. "I've seen no evidence of improper behavior on his part. No evidence whatsoever."
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....<b>and, 17 months after the preceding article, there was the following reporting....and nothing, since....</b>
Quote:
http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache...lnk&cd=3&gl=us
Top Secret: Status Of Chalabi Inquiry
November 7, 2005 By SCOT J. PALTROW, Wall Street Journal
As Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi arrives this week in Washington for talks, there is little sign of progress in a federal investigation of allegations that he once leaked U.S. intelligence secrets to Iran.
More than 17 months after then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice publicly promised a full criminal inquiry, the Federal Bureau of Investigation hasn't interviewed Mr. Chalabi himself or many current and former U.S. government officials thought likely to have information related to the matter, according to lawyers for several of these individuals and others close to the case.
The investigation of Mr. Chalabi, who had been a confidant of senior Defense Department officials before the war in Iraq, remains in the hands of the FBI, with little active interest from local federal prosecutors or the Justice Department, these people said. There also has been no grand-jury involvement in the case.
The investigation centers on allegations that one or more U.S. officials in early 2004 leaked intelligence to Mr. Chalabi, including the fact that the U.S. had broken a crucial Iranian code, and that Mr. Chalabi in turn had passed the information to the Baghdad station chief of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The assertions about Mr. Chalabi's involvement came after U.S. intelligence agencies intercepted a cable from the station chief back home to Iran, detailing what the chief claimed was a conversation with Mr. Chalabi about the broken code.
Former intelligence officials said such a leak could have caused serious damage to U.S. national security. The broken code had enabled U.S. intelligence agencies to monitor covert cable traffic among Iranian operatives around the world. The encrypted cable traffic was a main source of information on Iranian operations inside Iraq. The leak also threatened U.S. efforts to monitor any Iranian steps to develop nuclear weapons. And there was concern that the disclosure could prompt other countries to upgrade their encryption, making it more difficult for the U.S. to spy on them.
Mr. Chalabi has strongly denied the allegations. He once was a close Bush administration ally and a key proponent of the Iraqi invasion, though he has more recently appeared to fall from American favor. Before the war, during his long period as a prominent Iraqi exile, he also cultivated close ties to the government in Iran, which was his ally in opposing former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Just this weekend, Mr. Chalabi made a trip to Tehran to visit Iranian government leaders.
The handling of the Chalabi investigation so far stands in contrast to the aggressive inquiry conducted by special counsel Patrick Fitzgerald into the leaking of intelligence agent Valerie Plame's name, which led to the indictment of I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney's former chief of staff.
Questions about the progress of the Chalabi investigation also follow the FBI's disclosure last week that it had closed an investigation into forged documents purporting to show Iraq had sought uranium ore from Niger. The Niger claim set off an intense intelligence debate, which was at the center of the leaking of the intelligence agent's identity.
Whitley Bruner, a former longtime undercover Central Intelligence Agency official in the Middle East who has followed Mr. Chalabi's career closely since 1991, said that, in contrast to Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation, the zChalabi leak inquiry "just sort of disappeared."
FBI spokesman John Miller strongly denied that the Chalabi investigation has languished. "This is currently an open investigation and an active investigation," he said, adding that "numerous current and former government employees have been interviewed."
Mr. Miller said that, because the investigation is an active one, he couldn't discuss specific individuals nor comment on how the inquiry is being conducted. A Justice Deptartment spokesman declined to comment.
Mr. Chalabi's lawyer, Boston attorney John J.E. Markham II, said neither the FBI nor Justice Department ever responded to an offer to have Mr. Chalabi come to Washington to answer law-enforcement questions and aid in the investigation. Mr. Markham made available a copy of a letter he said he had sent on June 2, 2004, to then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller. It categorically denied that Mr. Chalabi had leaked any U.S. intelligence. And it stated "Dr. Chalabi is willing and ready to come to Washington, D.C. to be interviewed fully by law-enforcement agents on this subject and to answer all questions on this subject fully and without reservation."
Mr. Markham, a former federal prosecutor, said that, ordinarily in a leak investigation, "the first thing you would do would be to get the tippee," the person to whom the information was leaked, "in there and say 'Who talked to you?' " But, he said, "That never happened."
The FBI's Mr. Miller said he wouldn't comment on Mr. Chalabi but said the FBI , in general, interviews witnesses when an investigation indicates it is best to do so, not necessarily at the beginning of an inquiry. He added, "The fact that this person or that person has or hasn't been interviewed yet is just not material to whether there's an active investigation."
