Aristotle's position is essentially there's an ought built into the is. If there's something 'ought-ish' built into 'is-ish-ness', then the inference is a valid inference. You are, of course, entitled to deny the first premise, that the ontological is somehow ethical, but that's not the same thing as saying that it's an invalid inference. I didn't say anything more, because I didn't want to hijack the thread, and I suggest we not go any further down this road.
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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