Banned
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Quote:
Originally Posted by politicophile
Elphaba, can you please go here and tell me how those same Senators voted on the same bill in the full Senate? Also, I can't find an actual record of the vote within the committee.
All I've found is that the current committee, which obviously has slightly different membership than the one back then, approved the bill by a vote of 10-4, with three Democrats voting in favor of it.
If it turns out that the Intelligence Committee members voted against the use of force, I would be inclined to change my mind about my original post.
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I doubt that any information that I am able to post will change your "mind". I've spent more than a year here trying to raise awareness that members here that are far less right leaning than you show yourself to be.....
do not, in fact, "know" what they are adament about assuming that they "know". You have been programmed, as another poster or two to this thread has already pointed out, to you.
But.....here goes:
(In October, 2002, democrats comprised the senate majortity and chaired senate committees, owing to Sen. Jefford's defection from republican party ranks, to an independent party status. The chairman of the senate intelligence committee, Bob Graham of Florida, voted "nay" on resolution H.J. Res. 114, on October 11, 2002, in the 77 to 23, full senate vote, along with four other democrats on that committee........)
Quote:
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-...625.pdf#page=2
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
BOB GRAHAM, Florida, Chairman <b>NAY></b> On the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 114 ) October 11, 2002
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Vice Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan <b>NAY></b> On the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 114 ) October 11, 2002
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
RON WYDEN, Oregon <b>NAY></b> On the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 114 ) October 11, 2002
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois <b>NAY></b> On the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 114 ) October 11, 2002
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland <b>NAY></b> On the Joint Resolution (H.J.Res. 114 ) October 11, 2002
JON KYL, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio
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Quote:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/s020304b.html
Congressional Record: February 3, 2004 (Senate)
Page S389-S391
U.S. INTELLIGENCE
Mr. DURBIN (speaking)
.......I come to the floor and want to be careful of the words I say. I do
not want to disclose anything I have been told in the Senate
Intelligence Committee. That is certainly the policy which should be
followed by every member of that committee. We are given a rare
opportunity to see the intelligence community and its work from inside.
Because we are given that opportunity, we are warned not to share that
information. So the points I am about to make relate exclusively to
that information which has been made public and declassified. It raises
an important issue.........
......So I asked Dr. Kay--and others have as well--after you had completed
your investigation, after you had looked at those sites, what did you
find? And the answer was: Nothing, nothing whatever.
We accumulated this information; we said, through our intelligence
sources, we have 550 known locations; and we were wrong in every
instance.
How can that be? How can the intelligence community have missed it?
The second element, the unmanned aerial vehicles, flying over
locations, mapping different things, viewing different locations,
prepared, if necessary, to fire on hostile situations--these unmanned
aerial vehicles were identified by the intelligence community and the
administration as a threat not only to the Middle East but to the
United States of America. We were told these unmanned aerial vehicles
would be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons against the
United States of America.
I can state now in published reports we know that the UAVs were not
designed for this purpose. We missed it completely. Sadly, I can say
there is additional information which has not been disclosed which also
casts doubt on that conclusion.
<b>Why is it important? Because Members of the Senate were called to the
White House, asked to vote for the use-of-force resolution, and told
that the reason for the necessity of an invasion was the unmanned
aerial vehicles and their threat to the United States of America. They
were given partial information--in fact, misleading information--about
the danger associated with the unmanned aerial vehicles.</b>
All of this raises serious questions, questions Senator Daschle and
others have addressed. This is what it comes down to: This should not
be a matter of either the Democrats in the Senate or the Republicans in
the Senate protecting their President. I will say this: If an open,
honest, independent investigation finds anything was done wrong under
the Clinton administration leading up to this intelligence failure, so
be it. If they find anything wrong in this intelligence operation under
President George W. Bush was responsible for this breakdown, so be it.
The American people deserve an honest answer.
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Quote:
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEB...er.pdf#page=10
(pages 294 - 295)
C. White Paper Conclusion
(U) Conclusion 85. The Intelligence Community's elimination of the caveats from the
unclassified White Paper misrepresented their judgments to the public which did not have
access to the classified National Intelligence Estimate containing the more carefully worded
assessment.
(U) Conclusion 86. The names of the agencies which had dissenting opinions in the classified
National Intelligence Estimate were not included in the unclassified white paper and in the
case of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the dissenting opinion was excluded completely.
In both cases in which there were dissenting opinions, the dissenting agencies were widely
regarded as the primary subject matter experts on the issue in question.
Excluding the names of the agencies provided readers with an incomplete picture of the
nature and extent of the debate within the Intelligence Community regarding the issues.
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