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Born Against
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Hot off the presses today, here's an interesting article right on target on the thread topic, in the London Financial Times by Catherine Daniel.
She doesn't focus as much as Blumenthal on the Nixon administration, but instead points to Cheney's experience in the Ford, Reagan, Bush I administrations, particularly his role as the minority chair of the Iran-contra committee. For Cheney, Iran-contra was simply a matter of the executive exercising its legitimate power against the illegitimate runaway power of Congress.
And his recent intransigence on the torture issue is very revealing in demonstrating his belief that the power of the president's office transcends international law and ethics.
Quote:
(no link available)
The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)
December 14, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1
SECTION: THE AMERICAS; Pg. 12
LENGTH: 1275 words
HEADLINE: Cheney leads fight for presidential power. Caroline Daniel argues that the vice-president's efforts to prevent Congress from outlawing torture should be seen as a battle in the war over executive muscle
BYLINE: By CAROLINE DANIEL
Dick Cheney used to be portrayed in cartoons as the ventriloquist of the administration, his hand inserted into a George W. Bush puppet. Now the cartoons of the vice-president have a darker tone, with his hands controlling various instruments of torture.
The image reflects his dominant role in efforts to prevent Congress from outlawing the use of any interrogation methods deemed to be cruel, inhumane or degrading. After he lobbied senators to dismiss the amendment a Washington Post editorial dubbed him: "Vice-President for Torture".
Mr Cheney's advocacy, however, is best understood not as a defence of torture but as a key battle in the war over presidential power. His views of executive power were forged during the US retreat from Vietnam at a time of congressional assertiveness on foreign policy. After September 11 2001 he saw a chance to implement ideas about expansive executive power that he had long embraced and swing the pendulum back towards the president.
In an ABC interview in January 2002, Mr Cheney set out his philosophy: "In 34 years, I have repeatedly seen an erosion of the powers and the ability of the president of the United States to do his job. One of the things that I feel an obligation on - and I know the president does too - is to pass on our offices in better shape than we found them."
His interest in the issue can be traced to his formative political years as chief of staff to President Gerald Ford from 1975. His promotion came amid growing public unease over Vietnam. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, forcing the president explicitly to consult and report back to them when committing troops overseas. In 1974 the Church committee flexed its authority over intelligence activities, sparked by revulsion against CIA dirty tricks in the 1960s and 1970s.
"He saw the power of the presidency emasculated under his watch, particularly with the inability to stay the course in Vietnam," says Vin Weber, a Republican strategist who has known him for 25 years. "He's been determined to reverse this ever since from the energy taskforce to national security. I believe the current issue is less about the value of torture than about an imperative to preserve and strengthen the presidency."
Even as a congressman, Mr Cheney's loyalties lay with the White House. According to Congressional Quarterly, in 1981, 83 per cent of his votes backed Ronald Reagan, and in 1982, it was 87 per cent, making him the second strongest supporter in the House. His instincts were reinforced by Iran-Contra. The scandal was caused in part by Reagan's efforts to get around a congressional prohibition on giving aid to the Nicaraguan Contras by using the proceeds of secret arms sales to Iran. Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank, says Mr Cheney's role as minority chair of the Iran-Contra committee crystallised his views. "The minority report is a sophisticated analysis of the separation of powers and Dick Cheney's staff wrote that section."
One conclusion of the minority report, published in 1987, was that Iran-Contra could be traced to a boundless view of congressional power in the 1970s, and the "state of political guerilla warfare over foreign policy between the legislative and executive branches."
Elected in the wake of Iran-Contra, George H.W. Bush led a deliberate, co-ordinated effort to redraw the lines between the different branches of government. Dick Cheney, as his defence secretary, griped about reporting requirements to Congress, and in 1989 set out his own ideas in a paper to the AEI, called "Congressional Over-reaching in Foreign Policy". He denounced presidential paralysis by congressional indecision. "When Congress steps beyond its capacities, it takes traits that can be helpful to collective deliberation and turns them into a harmful blend of vacillation, credit claiming, blame avoidance and indecision," he warned. "The presidency in contrast, was designed as a one-person office to insure it would be ready for action. Its major characteristics, to use the language of Federalist No.70, were to be 'decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch'."
George W. Bush continued the strategy of his father. Mr Cheney has led the charge. The first sign was in 2001 when he refused to give the names of advisers to his energy taskforce to Congress. His aim was to establish a right to confidential consultations, using legal trench warfare to set precedents that will outlast his term in office.
It is in the "war on terror" that the administration has been most vigorous and successful in reclaiming authority in foreign policy. It marked an astute recognition that congressional power tends to be greatest at times of peace and presidential power at times of war.
A key player has been David Addington, who got to know Mr Cheney in the 1980s when he worked as a lawyer for the CIA and the congressional intelligence committee. The two men shared the same views of Iran-Contra. He became Pentagon general counsel under Mr Cheney and later his legal counsel. Mr Addington helped draft a controversial August 2002 Justice Department memo that redefined torture so narrowly that it seemed to permit the abuse of detainees and also noted that the president could legally order torture in his role as commander in chief.
In spite of the damage to the US international image over torture claims, Mr Cheney has shown no signs of backing down. The priority he places on these legal issues rather than quick political payoffs was shown when he picked Mr Addington as his new chief of staff when the incumbent was indicted for his role in the CIA leak case.
This defiant public image on issues such as torture and Iraq has come at a price. His approval ratings slumped to 19 per cent in a CBS News poll. "Cheney has become an obvious target, and he wears the bulls-eye very well to anti-war critics and those concerned with torture," says Paul Light, a professor at New York University. "He is a vice-president in reverse. In the past vice-presidents, who become players become more powerful over time. Dick Cheney started not as a junkyard dog but as a father-figure, a mentor."
Part of his insouciance comes from the fact that he is unusually free to speak his mind. He has no plans to stand for president, so feels no need to court popular or congressional approval. He sees himself as accountable to the president. "He has got into a bubble," says Professor James Thurber of American University. "It is all about building coalitions and he doesn't seem to be thinking as he was in the first six months of the first term about congressional liaison."
There are few signs that Mr Bush is distancing himself from his closest and most powerful counsellors. Yet there are dangers that his effort to expand executive power could be jeopardised by over-reaching and a failure to pay attention to the politics. The amendment over torture from Senator John McCain - backed by 90 senators to 9 against - is clearly one sign of this.
As history has shown, congressional attacks on presidential power have typically followed executive branch scandal. Moreover, there is a danger that by embracing torture it shores up the legal powers of the presidency but erodes an equally critical aspect: its moral authority.
So far Mr Cheney has resisted making concessions over the torture issue. Yet he could note a prescient passage from the Iran-Contra minority report. "Presidents are elected to lead and to persuade. But presidents must also have congressional support for the tools to make foreign policy effective. No president can ignore Congress and be successful over the long term."
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