It's interesting that he's able to link "the battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the groundwork and the vanguard for the major battles which have begun in the heart of the Islamic world." But then later displays open contempt for Shia. Also no mention of SE Asia fundamentalists (Thailand, Indonesia, Bali, etc.). It's clear that there's nowhere near the level of organization or unity in the Islamic world that Zawahiri would like to believe exists.
It's also clear that such a plan as he outlines here: 1) wait for the Americans to leave 2) assume power--would not have been remotely possible with Saddam Hussein in power. So we're left playing a game of relative evils. It remains to be seen whether the Shia government that the U.S. put in power is any less an evil entity than Hussein or the alternatives outlined here. We assume so, but it's a rather broad assumption. We don't have a particularly strong track record with the Shia leadership of Iran.
Alternatives for the U.S. at this point seem few. We could withdraw now and immediate civil war would ensue or we could withdraw in five or six years and immediate civil war would ensue. A third alternative of indefinite occupation exists but we should be sober about the implications. A lot of people bristle at the comparison, but there are key corollaries between what the U.S. faces now and what we faced in Vietnam. At the very least, the mistakes of Vietnam need to be avoided. Zawahiri above outlines pretty well how the mistakes of Vietnam, if made today, will play into Zarqawi's favor. It's a pity that the person who actually did learn from the Vietnam experience was excluded from the war planning and ousted from power: Colin Powell.
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