What is the problem with "Philosophical" Zombies? I'm am a Zombie -- I have no internal consciousness. It doesn't seem to cause any issue with my interaction with other humans, and they can't tell the difference.
Now, I'm pretty sure that if you did a sufficienly advanced brain-scan, you would see simulations of conversation, images, and other symbol-like manipulation going on inside my head. But that is no more proof I'm not a Zombie than my ability to speak or type in a conversation is.
I am an intelligent Zombie. I can solve problems, run simulations, predict actions. The simulations I can run include the actions and personalities of other intelligences -- this aids in interaction with other intelligences. You can almost certainly detect the rough action of simulation via fMRIs, and eventually more of the pattern once technology can figure out detailed neuron firing patterns.
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Personally, I don't like killing cute animals. Cuteness in animals generates empathic bonds. I don't mind a cute animal being killed.
I especially don't like killing animals that humans have formed bonds with -- that causes emotional hurt. I do mind cute animals that intelligences are bonded with being hurt. For many of the same reasons, I don't like killing, or the killing of, babies (plus most babies took a pretty damn huge amount of work by an intelligent actor -- the mother -- so killing a baby is also very much like destroying a work of art).
I value intelligence -- so killing developed humans is also a thing I avoid. Even isolated intelligences (which are quite rare).
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To me, cyborgs are no different than young children whose brain tissue develops as it gets older, or birds whose singing neurons are replaced every year. It is simply a matter of a new substrait on top of which an intelligence runs.
It isn't the substrait I'm all that interested in -- other than as it is used to form emotional bonds with (people get attached to their bodies, and to the bodies of others), and how it is useful to the intelligence which uses it.
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Now, onto the actual paper you put forward. It has at least one error.
Your paper seems to be internally inconsistent.
Quote:
Dennett thinks that the concept of zombies is ridiculous, because in order to be behaviorally identical to us, they must have the exact same chance of developing mentalistic vocabulary, making their thought processes identical to us, giving them interests.
We believe that Dennett is correct, because we follow his reasoning that the ability to emulate a person is only able to be achieved through a person directly. To act the way we do, you would need the same thought processes, which are derived from our interests.
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Above, you assert that Zombies are ridiculous.
Quote:
Discuss this issue in relation to the UN ban under consideration.
The UN ban on the creation of cyborgs should NOT be lifted, because there exists the possibility that a zombie may be created. If a zombie is created, a person is destroyed - murder, the violation of a person's innate right to life. We cannot tell whether someone has become a zombie; until this changes, the ban on cyborgs should not be lifted. If later it becomes possible to detect zombiehood, the ban should be lifted only if the process of cyberization does not create a zombie and thus preserves the person and protects their moral rights.
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And above you assert that the creation of humans with a modified cyborg substrait should be banned.
One could argue that you are not inconsitent, but are rather being cautious -- that your lack of belief in the possibility Zombies is not absolute, and the chance that they exist is sufficient to argue that one should guard against them.
But without making this explicit, the paper simply looks like it disagrees with itself.