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stepping outside of the model for being-in-the-world staged by propositions is easier than you make it sound, zyr: think about your everyday life, and the fact that you hear sound, for example: sound is an eminently temporal phenomenon--propositions cannot stage time except as a series of states---but time is simply marked as a series of states (clocktime) but is and is not a series of states (time is not an object---if you think about it, the idea that you can examine time is a function of how you can use the word time in a propositon)
propositions model the world.
if you think about perception as a process that unfolds time/unfolds within time, you are bumped onto a different logical register that lets you see pretty directly (if my experience is any guide) that propositions describe aspects of existing states of affairs--but these descriptions are not and cnanot be exhaustive.
another way of thinking about this: propositions stage epistemological relations: questions about propositions stage ontological problems.
moving out from under the veil of propositions is not particular difficult: what IS difficult is trying to work on how to speak or write from that viewpoint. this is the place where merleau-ponty's last work found itself trapped and spinning (visible and invisible and teh working notes in particular)
sorry for the namedropping in place of arguments---i am in between things---i'll try to post more/other stuff about this later---i am really interested in this kind of problem.
meanwhile, other views please.
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a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear
it make you sick.
-kamau brathwaite
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