loquitur

Smooth, I graduated law school in '84.

Bork was ....... well, a curmudgeonly version of Scalia, without the libertarian streak. Modern original meaning theorists tend to go up a single level of abstraction, so to speak: so (for example) speech/press/assembly/petition are all expressive rights, and expression is protected. Whereas Bork once floated the idea that the first amendment protects ONLY political speech.

To my mind, taking the const seriously means that rights come from two places: (1) direct restrictions on govt'l ability to act (whether express or implied) - this is what we typically think of as rights; and (2) structural constraints on the ability of govt to act (which in turn come in two types, separation fo powers and federalism). Each type is essential to protecting our liberties. Never underestimate how important the second type is: it's what Jefferson thought was the primary protection for the citizenry against tyranny.

I would say textualist is a subset of interpretivist. An interpretivist will try to ascertain the meaning of the words by looking to logical sources. A textualist, in theory, looks at the words and tries to figure out what they mean. The textualist will use fewer sources of guidance, I would guess. Think back to how Roberts explained his approach in his Judiciary Committee hearings - that's interpretivism. Ditto for Alito. It's still bound to the text, but it's not limited to the text. Thomas, on the other hand, is a more pure textualist than Scalia: he looks to original meaning, period.

I haven't followed this stuff all that closely since law school, though I do still read casually about it, enough to keep a hand in and follow the arguments. Back in law school Brennan was still on the court doing his thing - very different kind of court.