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Spiker439 · 10-29-2005, 04:16 PM

I was just reading the thread on whether or not free will exists given an omniscient creator. I think it does; I can choose to go outside or stay inside, provided I have the physical means to do so, regardless of whether or not god actually knows what I'm going to do. His knowledge does not impede my choices, as far as I'm concerned. This is basically the PAP - the principle of alternate possibilities. If you grant me this assumption, then let me pose the following question:

First let us define responsibility. One can only be held responsible for one's actions if one had free will to perform those actions in the first place. If one is causally determined to do something (Ie if you adopt a deterministic view of causality) then no one should be held responsible for anything. Given that we do have prisons and detention after class, I think this is rather counterintuitive. If I shoot someone then surely I will be held responsible for my actions. However if I was caused to shoot someone, and I could not have done otherwise (Ie there's a chip in my brain controlling my behaviour that makes me shoot someone), then surely I would not be held responsible within this context. Let us therefore assume a stance of non-determinism, to allow for the concept of responsibility, in any case.

Let us examine the following case**:

We have a test subject Jones. Jones wants to perform action X. With no outside influence, Jones will likely perform the action X unhindered.

Enter a second test subject Black. Black REALLY wants Jones to do X. Black will go to ANY means to get Jones to do X. In any imaginable scenario, Black will make Jones do X. Black will do this by implanting a chip in Jones' brain while Jones is sleeping. Jones will NOT know of it's existence, or of the wishes of Black for Jones to do X. If the chip detecs any un-X thought process or behaviour from jones, it will instantaneously kick in and make Jones perform X.

Now we imagine that Jones wakes up, and performs the action X without the chip having had to do anything at all - That is to say, he did X and the chip did not have to make him do X. I think that certainly we would hold Jones responsible for action X. The thing is... he could not have done otherwise! While Jones did X because of his previous conviction to do X, he still had no choice because if he had tried to do otherwise, Black (The chip) would have made him do X. And so, even though he had no choice, he is still held accountable for X.

Does this mean that it is possible to be determined (Not be able to do otherwise) and to still be held responsible for our actions? Seems counterintuitive but... what are your thoughts?

**I must of course add that this is not from the depths of my own mind, but was envisioned by Harry Frankfurt (Journal of Philosophy Vol. 66, 1969). This is one of four so called Frankfurt cases.

10-29-2005, 04:16 PM	#1 (permalink)
Spiker439 Upright	Free Will and Responsibility I was just reading the thread on whether or not free will exists given an omniscient creator. I think it does; I can choose to go outside or stay inside, provided I have the physical means to do so, regardless of whether or not god actually knows what I'm going to do. His knowledge does not impede my choices, as far as I'm concerned. This is basically the PAP - the principle of alternate possibilities. If you grant me this assumption, then let me pose the following question: First let us define responsibility. One can only be held responsible for one's actions if one had free will to perform those actions in the first place. If one is causally determined to do something (Ie if you adopt a deterministic view of causality) then no one should be held responsible for anything. Given that we do have prisons and detention after class, I think this is rather counterintuitive. If I shoot someone then surely I will be held responsible for my actions. However if I was caused to shoot someone, and I could not have done otherwise (Ie there's a chip in my brain controlling my behaviour that makes me shoot someone), then surely I would not be held responsible within this context. Let us therefore assume a stance of non-determinism, to allow for the concept of responsibility, in any case. Let us examine the following case: We have a test subject Jones. Jones wants to perform action X. With no outside influence, Jones will likely perform the action X unhindered. Enter a second test subject Black. Black REALLY wants Jones to do X. Black will go to ANY means to get Jones to do X. In any imaginable scenario, Black will make Jones do X. Black will do this by implanting a chip in Jones' brain while Jones is sleeping. Jones will NOT know of it's existence, or of the wishes of Black for Jones to do X. If the chip detecs any un-X thought process or behaviour from jones, it will instantaneously kick in and make Jones perform X. Now we imagine that Jones wakes up, and performs the action X without the chip having had to do anything at all - That is to say, he did X and the chip did not have to make him do X. I think that certainly we would hold Jones responsible for action X. The thing is... he could not have done otherwise! While Jones did X because of his previous conviction to do X, he still had no choice because if he had tried to do otherwise, Black (The chip) would have made him do X. And so, even though he had no choice, he is still held accountable for X. Does this mean that it is possible to be determined (Not be able to do otherwise) and to still be held responsible for our actions? Seems counterintuitive but... what are your thoughts? I must of course add that this is not from the depths of my own mind, but was envisioned by Harry Frankfurt (Journal of Philosophy Vol. 66, 1969). This is one of four so called Frankfurt cases.