asaris

Probably because if he doesn't, he'll get into trouble.

I disagree with some of what you say in your first post, but I think some of that is just our ways of putting things, so I won't linger on that. But you talk about Hume's argument that you can't derive an ought from an is, and that's as good a place as any. Simply put, I think Hume was both right and wrong. You can't derive the right from what is, just because what is doesn't entail anything specific about what is good for us. But he's wrong in that you can say that what is good is grounded in what is.

Let me put this another way. Essentially the position boils down to "good is good because God says so". But this seems entirely arbitrary, and we like to think that to some extent good is good just because. So Scotus wants to ground morality in human nature, while still also grounding it in God. That is to say, Scotus's system has the advantage that Thomas's system has of making the good something grounded in what is (and so not based on God's mere whim like later divine command theories), while also having the advantage of grounding morality in God's will.

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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."

"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."

-- Friedrich Nietzsche