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pennywise121 · 08-21-2005, 10:29 PM

i dont want to threadjack this topic any further, but it would seem that there are some disparate assumptions about the world that need to be pointed out so that we may better understand where the other one is coming from.

for one, you have put forward the epistemological conception of JTB. the platonic conception of justified true belief, while a perfectly reasonable one, is unfortunately not the conception of knowledge that i am working under. JTB does not necessitate certainty, which leaves the possibility of accidental "knowledge" (which i would argue is not true knowledge). if the only requirements for making an epistemological claim are that 1. i have a belief. 2. i can justify my belief to the liking of at least myself, and at best to others, and 3. my belief is true (hence, justified true belief), we leave ourselves open to the possibility that it could well be a coincident.

for example, if i am well aquainted with you asaris, and i believe that you have a raisin bagel in your fridge right now, and i can justify that belief based on my familiarity with you, i can still make no claim of knowledge even if it happens to be true that you have a raisin bagel in your fridge. i did not KNOW that you did, even if i had good reason to believe it.

now, anyone would be hard pressed (myself included) to prove that certainty is required for knowledge. for instance, our modern conception of science does not require certainty to make claims about how we believe the world works. if it did, there would be no breakthroughs in gravity, nor thermodynamics, etc. etc.

however, because we are purely into the realm of hypotheticals, i beleive that we must hold ourselves to a higher standard than is possible in real-life applications.

consider the following
1. true knowledge is infallable (on this point we agree, asaris)
2. if an idea is fallable (i.e. there is a possibility that it can be wrong), it cannot be the basis for a claim of knowledge.
3. if i adhere to JTB principle about belief x, but i had no CERTAINTY that belief x was true, i cannot claim to have knowledge (see 1 above).

now, for the record, this falls along the lines of error theory, derived from Descarte's meditations.
1. Knowledge is infallable
2. if i can not be certain i am not in error about belief x, i cannot claim to KNOW x
3. i cannot be certain i am not in error.
---------------------------------
4. i can not claim to know x

now, to allay suspicions of further modal confusion, what i am saying is not that because i cannot be certain about x, i will NEVER be certain about it. rather, what i am saying is that at the single point in time (and any other subsequent point where proposition 3 holds true) we can make no epistemological claim based on belief x.

furthermore, omniscience is a powerful quality. unless god is correct in her knowledge 100% of the time, she is not omniscient. simply being "really really good at predicting" falls far short of omniscience.

as to the issue of existence inside or outside of our conception of time being a non-sequitor, i respectfully disagree. i put forth only three of the many conceptions of god-time that are possible, and for good reason.

my first example was to disprove the concept that god could be omniscient without experientially independant knowledge (we must choose for her knowledge to be considered such).
if, however (example 2), god created the universe, and is omniscient, it follows that god would know everything that would come to pass, and we have a problem of predestination, or "theological fatalism", which has its own issues and solutions not related to this thread (and thus, not discussed here), not the least of which is ultimate omnipotence (given that god is the creator of everything that is, god is therefore the ultimate cause of everything that happens as a result of her creation of the universe).
if, as another possibility (example 3), god did not create the universe, but exists as an entity outside of our dimension, with omniscience, but not ultimate omnipotence, we have an issue of having free will only to ourselves, and not to god (that sees all of existence at a glance, and knows what was, is, and will be), which amounts to nothing more than second order free will, and as such, is not truly free will.

we must take care not to limit our choices and define our conceptions of "free will" or "omniscience" too narrowly, for if we are to come to any epistemic claim, we must address possible detractions to the idea.

now, with that in mind, i sincerely apologize to jumpinjesus for officially threadjacking a discussion on free will into one on the effects of omniscience. as such, i have created a separate thread dealing solely with the issue of omniscience, and some very interesting (at least to me) theories on the effects of omniscience on our existence, one of which was put forth by a professor of quantum physics, even.

i encourage you to join me at omniscience continued...... for further discussion- assuming anyone wants to.

