This is no longer simply a mliitary problem. A larger US military presence without concurrent measurable political and diplomatic carrots and sticks is, IMO, equally unacceptable.
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You can't bring Iraqi factions to the table while there is so much infighting; the only way you will get them to talk is to beat them into submission and disrupt any operational capacity they have to operate with. Why the hell would they talk when they have other options?
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Do you think we can beat the Sunni insurgency into submission when as many commanders have said in the past, "for every insurgent we kill, two brothers or cousins join the anti-american cause" - suicide bombers require little operational capacity. The way to get them to talk is to give them a sense of ownership in the government, the economy, the oil revenue and the future of the country that they once dominated but now find themselves in the minority.
On the other side, can we rely on the Iraqi defense forces to ever step up and take the lead when they are largely infiltrated by the 20+ militiias more loyal to various Shia sectarian leaders than the central government? If we take on the mlitias, we create more anti-american sentiment among the larger Shia populace - more brothers and cousins.
Military might works on a battle field. Will it ever succeed in an urban environment where the men, women and children, with all of their deep sectarian divisions and long-standing hatreds for one another, have one thing in common - a growing anti-american sentiment?
Those in command only two months ago expressed their concerns as well. Gen Abizaid in testimony at a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing late last year, when the surge plan was being considered:
Ive met with every divisional commander General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey we all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future;
Were they speaking to protect their own legacy or offering their honest assessments, based on their experiences, of what they believe is the best interest of the troops, the mission and the country?