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Originally Posted by dc_dux
ace...I just dont understand how anyone can accept less than the full truth, including the dissenting intelligence, from this or any president when he is asking to take the country to war.
And I dont understand why this lack of candor with the American should not be investigated futher (since the Repub Congress did virtually nothing), with the hope of preventing it from happening again.
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I can across an interesting article ( from a diplomacy school, given my views of text book diplomats, go figure). He talks about the flaws in dealing with intelligence, it seems that the standard you are setting with Bush, if applied to historical figures/settings and their faulty use of intelligence it would mean no one would get the benefit of the doubt for an error an judgement ( not that I am saying the Iraq invasion was an error). I could possibly conceed an error in judgement, but not a lie given what I know. And like I have posted many times, leaders need people who can stand up and ask questions when they need to be asked and that we should never blindly accept a "sales pitch" for war without doing our homework and being compfortable with the "whys". I did my homework and I was comfortable with the "whys" and I did not rely on speeches at the UN, to Congress, or interviews on NBC. Hopefully there will not be a next time, but if there is... Here is a quote and link.
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Follies and errors have their genesis in both individual and organizational failures or inadequacies. Individual deficiencies lay the groundwork for organizational problems and thus need to be dealt with first. Rational theories of policy/decision making emphasize complete and extensive fact-gathering and perception. In fact, we know this is not the case. Individuals perceive events according to their own makeup and biases.
U.S. Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii were convinced that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor. In the face of mounting evidence that something was afoot, they interpreted each new piece of evidence according to their own preconceptions: The Japanese carriers could not be located because of radio silence--they were headed for Malaysia. Small two-man submarines surfaced off Oahu very early Sunday December 7--simply reconnaissance.
An entire group of men were so certain that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor that they even decided not to alter the fleet and naval base training exercises in any way to increase readiness and reconnaissance, disregarding entirely the possibility that they could be wrong. Similarly, Allied commanders in Europe in December, 1944 were so certain that the Germans would adopt a defensive deployment that they did not even look for signals that Hitler might not take a fully rational approach to the problem of defending Germany, and hence missed the German buildup. In the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Shah deluded himself up to and beyond the last moment that a serious challenge to him and his regime was growing.
Individuals are frequently in error, but more often than not they realize their mistakes when matters begin to go wrong and events turn out differently than anticipated. But there are cases, however, more numerous than one would like to think, where persistence in error leads to folly because self-correcting mechanisms do not come into play for various reasons. An individual's ego is simply too tied up in a fixed position to permit change. His or her arrogance simply will not admit a wrong view.
Hard-line British statesmen and politicians in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period of the American Revolution --extending over 20 years --fall neatly into this category. From the time of the Stamp Acts forward, British prime ministers and lord chancellors were outraged at the colonies' reaction to governance from London without representation.
As matters grew worse and led to war, the willful blindness of Frederick, Lord North and Lord George Germain brought on the unity of the American colonies and the military defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown which brought down the British Government. Statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic, most notably Edmund Burke in England and Benjamin Franklin in America as well as most historians in the years since, believed that absent the stubborn, willful blindness of British statesmen, America would have maintained some sort of a political relationship with Great Britain.
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http://www.uky.edu/~stempel/error.htm
There was no doubt Bush's ego was tied up into aggressive action. Everyone knew it. Given his singular focus that makes the lack of conviction by those now saying it is Bush's war even more shameful. I think by saying he lied, it is just an excuse since the war turned south.
Here is another quote, I am sure many will enjoy.
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In this brief observation, the astute Will Rogers captures the essence of today's problem. In the context of governments and nations, the history of intelligence-gathering goes hand-in-glove throughout recorded history. People don't like surprises and both individuals and organizations believe the more information they have, the better off they will be. A corollary is that, given the laws of human nature, people will try to hide information when they believe it is to their advantage. Hence the creation of intelligence organizations to obtain such information, as well as counterintelligence units to protect it from others.
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This is not brain surgery and I know I have been called a cynic, but I never accept someone else's research or intelligence on blind faith. So, the folks that have been "lied" to seem to be in a catch 22 in my view. You either believed the intelligence and now are making an excuse or you did not do your homework up front. I am not sure what is worse, but Bush did what every decision maker does.
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Originally Posted by The_Jazz
I believe that Colin Powell was similarly steered.
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Powell was directly reviewing the intelligence. Tenet was right there by his side. Powell had control of his words. Tenet could have said something to Powell, but did not.
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Ace, you have been put in the unfortunate position of trying to defend something that I think that you don't agree with completely. As such, you've become the sounding board upon which all questions on this topic are tested. It seems that you still support the ideals behind the initial invasion, you are starting to doubt some things with the rest of us. If I'm wrong, I apologize, but it's just an observation from the last few months of these conversations and not meant to be taken negatively at all. With it in mind, I basically want to acknowledge your service as the counter-point to all the anti-invasion arguments.
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I think the intelligence was our best shot at what we thought. There was intelligence pointing to going to war, and Bush made his case on that information as well as information that was common knowledge. I think our error has been in our occupation.