One likely focus of FBI inquiries would be a small group of people in the Pentagon and White House who had frequent contact with Mr. Chalabi and also probably knew the closely guarded secret of the broken code. Interviews indicate that many of these individuals haven't been questioned by the FBI.
Among the officials with whom Mr. Chalabi at one time had close ties, for instance, was Douglas J. Feith, who until earlier this year was an undersecretary of defense and headed the Pentagon's powerful office of policy and planning. In an interview, Mr. Feith said he has never been questioned by the FBI or federal prosecutors in connection with the investigation and that if others had been, he was unaware of it.
Lawrence Di Rita, spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, said in an emailed response to questions that he had no knowledge of the FBI or federal prosecutors having questioned current or former Defense Department officials. "I don't know anything about a [Department of Justice] investigation in this matter," Mr. Di Rita said.
Mr. Chalabi had been considered a trusted ally by influential figures within the administration, but last spring those ties appeared to have ruptured. On May 20 of last year, Iraqi police backed by U.S. troops raided Mr. Chalabi's headquarters, searching for evidence of corruption and leaked American intelligence.
Since then, however, the Bush administration has become more open to dealing with Mr. Chalabi again, spurred on by his rise in the current Iraqi government, the possibility that he might become prime minister and his current control over, among other things, Iraqi oil production.
Mr. Chalabi's visit to Washington this week is his first since the leak allegations. He is scheduled to meet with Treasury Secretary John Snow and with Ms. Rice, now secretary of state. He also is to give a speech to the conservative American Enterprise Institute.
Senate Democrats have been pressing for an investigation into the role Mr. Chalabi played in drumming up support for a war to depose Mr. Hussein. They also are critical of Mr. Chalabi because of alleged corruption; in 1992, he was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court of having embezzled $288 million from a bank at which he was managing director. He has strongly denied the corruption allegations.
Spokesmen for both Mr. Snow and Ms. Rice said they were meeting with Mr. Chalabi, despite past events, because he is a powerful government figure in Iraq. State Department Iraq adviser James Jeffery said Mr. Chalabi "is deputy prime minister of a critically important country at a critically important time, he was democratically elected, and it's on that basis that we see him."
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....I know.....I know.....it's "both parties".....that are "the problem"...time to "clean house".....indpendent candidates.....libertarian candidates....we need smaller government....that's "the problem"....IMO, that's bullshit. We've got 45 million with no health insurance, half the population owning just 2-1/2 percent of all US assets, an estimate of 12 million undocumented aliens, an aging population that will include 47 million turing age 62 by 2027....over the next 20 years......and "we voted"....twice since 2000....to trade the leadership that reduced annual treasury debt increase to just 18 billion in 2000....to a leadership that added an addtional $3500 billion, of total treasury debt....by Jan., 2009 in just the eight years that it ran the executive branch.....that's an average of $412 billion in additional debt per year, and we haven't even listed the ways that the post 2000 leadership have compromised the integrity of the government, national security, law enforcement, judicial impartiality, foreign relations....etc....etc....
Yet, the solution to all of the above, is to "blame both parties", and advocate for a libertarian, small government political movement. Why not get serious and accept that Waxman and Leahy and Conyers, working to restore checks and balances, and a democratic landslide in Nov., 2008 is the best we're gonna get.... Why not accept and understand that this is the best we will achieve, and maybe, not even that. Waxman is relentlessly and methodically providing you with what has gone wrong.....I don't see that the party that was removed after the 2000 election, with it's $18 billion annual debt increase run rate, and no ability to pass legislation or even to hold investigative hearings.....for the house, it's been since 1994, and for the senate, since 1998, with a brief hiatus in late 2001 and part of 2002, can reliably be lumped into a "it's both parties" dismissal.
I can't see that an advocacy for an Ayn Rand styled, libertarian utopia, in the midst of such an imbalance of wealth and power distribution, is anything but unrealistic, escapism. I do see sudden progress in confronting and investigating the perpetrators of what has so badly damaged our government and our fiscal state. The committee chairman in congress who are pursuing the malfeasance are our best and only practicle hope, since we have no stomach for grassroots, civil disobedience. Let's accept that we have but one alternative, and it is at work as we speak.
It is the eleventh hour, and it is very, very dark.....
Last edited by host; 06-26-2007 at 03:28 PM..
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