08-21-2005, 10:29 PM	#57 (permalink)
pennywise121 Upright Location: Sacramento	i dont want to threadjack this topic any further, but it would seem that there are some disparate assumptions about the world that need to be pointed out so that we may better understand where the other one is coming from. for one, you have put forward the epistemological conception of JTB. the platonic conception of justified true belief, while a perfectly reasonable one, is unfortunately not the conception of knowledge that i am working under. JTB does not necessitate certainty, which leaves the possibility of accidental "knowledge" (which i would argue is not true knowledge). if the only requirements for making an epistemological claim are that 1. i have a belief. 2. i can justify my belief to the liking of at least myself, and at best to others, and 3. my belief is true (hence, justified true belief), we leave ourselves open to the possibility that it could well be a coincident. for example, if i am well aquainted with you asaris, and i believe that you have a raisin bagel in your fridge right now, and i can justify that belief based on my familiarity with you, i can still make no claim of knowledge even if it happens to be true that you have a raisin bagel in your fridge. i did not KNOW that you did, even if i had good reason to believe it. now, anyone would be hard pressed (myself included) to prove that certainty is required for knowledge. for instance, our modern conception of science does not require certainty to make claims about how we believe the world works. if it did, there would be no breakthroughs in gravity, nor thermodynamics, etc. etc. however, because we are purely into the realm of hypotheticals, i beleive that we must hold ourselves to a higher standard than is possible in real-life applications. consider the following 1. true knowledge is infallable (on this point we agree, asaris) 2. if an idea is fallable (i.e. there is a possibility that it can be wrong), it cannot be the basis for a claim of knowledge. 3. if i adhere to JTB principle about belief x, but i had no CERTAINTY that belief x was true, i cannot claim to have knowledge (see 1 above). now, for the record, this falls along the lines of error theory, derived from Descarte's meditations. 1. Knowledge is infallable 2. if i can not be certain i am not in error about belief x, i cannot claim to KNOW x 3. i cannot be certain i am not in error. --------------------------------- 4. i can not claim to know x now, to allay suspicions of further modal confusion, what i am saying is not that because i cannot be certain about x, i will NEVER be certain about it. rather, what i am saying is that at the single point in time (and any other subsequent point where proposition 3 holds true) we can make no epistemological claim based on belief x. furthermore, omniscience is a powerful quality. unless god is correct in her knowledge 100% of the time, she is not omniscient. simply being "really really good at predicting" falls far short of omniscience. as to the issue of existence inside or outside of our conception of time being a non-sequitor, i respectfully disagree. i put forth only three of the many conceptions of god-time that are possible, and for good reason. my first example was to disprove the concept that god could be omniscient without experientially independant knowledge (we must choose for her knowledge to be considered such). if, however (example 2), god created the universe, and is omniscient, it follows that god would know everything that would come to pass, and we have a problem of predestination, or "theological fatalism", which has its own issues and solutions not related to this thread (and thus, not discussed here), not the least of which is ultimate omnipotence (given that god is the creator of everything that is, god is therefore the ultimate cause of everything that happens as a result of her creation of the universe). if, as another possibility (example 3), god did not create the universe, but exists as an entity outside of our dimension, with omniscience, but not ultimate omnipotence, we have an issue of having free will only to ourselves, and not to god (that sees all of existence at a glance, and knows what was, is, and will be), which amounts to nothing more than second order free will, and as such, is not truly free will. we must take care not to limit our choices and define our conceptions of "free will" or "omniscience" too narrowly, for if we are to come to any epistemic claim, we must address possible detractions to the idea. now, with that in mind, i sincerely apologize to jumpinjesus for officially threadjacking a discussion on free will into one on the effects of omniscience. as such, i have created a separate thread dealing solely with the issue of omniscience, and some very interesting (at least to me) theories on the effects of omniscience on our existence, one of which was put forth by a professor of quantum physics, even. i encourage you to join me at omniscience continued...... for further discussion- assuming anyone wants to. __________________ Food for thought.