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Old 09-26-2005, 03:29 PM   #59 (permalink)
joshbaumgartner
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Quote:
Originally Posted by powerclown
Therein lies the catch: the Shah didn't resort to authoritarian means until he ran into hardline Islamic fundamentalists opposed to his efforts to modernize Iran. Ataturk ran into the exact same thing in his attempts to modernize Turkey.
Perhaps a quick recap of history is required here.

The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was originally placed on the throne in 1941 by the British in replacement of his father, whom the British feared was too friendly to Germany. Internal unrest rose from the end of WWII until 1951, when the parliament, under Prime Minister Razmara, nationalized the country's oil resources. Razmara was assassinated by Fadayan-e Islam, and Dr. Mossadegh replaced him. The Shah gave assent to the promotion despite Mossadegh's determination to follow his predecessor in the move to nationalize oil.

The British responded by enforcing a naval blockade preventing oil exports from the country. The people re-elected Mossadegh in 1952, but the Shah refused to support him. He resigned and the Shah appointed Qavam as PM in his place. Qavam immediately announced plans to acquiesce to British demands, and massive national protests resulted, forcing him to resign. The Shah, fearful of the unrest, re-appointed Mossadegh.

Mossadegh was immensly popular due to social reforms and a strong sense of nationalism. He was supported not only by moderates, but also by Communist and Islamist parties. However, he was unpopular with the military, and they built ties with British and American agencies to get assistance in Mossadegh's downfall. CIA operatives exploited the differences between Mossadegh's supporters, painting him as a Communist to inflame the Islamists. Mossadegh assumed increasingly authoratative measures to counter these plots. As he came closer to making Iran a republic in 1953, as opposed to a monarchy, the Shah left Iran.

The nation dissolved into civil strife in 1953, and with the military on side, the Shah's supporters gained the upper hand, installing him at the head of the country. CIA involvement in the event is not questioned, and in fact many supporters praise the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation.

The Shah held power by continuing socialist reforms, including the siezure and dissemination to farmers of several large estates, the institution of women's rights initiatives, and the beginnings of a social security system. He also retained the support of the British and Americans by re-opening Iran's oil to their corporations, and becoming a client for their military hardware and other products. Meanwhile, dissent at home was quelled by the formation in 1957 of the SAVAK, or secret police, which were notorious for their brutal treatment of all perceived enemies of the Shah. Naturally, this led to ever increasing resentment of the Shah's authority, followed by ever more violent reprisals, and ultimately the ground support for the revolution of 1979. This revolution was at first broad based, but ultimately leadership was taken by the Ayatollah and his faction, resulting in the Iran of today.

The Shah follows a pretty typical path for the authoritarian governments we tend to support. He has definite plans to make his nation great, and even does a number of things that needed doing, but does so with a force of will as opposed to building national consensus for actions, and relies heavily on a combination of foreign support and draconian internal policies to maintain authority. In the end the only real difference between the dictators we support and those we demonize are whether or not they rely on foreign support. Those who go it alone or seek support from say Russia or China are going to be demonized, while those who tie their fortunes to American or British support are upheld.

Ultimately, these relationships fail, and any good that the dictator may have done for the country is wiped out by the conflict that inevitably arises out of their authoritarian governance, whether it be a revolution, war, or isolation and stagnation.

Dictators often appear sexy to many. They often begin with a strong will, and present a determination to put an end to the petty struggles of their nation and lead their country to reach for greatness. They often hold out the hope of overcoming old problems with bold dictates. To outsiders, they will often have a modern and moderated appearance, making us think they are elements for change, badly needed to help lift their nation up to into the modern world. But far more often than not, these dreams prove elusive, and ultimately, when they are finally at the end of their reign, their nations are not better off but worse, than when they began.

Josh
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