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First and foremost I don't disagree with the reality of what you are saying, most of it is rather obvious. I personally think assertations that by including the Sunni factions giving them stakes in the government/economy/oil sharing are disingenious and offbase. I'm not striving for alienation of them, obviously if we are to make a cohesive functioning stable Iraq, they need to feel included; I think fundamentally that is unrealistic though, just by the ethnic identity and history of Iraq, at the same time that is neither here nor there.
And dealing with the Shia militias, or them all together, I think we are screwed as it stands now, it was a big fumble which I blame on a few points namely 1) fighting a war in the public eye 2) the politicking this war has created 3) as a result of the first two points made how we have handled the situation and how it relates to our operation/rules of engagement. Al-Sadr's head should've been on a pole years ago, why he is still alive right now is beyond me. Fallujah is another prime example where unrest took days/weeks to respond too. All that represents to me is too little too, and that correlates to the current situation right now, but as it stands I don't see any other feasbile option as it pertains to regaining control.
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To win a war you must serve no master but your ambition.
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