joshbaumgartner

As for shelf life, it is an excellent question. Chemical weapons have relatively limited shelf life, although specifics depend on the type in question. A chemical weapons stockpile can't exist on its own, at lest not for long. It requires an infrastructure of manufacture, storage, transportation, delivery, and command to maintain it for more than a couple of years at most. Since the majority of hard evidence we have of chemical weapons existing in Iraq comes from prior to Desert Storm, for Iraq to retain this capability would have required such an infrastructure.

We can easily visualize loading drums of VX in solution or whatever onto transports and flying them out to Syria. What isn't so readily acceptable is the idea that the entire infrastructure could be transported out, or the parts that couldn't be transported destroyed in such a short period of time, and that this task could be done so secretly and so completely that we wouldn't have any real evidence to its existance remain. We know Saddam had chemicals at some point, true, but we haven't found anything yet that indicates that he had an active chemical warfare capability during the lead-up to the invasion.

It takes the US a decade to close a chemical warfare facility and finally get the thing to the point where it isn't soaked with remnants of its original role. But yet somehow Saddam can in a matter of months bury his entire chemical program or ship it abroad, all without us able to keep tabs on it?

I wouldn't be surprised to find out that Saddam made some attempt to send chemical elements out of the country. What I find implausible is the idea that a chemical weapons program of such magnitude and capability as to warrant the invasion of a country could so quickly, completely, and secretly be cleansed just prior to said invasion.

As for Syria's use, I would think it unlikely that they would have much use at all for the agents. If some sensitive manufacturing tools were transferred, they'd probably find a home in Syria's program, but the agents themselves would be of little value.

Unlike a nuclear program, where fissile material is the currency that determines your capacity, chemical programs rely on infrastructure. The agenst themselves degrade rapidly, and are expensive and risky to store in large amounts. Instead, you need an infrastructure that can maintain a limited ready stockpile for quick use, with the manufacturing backup to both continually replenish your stockpile as well as be able to keep a supply given a usage situation. You can make a quantity and store it somewhere but you are likely to find it useless by the time you need it. If Saddam sent agents to Syria, they were very likely already inert if not nearly so, unless he had a significant infrastructure in Iraq.

What about terrorists? If Syria felt that Saddam's chemicals had use in being supplied to terrorists, versus simply supplying chemicals from other sources, then its probably a good thing, as pointed out above, these agents are very likely of little potency compared to fresh weapons that are part of an active chemical infrastructure. Frankly I don't see why Iraqi-made chemicals would be any more dangerous in Syrian or Iranian hands than say, Iranian-made chemicals.